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PREFACE
This book off ers an accessible introduction to the topic of impact evaluation 
and its practice in development. Although the book is geared principally 
toward development practitioners and policy makers, we trust that it will be 
a valuable resource for students and others interested in impact evaluation. 
Prospective impact evaluations assess whether or not a program has 
achieved its intended results or test alternative strategies for achieving 
those results. We consider that more and better impact evaluations will help 
strengthen the evidence base for development policies and programs around 
the world. Our hope is that if governments and development practitioners 
can make policy decisions based on evidence—including evidence gener-
ated through impact evaluation—development resources will be spent more 
eff ectively to reduce poverty and improve people’s lives. The three parts in 
this handbook provide a nontechnical introduction to impact evaluations, 
discussing what to evaluate and why in part 1; how to evaluate in part 2; and 
how to implement an evaluation in part 3. These elements are the basic tools 
needed to successfully carry out an impact evaluation. 
The approach to impact evaluation in this book is largely intuitive, and 
we attempt to minimize technical notation. We provide the reader with a 
core set of impact evaluation tools—the concepts and methods that under-
pin any impact evaluation—and discuss their application to real-world 
development operations. The methods are drawn directly from applied 
research in the social sciences and share many commonalities with research 
methods used in the natural sciences. In this sense, impact evaluation brings 
the empirical research tools widely used in economics and other social sci-
ences together with the operational and political-economy realities of pol-
icy implementation and development practice. 
From a methodological standpoint, our approach to impact evaluation is 
largely pragmatic:  we think that the most appropriate methods should be 
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identiﬁ ed to ﬁ t the operational context, and not the other way around. This 
is best achieved at the outset of a program, through the design of prospec-
tive impact evaluations that are built into the project’s implementation. We 
argue that gaining consensus among key stakeholders and identifying an 
evaluation design that ﬁ ts the political and operational context are as impor-
tant as the method itself. We also believe strongly that impact evaluations 
should be candid about their limitations and caveats. Finally, we strongly 
encourage policy makers and program managers to consider impact evalua-
tions in a logical framework that clearly sets out the causal pathways by 
which a program works to produce outputs and inﬂ uence ﬁ nal outcomes, 
and to combine impact evaluations with monitoring and complementary 
evaluation approaches to gain a full picture of performance.
What is perhaps most novel about this book is the approach to applying 
impact evaluation tools to real-world development work. Our experiences 
and lessons on how to do impact evaluation in practice are drawn from 
teaching and working with hundreds of capable government, academic, and 
development partners. Among all the authors, the book draws from dozens 
of years of experience working with impact evaluations in almost every cor-
ner of the globe.
This book builds on a core set of teaching materials developed for the 
“Turning Promises to Evidence” workshops organized by the offi  ce of the 
Chief Economist for Human Development (HDNCE), in partnership with 
regional units and the Development Economics Research Group (DECRG) 
at the World Bank. At the time of writing, the workshop had been delivered 
over 20 times in all regions of the world. The workshops and this handbook 
have been made possible thanks to generous grants from the Spanish gov-
ernment and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Develop-
ment (DfID) through contributions to the Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund 
(SIEF). This handbook and the accompanying presentations and lectures 
are available at http://www.worldbank.org/ieinpractice. 
Other high-quality resources provide introductions to impact evaluation 
for policy, for instance, Baker 2000; Ravallion 2001, 2008, 2009; Duﬂ o, 
Glennerster, and Kremer 2007; Duﬂ o and Kremer 2008; Khandker, Kool-
wal, and Samad 2009; and Leeuw and Vaessen 2009. The present book dif-
ferentiates itself by combining a comprehensive, nontechnical overview of 
quantitative impact evaluation methods with a direct link to the rules of 
program operations, as well as a detailed discussion of practical implemen-
tation aspects. The book also links to an impact evaluation course and sup-
porting capacity building material.
The teaching materials on which the book is based have been through 
many incarnations and have been taught by a number of talented faculty, all 
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of whom have left their mark on the methods and approach to impact evalu-
ation. Paul Gertler and Sebastian Martinez, together with Sebastian Galiani 
and Sigrid Vivo, assembled a ﬁ rst set of teaching materials for a workshop 
held at the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) in Mexico in 2005. 
Christel Vermeersch developed and reﬁ ned large sections of the technical 
modules of the workshop and adapted a case study to the workshop setup. 
Laura Rawlings and Patrick Premand developed materials used in more 
recent versions of the workshop.
We would like to thank and acknowledge the contributions and substan-
tive input of a number of other faculty who have co-taught the workshop, 
including Felipe Barrera, Sergio Bautista-Arredondo, Stefano Bertozzi, Bar-
bara Bruns, Pedro Carneiro, Nancy Qian, Jishnu Das, Damien de Walque, 
David Evans, Claudio Ferraz, Jed Friedman, Emanuela Galasso, Sebastian 
Galiani, Gonzalo Hernández Licona, Arianna Legovini, Phillippe Leite, 
Mattias Lundberg, Karen Macours, Plamen Nikolov, Berk Özler, Gloria M. 
Rubio, and Norbert Schady. We are grateful for comments from our peer 
reviewers, Barbara Bruns, Arianna Legovini, Dan Levy, and Emmanuel 
Skouﬁ as, as well as from Bertha Briceno, Gloria M. Rubio, and Jennifer 
Sturdy. We also gratefully acknowledge the eff orts of a talented workshop 
organizing team, including Paloma Acevedo, Theresa Adobea Bampoe, Febe 
Mackey, Silvia Paruzzolo, Tatyana Ringland, Adam Ross, Jennifer Sturdy, 
and Sigrid Vivo.
The original mimeos on which parts of this book are based were written 
in a workshop held in Beijing, China, in July 2009. We thank all of the indi-
viduals who participated in drafting the original transcripts of the work-
shop, in particular Paloma Acevedo, Carlos Asenjo, Sebastian Bauhoff , 
Bradley Chen, Changcheng Song, Jane Zhang, and Shufang Zhang. We are 
also grateful to Kristine Cronin for excellent research assistance, Marco 
Guzman and Martin Ruegenberg for designing the illustrations, and Cindy 
A. Fisher, Fiona Mackintosh, and Stuart K. Tucker for editorial support dur-
ing the production of the book.
We gratefully acknowledge the support for this line of work throughout 
the World Bank, including support and leadership from Ariel Fiszbein, Ari-
anna Legovini, and Martin Ravallion.
Finally, we would like to thank the participants in workshops held in 
Mexico City, New Delhi, Cuernavaca, Ankara, Buenos Aires, Paipa, For-
taleza, Soﬁ a, Cairo, Managua, Madrid, Washington, Manila, Pretoria, Tunis, 
Lima, Amman, Beijing, Sarajevo, Cape Town, San Salvador, Kathmandu, Rio 
de Janeiro, and Accra. Through their interest, sharp questions, and enthusi-
asm, we were able to learn step by step what it is that policy makers are 
looking for in impact evaluations. We hope this book reﬂ ects their ideas.
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INTRODUCTION TO 
IMPACT EVALUATION
In this fi rst part of the book, we give an overview of what impact evaluation 
is about. In chapter 1, we discuss why impact evaluation is important and 
how it fi ts within the context of evidence-based policy making. We contrast 
impact evaluation with other common evaluation practices, such as monitor-
ing and process evaluations. Finally, we introduce different modalities of im-
pact evaluation, such as prospective and retrospective evaluation, and effi cacy 
versus effi ciency trials.
In chapter 2, we discuss how to formulate evaluation questions and hypoth-
eses that are useful for policy. These questions and hypotheses form the ba-
sis of evaluation because they determine what it is that the evaluation will be 
looking for.
Part 1

 3
Why Evaluate?
CHAPTER 1
Development programs and policies are typically designed to change out-
comes, for example, to raise incomes, to improve learning, or to reduce ill-
ness. Whether or not these changes are actually achieved is a crucial public 
policy question but one that is not often examined. More commonly, pro-
gram managers and policy makers focus on controlling and measuring the 
inputs and immediate outputs of a program—how much money is spent, 
how many textbooks are distributed—rather than on assessing whether pro-
grams have achieved their intended goals of improving well-being.
Evidence-Based Policy Making
Impact evaluations are part of a broader agenda of evidence-based policy 
making. This growing global trend is marked by a shift in focus from inputs 
to outcomes and results. From the Millennium Development Goals to pay-
for-performance incentives for public service providers, this global trend 
is reshaping how public policies are being carried out. Not only is the 
focus on results being used to set and track national and international tar-
gets, but results are increasingly being used by, and required of, program 
managers to enhance accountability, inform budget allocations, and guide 
policy decisions. 
Monitoring and evaluation are at the heart of evidence-based policy 
making. They provide a core set of tools that stakeholders can use to verify 
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and improve the quality, effi  ciency, and eff ectiveness of interventions at var-
ious stages of implementation, or in other words, to focus on results. Stake-
holders who use monitoring and evaluation can be found both within 
governments and outside. Within a government agency or ministry, offi  cials 
often need to make the case to their superiors that programs work to obtain 
budget allocations to continue or expand them. At the country level, sec-
toral ministries compete with one another to obtain funding from the min-
istry of ﬁ nance. And ﬁ nally, governments as a whole have an interest in 
convincing their constituents that their chosen investments have positive 
returns. In this sense, information and evidence become means to facilitate 
public awareness and promote government accountability. The information 
produced by monitoring and evaluation systems can be regularly shared 
with constituents to inform them of the performance of government pro-
grams and to build a strong foundation for transparency and accountability. 
In a context in which policy makers and civil society are demanding 
results and accountability from public programs, impact evaluation can 
provide robust and credible evidence on performance and, crucially, on 
whether a particular program achieved its desired outcomes. At the global 
level, impact evaluations are also central to building knowledge about the 
eff ectiveness of development programs by illuminating what does and 
does not work to reduce poverty and improve welfare.
Simply put, an impact evaluation assesses the changes in the well-being 
of individuals that can be attributed to a particular project, program, or pol-
icy. This focus on attribution is the hallmark of impact evaluations. Corre-
spondingly, the central challenge in carrying out eff ective impact evaluations 
is to identify the causal relationship between the project, program, or policy 
and the outcomes of interest.
As we will discuss below, impact evaluations generally estimate average 
impacts of a program on the welfare of beneﬁ ciaries. For example, did the 
introduction of a new curriculum raise test scores among students? Did a 
water and sanitation program increase access to safe water and improve 
health outcomes? Was a youth training program eff ective in fostering 
entrepreneurship and raising incomes? In addition, if the impact evalua-
tion includes a suffi  ciently large sample of recipients, the results can also 
be compared among subgroups of recipients. For example, did the intro-
duction of the new curriculum raise test scores among female and male 
students? Impact evaluations can also be used to explicitly test alternative 
program options. For example, an evaluation might compare the perfor-
mance of a training program versus that of a promotional campaign to 
raise ﬁ nancial literacy. In each of these cases, the impact evaluation pro-
vides information on the overall impact of a program, as opposed to spe-
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ciﬁ c case studies or anecdotes, which can give only partial information 
and may not be representative of overall program impacts. In this sense, 
well-designed and well-implemented evaluations are able to provide con-
vincing and comprehensive evidence that can be used to inform policy 
decisions and shape public opinion. The summary in box 1.1 illustrates 
Box 1.1: Evaluations and Political Sustainability
The Progresa/Oportunidades Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Mexico 
In the 1990s, the government of Mexico 
launched an innovative conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) program called “Progresa.” Its 
objectives were to provide poor households 
with short-term income support and to cre-
ate incentives to investments in children’s 
human capital, primarily by providing cash 
transfers to mothers in poor households 
conditional on their children regularly attend-
ing school and visiting a health center. 
From the beginning, the government 
considered that it was essential to monitor 
and evaluate the program. The program’s 
offi cials contracted a group of researchers 
to design an impact evaluation and build it 
into the program’s expansion at the same 
time that it was rolled out successively to 
the participating communities. 
The 2000 presidential election led to a 
change of the party in power. In 2001, Pro-
gresa’s external evaluators presented their 
fi ndings to the newly elected administration. 
The results of the program were impressive: 
they showed that the program was well tar-
geted to the poor and had engendered 
promising changes in households’ human 
capital. Schultz (2004) found that the pro-
gram signifi cantly improved school enroll-
ment, by an average of 0.7 additional years 
of schooling. Gertler (2004) found that the 
incidence of illness in children decreased by 
23 percent, while adults reported a 19 per-
cent reduction in the number of sick or dis-
ability days. Among the nutritional outcomes, 
Behrman and Hoddinott (2001) found that 
the program reduced the probability of 
stunting by about 1 centimeter per year 
for children in the critical age range of 12 to 
36 months. 
These evaluation results supported a 
political dialogue based on evidence and 
contributed to the new administration’s deci-
sion to continue the program. For example, 
the government expanded the program’s 
reach, introducing upper-middle school 
scholarships and enhanced health programs 
for adolescents. At the same time, the 
results were used to modify other social 
assistance programs, such as the large and 
less well-targeted tortilla subsidy, which was 
scaled back.
The successful evaluation of Progresa 
also contributed to the rapid adoption of 
CCTs around the world, as well as Mexico’s 
adoption of legislation requiring all social 
projects to be evaluated.
Sources: Behrman and Hoddinott 2001; Gertler 2004; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Levy and Rodriguez 2005; 
Schultz 2004; Skoufi as and McClafferty 2001.
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how impact evaluation contributed to policy discussions around the 
expansion of a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico.1 Box 1.2 illus-
trates how impact evaluation helped improve the allocations of the Indo-
nesian government resources by documenting which policies were most 
eff ective in decreasing fertility rates.
Box 1.2: Evaluating to Improve Resource Allocations 
Family Planning and Fertility in Indonesia
In the 1970s, Indonesia’s innovative family 
planning efforts gained international recogni-
tion for their success in decreasing the 
country’s fertility rates. The acclaim arose 
from two parallel phenomena: (1) fertility 
rates declined by 22 percent between 1970 
and 1980, by 25 percent between 1981 and 
1990, and a bit more moderately between 
1991 and 1994; and (2) during the same pe-
riod, the Indonesian government substan-
tially increased resources allocated to family 
planning (particularly contraceptive subsi-
dies). Given that the two things happened 
contemporaneously, many concluded that it 
was the increased investment in family plan-
ning that had led to lower fertility. 
Unconvinced by the available evidence, a 
team of researchers tested whether family 
planning programs indeed lowered fertility 
rates. They found, contrary to what was gen-
erally believed, that family planning programs 
only had a moderate impact on fertility, and 
they argued that instead it was a change in 
women’s status that was responsible for the 
decline in fertility rates. The researchers 
noted that before the start of the family plan-
ning program very few women of reproduc-
tive age had fi nished primary education. 
During the same period as the family plan-
ning program, however, the government 
undertook a large-scale education program 
for girls, so that by the end of the program, 
women entering reproductive age had bene-
fi ted from that additional education. When 
the oil boom brought economic expansion 
and increased demand for labor in Indonesia, 
educated women’s participation in the labor 
force increased signifi cantly. As the value of 
women’s time at work rose, so did the use of 
contraceptives. In the end, higher wages and 
empowerment explained 70 percent of the 
observed decline in fertility—more than the 
investment in family planning programs.
These evaluation results informed policy 
makers’ subsequent resource allocation 
decisions: funding was reprogrammed away 
from contraception subsidies and toward 
programs that increased women’s school 
enrollment. Although the ultimate goals of 
the two types of programs were similar, eval-
uation studies had shown that in the Indone-
sian context, lower fertility rates could be 
obtained more effi ciently by investing in edu-
cation than by investing in family planning.
Sources: Gertler and Molyneaux 1994, 2000.
Why Evaluate?  7
What Is Impact Evaluation?
Impact evaluation ﬁ gures among a broad range of complementary methods 
that support evidence-based policy. Although this book focuses on quantita-
tive impact evaluation methods, we will start by placing them in the broader 
results context, which also includes monitoring and other types of evaluation.
Monitoring is a continuous process that tracks what is happening 
within a program and uses the data collected to inform program imple-
mentation and day-to-day management and decisions. Using mostly 
administrative data, monitoring tracks program performance against 
expected results, makes comparisons across programs, and analyzes 
trends over time. Usually, monitoring tracks inputs, activities, and outputs, 
though occasionally it can include outcomes, such as progress toward 
national development goals. 
Evaluations are periodic, objective assessments of a planned, ongoing, or 
completed project, program, or policy. Evaluations are used to answer spe-
ciﬁ c questions related to design, implementation, and results. In contrast to 
continuous monitoring, they are carried out at discrete points in time and 
often seek an outside perspective from technical experts. Their design, 
method, and cost vary substantially depending on the type of question the 
evaluation is trying to answer. Broadly speaking, evaluations can address 
three types of questions (Imas and Rist 2009):
• Descriptive questions. The evaluation seeks to determine what is taking 
place and describes processes, conditions, organizational relationships, 
and stakeholder views. 
• Normative questions. The evaluation compares what is taking place to 
what should be taking place; it assesses activities and whether or not tar-
gets are accomplished. Normative questions can apply to inputs, activi-
ties, and outputs. 
• Cause-and-eff ect questions. The evaluation examines outcomes and tries 
to assess what diff erence the intervention makes in outcomes.
Impact evaluations are a particular type of evaluation that seeks to answer 
cause-and-eff ect questions. Unlike general evaluations, which can answer 
many types of questions, impact evaluations are structured around one par-
ticular type of question: What is the impact (or causal eff ect) of a program on 
an outcome of interest? This basic question incorporates an important causal 
dimension: we are interested only in the impact of the program, that is, the 
eff ect on outcomes that the program directly causes. An impact evaluation 
looks for the changes in outcome that are directly attributable to the program.
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The focus on causality and attribution is the hallmark of impact evalua-
tions and determines the methodologies that can be used. To be able to esti-
mate the causal eff ect or impact of a program on outcomes, any method 
chosen must estimate the so-called counterfactual, that is, what the out-
come would have been for program participants if they had not participated 
in the program. In practice, impact evaluation requires that the evaluator 
ﬁ nd a comparison group to estimate what would have happened to the pro-
gram participants without the program. Part 2 of the book describes the 
main methods that can be used to ﬁ nd adequate comparison groups.
The basic evaluation question—What is the impact or causal eff ect of a 
program on an outcome of interest?—can be applied to many contexts. For 
instance, what is the causal eff ect of scholarships on school attendance and 
academic achievement? What is the impact on access to health care of con-
tracting out primary care to private providers? If dirt ﬂ oors are replaced 
with cement ﬂ oors, what will be the impact on children’s health? Do 
improved roads increase access to labor markets and raise households’ 
income, and if so, by how much? Does class size inﬂ uence student achieve-
ment, and if it does, by how much? Are mail campaigns or training sessions 
more eff ective in increasing the use of bed nets in malarial areas?
Impact Evaluation for Policy Decisions
Impact evaluations are needed to inform policy makers on a range of deci-
sions, from curtailing ineffi  cient programs, to scaling up interventions that 
work, to adjusting program beneﬁ ts, to selecting among various program 
alternatives. They are most eff ective when applied selectively to answer 
important policy questions, and they can be particularly eff ective when 
applied to innovative pilot programs that are testing a new, unproven, but 
promising approach. The Mexican Progresa/Oportunidades evaluation 
described in box 1.1 became so inﬂ uential not only because of the innovative 
nature of the program, but also because its impact evaluation provided cred-
ible and strong evidence that could not be ignored in subsequent policy 
decisions. The program’s adoption and expansion were strongly inﬂ uenced 
by the evaluation results. Today, the Oportunidades program reaches close 
to one out of four Mexicans and is a centerpiece of Mexico’s strategy to 
combat poverty. 
Impact evaluations can be used to explore diff erent types of policy ques-
tions. The basic form of impact evaluation will test the eff ectiveness of a 
given program. In other words, it will answer the question, Is a given program 
eff ective compared to the absence of the program? As presented in part 2, 
this type of impact evaluation relies on comparing a treatment group that 
Key Concept:
The basic impact 
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received a project, program, or policy to a comparison group that did not in 
order to estimate the eff ectiveness of the program.
Beyond answering this basic evaluation question, evaluations can also be 
used to test the eff ectiveness of program implementation alternatives, that 
is, to answer the question, When a program can be implemented in several 
ways, which one is the most eff ective? In this type of evaluation, two or 
more approaches within a program can be compared with one another to 
generate evidence on which is the best alternative for reaching a particular 
goal. These program alternatives are often referred to as “treatment arms.” 
For example, when the quantity of beneﬁ ts a program should provide to 
be eff ective is unclear (20 hours of training or 80 hours?), impact evalua-
tions can test the relative impact of the varying intensities of treatment 
(see box 1.3 for an example). Impact evaluations testing alternative pro-
gram treatments normally include one treatment group for each of the 
treatment arms, as well as a “pure” comparison group that does not receive 
any program intervention. Impact evaluations can also be used to test inno-
vations or implementation alternatives within a program. For example, a 
program may wish to test alternative outreach campaigns and select one 
group to receive a mailing campaign, while others received house-to-house 
visits, to assess which is most eff ective. 
Box 1.3: Evaluating to Improve Program Design 
Malnourishment and Cognitive Development in Colombia
In the early 1970s, the Human Ecology 
Research Station, in collaboration with the 
Colombian ministry of education, imple-
mented a pilot program to address child-
hood malnutrition in Cali, Colombia, by 
providing health care and educational activi-
ties, as well as food and nutritional supple-
ments. As part of the pilot, a team of 
evaluators was tasked to determine (1) how 
long such a program should last to reduce 
malnutrition among preschool children from 
low-income families and (2) whether the 
interventions could also lead to improve-
ments in cognitive development.
The program was eventually made avail-
able to all eligible families, but during the 
pilot, the evaluators were able to compare 
similar groups of children who received dif-
ferent treatment durations. The evaluators 
fi rst used a screening process to identify a 
target group of 333 malnourished children. 
These children were then classifi ed into 
20 sectors by neighborhood, and each sec-
tor was randomly assigned to one of four 
treatment groups. The groups differed only 
in the sequence in which they started the 
treatment and, hence, in the amount of time 
that they spent in the program. Group 4 
started the earliest and was exposed to the 
treatment for the longest period, followed by 
groups 3, 2, and then 1. The treatment itself 
consisted of 6 hours of health care and 
(continued)
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Deciding Whether to Evaluate
Not all programs warrant an impact evaluation. Impact evaluations can be 
costly, and your evaluation budget should be used strategically. If you are 
starting, or thinking about expanding, a new program and wondering 
whether to go ahead with an impact evaluation, asking a few basic ques-
tions will help with the decision.
The ﬁ rst question to ask would be, What are the stakes of this program? 
The answer to that question will depend on both the budget that is 
involved and the number of people who are, or will eventually be, aff ected 
by the program. Hence, the next questions, Does, or will, the program 
require a large portion of the available budget? and, Does, or will, the pro-
gram aff ect a large number of people? If the program does not require a 
budget or only aff ects a few people, it may not be worth evaluating. For 
example, for a program that provides counseling to hospital patients using 
volunteers, the budget involved and number of people aff ected may not 
justify an impact evaluation. By contrast, a pay reform for teachers that 
will eventually aff ect all primary teachers in the country would be a pro-
gram with much higher stakes.
If you determine that the stakes are high, then the next question is 
whether any evidence exists to show that the program works. In particular, 
do you know how big the program’s impact would be? Is the available evi-
dence from a similar country with similar circumstances? If no evidence is 
available about the potential of the type of program being contemplated, 
you may want to start out with a pilot that incorporates an impact evalua-
tion. By contrast, if evidence is available from similar circumstances, the 
educational activities per day, plus additional 
food and nutritional supplements. At regular 
intervals over the course of the program, the 
evaluators used cognitive tests to track the 
progress of children in all four groups. 
The evaluators found that the children 
who were in the program for the longest 
time demonstrated the greatest gains 
in cognitive improvement. On the Stanford-
Binet intelligence test, which estimates 
mental age minus chronological age, group 
4 children averaged −5 months, and group 1 
children averaged −15 months. 
This example illustrates how program 
implementers and policy makers are able to 
use evaluations of multiple treatment arms 
to determine the most effective program 
alternative.
Source: McKay et al. 1978.
Box 1.3 continued
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cost of an impact evaluation will probably be justiﬁ ed only if it can address 
an important and new policy question. That would be the case if your pro-
gram includes some important innovations that have not yet been tested.
To justify mobilizing the technical and ﬁ nancial resources needed to 
carry out a high-quality impact evaluation, the program to be evaluated 
should be
• Innovative. It is testing a new, promising approach.
• Replicable. The program can be scaled up or can be applied in a diff erent 
setting.
• Strategically relevant. The program is a ﬂ agship initiative; requires sub-
stantial resources; covers, or could be expanded to cover, a large number 
of people; or could generate substantial savings.
• Untested. Little is known about the eff ectiveness of the program, globally 
or in a particular context.
• Inﬂ uential. The results will be used to inform key policy decisions.
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Once impact evaluation results are available, they can be combined with 
information on program costs to answer two additional questions. First, for 
the basic form of impact evaluation, adding cost information will allow us to 
perform a cost-beneﬁ t analysis, which will answer the question, What is the 
cost-beneﬁ t balance for a given program? Cost-beneﬁ t analysis estimates the 
total expected beneﬁ ts of a program, compared to its total expected costs. It 
seeks to quantify all of the costs and beneﬁ ts of a program in monetary terms 
and assesses whether beneﬁ ts outweigh costs. 
In an ideal world, cost-beneﬁ t analysis based on impact evaluation evi-
dence would exist not only for a particular program, but also for a series of 
programs or program alternatives, so that policy makers could assess which 
program or alternative is most cost-eff ective in reaching a particular goal. 
When an impact evaluation is testing program alternatives, adding cost 
information allows us to answer the second question, How do various pro-
gram implementation alternatives compare in cost-eff ectiveness? This cost-
eff ectiveness analysis compares the relative performance of two or more 
programs or program alternatives in reaching a common outcome. 
In a cost-beneﬁ t or cost-eff ectiveness analysis, impact evaluation esti-
mates the beneﬁ t and eff ectiveness side, and cost analysis provides the 
cost information. This book focuses on impact evaluation and does not 
Key Concept:
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discuss in detail how to collect cost data or conduct cost-beneﬁ t analysis.2 
However, it is critically important that impact evaluation be comple-
mented with information on the cost of the project, program, or policy 
being evaluated. Once impact and cost information is available for a variety 
of programs, cost-eff ectiveness analysis can identify which investments 
yield the highest rate of return and allow policy makers to make informed 
decisions on which intervention to invest in. Box 1.4 illustrates how impact 
evaluations can be used to identify the most cost-eff ective programs and 
improve resource allocation.
Box 1.4: Evaluating Cost-Effectiveness 
Comparing Strategies to Increase School Attendance in Kenya
By evaluating a number of programs in a 
similar setting, it is possible to compare the 
relative cost-effectiveness of different ap-
proaches to improving outcomes such as 
school attendance. In Kenya, the nongovern-
mental organization International Child Sup-
port Africa (ICS Africa) implemented a series 
of education interventions that included 
treatment against intestinal worms, provi-
sion of free school uniforms, and provision 
of school meals. Each of the interventions 
was subjected to a randomized evaluation 
and cost-benefi t analysis, and comparison 
among them provides interesting insights 
on how to increase school attendance.
A program that provided medication 
against intestinal worms to schoolchildren 
increased attendance by approximately 0.14 
years per treated child, at an estimated cost 
of $0.49 per child. This amounts to about 
$3.50 per additional year of school participa-
tion, including the externalities experienced 
by children and adults not in the schools but 
in the communities that benefi t from the 
reduced transmission of worms. 
A second intervention, the Child Spon-
sorship Program, reduced the cost of school 
attendance by providing school uniforms to 
pupils in seven randomly selected schools. 
Dropout rates fell dramatically in treatment 
schools, and after 5 years the program was 
estimated to increase years in school by an 
average of 17 percent. However, even under 
the most optimistic assumptions, the cost 
of increasing school attendance using the 
school uniform program was estimated to 
be approximately $99 per additional year of 
school attendance.
Finally, a program that provided free 
breakfasts to children in 25 randomly selected 
preschools led to a 30 percent increase in 
attendance in treatment schools, at an esti-
mated cost of $36 per additional year of 
schooling. Test scores also increased by 
about 0.4 standard deviations, provided the 
teacher was well trained prior to the program.
Although similar interventions may have 
different target outcomes, such as the 
health effects of deworming or educational 
achievement in addition to increased partici-
pation, comparing a number of evaluations 
conducted in the same context can reveal 
which programs achieved the desired 
goals at the lowest cost.
Sources: Kremer and Miguel 2004; Kremer, Moulin, and Namunyu 2003; Poverty Action Lab 2005; Vermeersch 
and Kremer 2005.
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Prospective versus Retrospective Evaluation
Impact evaluations can be divided into two categories: prospective and ret-
rospective. Prospective evaluations are developed at the same time as the 
program is being designed and are built into program implementation. 
Baseline data are collected prior to program implementation for both treat-
ment and comparison groups. Retrospective evaluations assess program 
impact after the program has been implemented, generating treatment and 
comparison groups ex-post. 
In general, prospective impact evaluations are more likely to produce 
strong and credible evaluation results, for three reasons. 
First, baseline data can be collected to establish preprogram measures 
of outcomes of interest. Baseline data provide information on beneﬁ cia-
ries and comparison groups before the program is implemented and are 
important for measuring preintervention outcomes. Baseline data on the 
treatment and comparison groups should be analyzed to ensure that the 
groups are similar. Baselines can also be used to assess targeting eff ective-
ness, that is, whether or not the program is going to reach its intended 
beneﬁ ciaries. 
Second, deﬁ ning measures of a program’s success in the program’s plan-
ning stage focuses the evaluation and the program on intended results. As 
we shall see, impact evaluations take root in a program’s theory of change 
or results chain. The design of an impact evaluation helps to clarify pro-
gram objectives, in particular because it requires establishing well-deﬁ ned 
measures of a program’s success. Policy makers should set clear goals and 
questions for the evaluation to ensure that the results will be highly policy 
relevant. Indeed, the full support of policy makers is a prerequisite for car-
rying out a successful evaluation; impact evaluations should not be under-
taken unless policy makers are convinced of the legitimacy of the 
evaluation and its value for informing important policy decisions.
Third and most important, in a prospective evaluation, the treatment and 
comparison groups are identiﬁ ed before the program is implemented. As we 
will explain in more depth in the chapters that follow, many more options 
exist for carrying out valid evaluations when the evaluations are planned 
from the outset and informed by a project’s implementation. We argue in 
parts 2 and 3 that a valid estimate of the counterfactual can almost always be 
found for any program with clear and transparent assignment rules, pro-
vided that the evaluation is designed prospectively. In short, prospective 
evaluations have the best chance to generate valid counterfactuals. At the 
design stage, alternative ways to estimate a valid counterfactual can be con-
sidered. The impact evaluation design can also be fully aligned to program 
operating rules, as well as to the program’s rollout or expansion path. 
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By contrast, in retrospective evaluations, the evaluator often has such 
limited information that it is diffi  cult to analyze whether the program was 
successfully implemented and whether its participants really beneﬁ ted 
from it. Partly, the reason is that many programs do not collect baseline data 
unless the evaluation was built in from the beginning, and once the program 
is in place, it is too late to do so.
Retrospective evaluations using existing data are necessary to assess pro-
grams that were assigned in the past. Generally, options to obtain a valid 
estimate of the counterfactual are much more limited in those situations. 
The evaluation is dependent on clear rules of program operation regarding 
the assignment of beneﬁ ts. It is also dependent on the availability of data 
with suffi  cient coverage of the treatment and comparison groups both 
before and after program implementation. As a result, the feasibility of a 
retrospective evaluation depends on the context and is never guaranteed. 
Even when feasible, retrospective evaluations often use quasi-experimental 
methods and rely on stronger assumptions; they thus can produce evidence 
that is more debatable.
Effi cacy Studies and Effectiveness Studies
The main role of impact evaluation is to produce evidence on program 
eff ectiveness for the use of government offi  cials, program managers, civil 
society, and other stakeholders. Impact evaluation results are particularly 
useful when the conclusions can be applied to the broader population of 
interest. The question of generalizability (known as “external validity” in 
the research methods literature) is key for policy makers, for it determines 
whether the results identiﬁ ed in the evaluation can be replicated for 
groups beyond those studied in the evaluation if the program is scaled up. 
In the early days of impact evaluations of development programs, a 
large share of evidence was based on effi  cacy studies carried out under 
very speciﬁ c circumstances; unfortunately, the results of those studies 
were often not generalizable beyond the scope of the evaluation. Effi  cacy 
studies are typically carried out in a very speciﬁ c setting, with heavy 
technical involvement from researchers during the implementation of 
the program. Such effi  cacy studies are often undertaken for proof of con-
cept, to test the viability of a new program. If the program does not gen-
erate anticipated impacts under these often carefully managed conditions, 
it is unlikely to work if rolled out under normal circumstances. Because 
effi  cacy studies are often carried out as pilots under closely managed con-
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ditions, the impacts of these often small-scale effi  cacy pilots may not nec-
essarily be informative about the impact of a similar project implemented 
on a larger scale under normal circumstances. For instance, a pilot inter-
vention introducing new treatment protocols may work in a hospital with 
excellent managers and medical staff , but the same intervention may not 
work in an average hospital with less-attentive managers and limited staff . 
In addition, cost-beneﬁ t computations will vary, as ﬁ xed costs and econo-
mies of scale may not be captured in small effi  cacy studies. As a result, 
whereas evidence from effi  cacy studies can be useful to test an approach, 
the results often have limited external validity and do not always ade-
quately represent more general settings, which are usually the prime con-
cern of policy makers. 
By contrast, eff ectiveness studies provide evidence from interventions 
that take place in normal circumstances, using regular implementation 
channels. When eff ectiveness evaluations are properly designed and imple-
mented, the results obtained will hold true not only for the evaluation sam-
ple, but also for other intended beneﬁ ciaries outside the sample. This 
external validity is of critical importance to policy makers because it allows 
them to use the results of the evaluation to inform programwide decisions 
that apply to intended beneﬁ ciaries beyond the evaluation sample. 
Combining Sources of Information to Assess 
Both the “What” and the “Why”
Impact evaluations conducted in isolation from other sources of informa-
tion are vulnerable both technically and in terms of their potential eff ec-
tiveness. Without information on the nature and content of the program 
to contextualize evaluation results, policy makers are left puzzled about 
why certain results were or were not achieved. Whereas impact evalua-
tions can produce reliable estimates of the causal eff ects of a program, 
they are not typically designed to provide insights into program imple-
mentation. Moreover, impact evaluations must be well aligned with a 
program’s implementation and therefore need to be guided by informa-
tion on how, when, and where the program under evaluation is being 
implemented. 
Qualitative data, monitoring data, and process evaluations are needed to 
track program implementation and to examine questions of process that are 
critical to informing and interpreting the results from impact evaluations. 
In this sense, impact evaluations and other forms of evaluation are comple-
ments for one another rather than substitutes.
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For example, a provincial government may decide to announce that it 
will pay bonuses to rural health clinics if they raise the percentage of 
births in the clinic attended by a health professional. If the evaluation 
ﬁ nds that no changes occur in the percentage of births attended in the 
clinic, many possible explanations and corresponding needs for action 
may exist. First, it may be that staff  in the rural clinics do not have suffi  -
cient information on the bonuses or that they do not understand the 
rules of the program. In that case, the provincial government may need 
to step up its information and education campaign to the health centers. 
Alternatively, if lack of equipment or electricity shortages prevent the 
health clinics from admitting more patients, it may be necessary to 
improve the support system and improve power supply. Finally, preg-
nant women in rural areas may not want to use clinics; they may prefer 
traditional birth attendants and home births for cultural reasons. In that 
case, it may be more effi  cient to tackle women’s barriers to access than to 
give bonuses to the clinics. Thus, a good impact evaluation will allow the 
government to determine whether or not the rate of attended births 
changed as a result of the bonus program, but complementary evaluation 
approaches are necessary to understand whether the program was car-
ried out as planned and where the missing links are. In this example, 
evaluators would want to complement their impact analysis by inter-
viewing health clinic staff  regarding their knowledge of the program, 
reviewing the availability of equipment in the clinics, conducting focus 
group discussions with pregnant women to understand their prefer-
ences and barriers to access, and examining any available data on access 
to health clinics in rural areas. 
Using Qualitative Data
Qualitative data are a key supplement to quantitative impact evaluations 
because they can provide complementary perspectives on a program’s per-
formance. Evaluations that integrate qualitative and quantitative analysis 
are characterized as using “mixed methods” (Bamberger, Rao, and Wool-
cock 2010). Qualitative approaches include focus groups and interviews 
with selected beneﬁ ciaries and other key informants (Rao and Woolcock 
2003). Although the views and opinions gathered during interviews and 
focus groups may not be representative of the program’s beneﬁ ciaries, they 
are particularly useful during the three stages of an impact evaluation:
1. When designing an impact evaluation, evaluators can use focus groups 
and interviews with key informants to develop hypotheses as to how 
Why Evaluate?  17
and why the program would work and to clarify research questions that 
need to be addressed in the quantitative impact evaluation work.
2. In the intermediate stage, before quantitative impact evaluation results 
become available, qualitative work can help provide policy makers 
quick insights into what is happening in the program.
3. In the analysis stage, evaluators can apply qualitative methods to pro-
vide context and explanations for the quantitative results, to explore 
“outlier” cases of success and failure, and to develop systematic expla-
nations of the program’s performance as it was found in the quantita-
tive results. In that sense, qualitative work can help explain why certain 
results are observed in the quantitative analysis, and it can be used to get 
inside the “black box” of what happened in the program (Bamberger, 
Rao, and Woolcock 2010).
Using Monitoring Data and Process Evaluations
Monitoring data are also a critical resource in an impact evaluation. They 
let the evaluator verify which participants received the program, how fast 
the program is expanding, how resources are being spent, and overall 
whether activities are being implemented as planned. This information is 
critical to implementing the evaluation, for example, to ensure that base-
line data are collected before the program is introduced and to verify the 
integrity of the treatment and comparison groups. In addition, the moni-
toring system can provide information on the cost of implementing the 
program, which is also needed for cost-beneﬁ t analysis.
Finally, process evaluations focus on how a program is implemented 
and operates, assessing whether it conforms to its original design and doc-
umenting its development and operation. Process evaluations can usually 
be carried out relatively quickly and at a reasonable cost. In pilots and in 
the initial stages of a program, they can be a valuable source of information 
on how to improve program implementation.
Notes
1. See Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for an overview of CCT programs and the 
inﬂ uential role played by Progresa/Oportunidades because of its impact 
evaluation
2. For a detailed discussion of cost-beneﬁ t analysis, see Belli et al. 2001; Boardman 
et al. 2001; Brent 1996; or Zerbe and Dively 1994.
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Determining Evaluation 
Questions
CHAPTER 2
This chapter outlines the initial steps in setting up an evaluation. The 
steps include establishing the type of question to be answered by the eval-
uation, constructing a theory of change that outlines how the project is 
supposed to achieve the intended results, developing a results chain, for-
mulating hypotheses to be tested by the evaluation, and selecting perfor-
mance indicators.
All of these steps contribute to determining an evaluation question and 
are best taken at the outset of the program, engaging a range of stakehold-
ers from policy makers to program managers, to forge a common vision of 
the program’s goals and how they will be achieved. This engagement 
builds consensus regarding the main questions to be answered and will 
strengthen links between the evaluation, program implementation, and 
policy. Applying the steps lends clarity and speciﬁ city that are useful both 
for developing a good impact evaluation and for designing and implement-
ing an eff ective program. Each step—from the clear speciﬁ cation of goals 
and questions, to the articulation of ideas embodied in the theory of 
change, to the outcomes the program hopes to provide—is clearly deﬁ ned 
and articulated within the logic model embodied in the results chain.
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Types of Evaluation Questions
Any evaluation begins with the formulation of a study question that 
 focuses the research and that is tailored to the policy interest at hand. The 
evaluation then consists of generating credible evidence to answer that 
question. As we will explain below, the basic impact evaluation question 
can be formulated as, What is the impact or causal eff ect of the program on 
an outcome of interest? In an example that we will apply throughout part 2, 
the study question is, What is the eff ect of the Health Insurance Subsidy 
Program on households’ out-of-pocket health expenditures? The question 
can also be oriented toward testing options, such as, Which combination of 
mail  campaigns and family counseling works best to encourage exclusive 
breast feeding? A clear evaluation question is the starting point of any 
eff ective evaluation.
Theories of Change  
A theory of change is a description of how an intervention is supposed to 
deliver the desired results. It describes the causal logic of how and why a 
particular project, program, or policy will reach its intended outcomes. A 
theory of change is a key underpinning of any impact evaluation, given the 
cause-and-eff ect focus of the research. As one of the ﬁ rst steps in the eval-
uation design, a theory of change can help specify the research questions.
Theories of change depict a sequence of events leading to outcomes; 
they explore the conditions and assumptions needed for the change to 
take place, make explicit the causal logic behind the program, and map the 
program interventions along logical causal pathways. Working with the 
program’s stakeholders to put together a theory of change can clarify and 
improve program design. This is especially important in programs that 
seek to inﬂ uence behavior: theories of change can help disentangle the 
inputs and activities that go into providing the program interventions, the 
outputs that are delivered, and the outcomes that stem from expected 
behavioral changes among beneﬁ ciaries.
The best time to develop a theory of change for a program is at the 
beginning of the design process, when stakeholders can be brought 
together to develop a common vision for the program, its goals, and the 
path to achieving those goals. Stakeholders can then start program imple-
mentation from a common understanding of the program, how it works, 
and its objectives. 
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In addition, program designers should review the literature for accounts 
of experience with similar programs, and they should verify the contexts 
and assumptions behind the causal pathways in the theory of change they 
are outlining. In the case of the cement ﬂ oors project in Mexico described 
in box 2.1, for example, the literature would provide valuable information 
on how parasites are transmitted and how parasite infestation leads to 
childhood diarrhea.
Box 2.1: Theory of Change
From Cement Floors to Happiness in Mexico 
In their evaluation of the Piso Firme or “fi rm 
fl oor” project, Cattaneo et al. (2009) exam-
ined the impact of housing improvement on 
health and welfare. Both the project and the 
evaluation were motivated by a clear theory 
of change. 
The objective of the Piso Firme project is 
to improve the living standards, especially 
the health, of vulnerable groups living in 
densely populated, low- income areas of 
Mexico. The program was fi rst started in the 
northern State of Coahuila and was based 
on a situational assessment conducted by 
Governor Enrique Martínez y Martínez’s 
campaign team.
The program’s results chain is clear. Eligi-
ble neighborhoods are surveyed door-to-door, 
and households are offered up to 50 square 
meters of cement. The government purchas-
es and delivers the cement, and the house-
holds and community volunteers supply the 
labor to install the fl oor. The output is the con-
struction of a cement fl oor, which can be 
completed in about a day. The expected out-
comes of the improved home environment 
include cleanliness, health, and happiness.
The rationale for this results chain is 
that dirt fl oors are a vector for parasites 
because they are harder to keep clean. 
Parasites live and breed in feces and can 
be ingested by humans when they are 
tracked into the home by animals or chil-
dren or on shoes. Evidence shows that 
young children who live in houses with dirt 
fl oors are more likely to be infected with 
intestinal parasites, which can cause diarrhea 
and malnutrition, often leading to impaired 
cognitive development or even death. Ce-
ment fl oors interrupt the transmission of 
parasitic infestations. They also allow bet-
ter temperature control and are more aes-
thetically pleasing.
Those expected outcomes informed the 
research questions addressed in the evalu-
ation by Cattaneo and his colleagues. They 
hypothesized that replacing dirt fl oors with 
cement fl oors would reduce the incidence 
of diarrhea, malnutrition, and micronutrient 
defi ciency. Doing that should in turn result 
in improved cognitive development in 
young children. The researchers also antici-
pated and tested for improvements in adult 
welfare, as measured by people’s increased 
satisfaction with their housing situation and 
lower rates of depression and perceived 
stress. 
Source: Catteneo et al. 2009.
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The Results Chain  
A theory of change can be modeled in various ways, for example using 
theoretical models, logic models, logical frameworks and outcome models, 
and results chains.1 All of these include the basic elements of a theory of 
change, that is, a causal chain, outside conditions and inﬂ uences, and key 
assumptions. In this book, we will use the results chain model because we 
ﬁ nd that it is the simplest and clearest model to outline the theory of 
change in the operational context of development programs. 
A results chain sets out a logical, plausible outline of how a sequence 
of inputs, activities, and outputs for which a project is directly respon-
sible interacts with behavior to establish pathways through which 
impacts are achieved (ﬁ gure 2.1). It establishes the causal logic from the 
initiation of the project, beginning with resources available, to the end, 
looking at long-term goals. A basic results chain will map the following 
elements:
Inputs: Resources at the disposal of the project, including staff and 
budget
Activities: Actions taken or work performed to convert inputs into 
 outputs 
Outputs: The tangible goods and services that the project activities pro-
duce (They are directly under the control of the implementing agency.)
Outcomes: Results likely to be achieved once the beneﬁ ciary population 
uses the project outputs (They are usually achieved in the short-to-me-
dium term.)
Final outcomes: The ﬁ nal project goals (They can be inﬂ uenced by mul-
tiple factors and are typically achieved over a longer period of time.)
The results chain has three main parts:
Implementation: Planned work delivered by the project, including 
 inputs, activities, and outputs. These are the areas that the implementa-
tion agency can directly monitor to measure the project’s performance. 
Results: Intended results consist of the outcomes and ﬁ nal outcomes, 
which are not under the direct control of the project and are contingent 
on behavioral changes by program beneﬁ ciaries. In other words, they 
depend on the interactions between the supply side (implementation) 
and the demand side (beneﬁ ciaries). These are the areas subject to 
impact evaluation to measure eff ectiveness.
Key Concept:
A results chain sets 
out the sequence of 
inputs, activities, and 
outputs that are 
expected to improve 
outcomes and fi nal 
outcomes.
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Assumptions and risks: These are not depicted in ﬁ gure 2.1. They  include 
any evidence from the literature on the proposed causal logic and the 
assumptions on which it relies, references to similar programs’ perfor-
mance, and a mention of risks that may aff ect the realization of 
intended results and any mitigation strategy put in place to manage 
those risks.
For example, imagine that the ministry of education of country A is think-
ing of introducing a new approach to teaching mathematics in high 
school. As shown in ﬁ gure 2.2, the inputs to the program would include 
staff  from the ministry, high school teachers, a budget for the new math 
program, and the municipal facilities where the math teachers will be 
trained. The program’s activities consist of designing the new mathemat-
ics curriculum; developing a teacher training program; training the teach-
ers; and commissioning, printing, and distributing new textbooks. The 
outputs are the number of teachers trained, the number of textbooks 
delivered to classrooms, and the adaptation of standardized tests to the 
new curriculum. The short-term outcomes consist of teachers’ use of the 
Figure 2.1   What Is a Results Chain?
Source: Authors, drawing from multiple sources.
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new methods and textbooks in their classrooms and their application of 
the new tests. The medium-term outcomes are improvements in student 
performance on the standardized mathematics tests. Final outcomes are 
increased high school completion rates and higher employment rates and 
earnings for graduates.
Results chains are useful for all projects, regardless of whether or not 
they will include an impact evaluation, because they allow policy makers 
and program managers to make program goals explicit, thus helping them 
to understand the causal logic and sequence of events behind a program. 
Results chains also facilitate discussions around monitoring and evaluation 
by making evident what information needs to be monitored and what out-
come changes need to be included when the project is evaluated. 
To compare alternative program approaches, results chains can be aggre-
gated into results trees that represent all the viable options considered dur-
ing program design or program restructuring. These results trees represent 
policy and operational alternatives for reaching speciﬁ c objectives; they can 
be used in thinking through which program options could be tested and 
evaluated. For example, if the goal is to improve ﬁ nancial literacy, one may 
investigate options such as an advertising campaign versus classroom 
instruction for adults.
Figure 2.2   Results Chain for a High School Mathematics Program
Source: Authors, drawing from multiple sources.
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Hypotheses for the Evaluation
Once you have outlined the results chain, you can formulate the hypoth-
eses that you would like to test using the impact evaluation. In the high 
school mathematics example, the hypotheses to be tested could be the 
following:
• The new curriculum is superior to the old one in imparting knowledge of 
mathematics.
• Trained teachers use the new curriculum in a more eff ective way than 
other teachers.
• If we train the teachers and distribute the textbooks, then the teachers 
will use the new textbooks and curriculum in class, and the students will 
follow the curriculum.
• If we train the teachers and distribute the textbooks, then the math test 
results will improve by 5 points on average.
• Performance in high school mathematics inﬂ uences completion rates 
and labor market performance.
Selecting Performance Indicators
A clearly articulated results chain provides a useful map for selecting the 
indicators that will be measured along the chain. They will include indica-
tors used both to monitor program implementation and to evaluate results. 
Again, it is useful to engage program stakeholders in selecting these indica-
tors, to ensure that the ones selected are good measures of program perfor-
mance.  The acronym SMART is a widely used and useful rule of thumb to 
ensure that indicators used are 
• Speciﬁ c: to measure the information required as closely as possible
• Measurable: to ensure that the information can be readily obtained
• Attributable: to ensure that each measure is linked to the project’s  eff orts
• Realistic: to ensure that the data can be obtained in a timely fashion, 
with reasonable frequency, and at reasonable cost
• Targeted: to the objective population.
Key Concept:
Good indicators are 
Specifi c, Measurable, 
Attributable, Realistic, 
and Targeted.
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When choosing indicators, remember that it is important to identify indi-
cators all along the results chain, and not just at the level of outcomes, so 
that you will be able to track the causal logic of any program outcomes that 
are observed. Even when you implement an impact evaluation, it is still 
important to track implementation indicators, so you can determine 
whether interventions have been carried out as planned, whether they 
have reached their intended beneﬁ ciaries, and whether they arrived on 
time (see Kusek and Rist 2004 or Imas and Rist 2009 for discussion of how 
to select performance indicators). Without these indicators all along the 
results chain, the impact evaluation will produce only a “black box” that 
identiﬁ es whether or not the predicted results materialized; it will not be 
able to explain why that was the case.
Apart from selecting the indicators, it is also useful to consider the 
arrangements for producing the data. Table 2.1 lists the basic elements of 
a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan, covering the arrangements 
needed to produce each of the indicators reliably and on time.
Table 2.1  Elements of a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
Element Description
Expected results 
(outcomes and outputs)
Obtained from program design documents and 
results chain.
Indicators 
(with baselines and 
indicative targets)
Derived from results chain; indicators should be 
SMART.
Data source Source and location from which data are to be 
obtained, e.g., a survey, a review, a stakeholder 
meeting.
Data frequency Frequency of data availability.
Responsibilities Who is responsible for organizing the data 
collection and verifying data quality and source? 
Analysis and reporting Frequency of analysis, analysis method, and 
responsibility for reporting. 
Resources Estimate of resources required and committed for 
carrying out planned M&E activities.
End use Who will receive and review the information? 
What purpose does it serve?
Risks What are the risks and assumptions in carrying 
out the planned M&E activities? How might they 
affect the planned M&E events and the quality of 
the data?
Source: Adapted from UNDP 2009.
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Road Map to Parts 2 and 3
In this ﬁ rst part of the book, we discussed why an impact evaluation might 
be undertaken and when it is worthwhile to do so. We reviewed the vari-
ous objectives that an impact evaluation can achieve and highlighted the 
fundamental policy questions that an evaluation can tackle. We insisted on 
the necessity to trace carefully the theory of change that explains the 
channels through which a program can inﬂ uence ﬁ nal outcomes. Impact 
evaluations essentially test whether that theory of change works or does 
not work in practice.
In part 2 we consider how to evaluate, by reviewing various alternative 
methodologies that produce valid comparison groups and allow valid 
program impacts to be estimated. We begin by introducing the counter-
factual as the crux of any impact evaluation, detailing the properties that 
the estimate of the counterfactual must have and providing examples of 
invalid or counterfeit estimates of the counterfactual. We then turn to 
presenting a menu of impact evaluation options that can produce valid 
estimates of the counterfactual. In particular, we discuss the basic intu-
ition behind four categories of methodologies: randomized selection 
methods, regression discontinuity design, diff erence-in-diff erences, and 
matching. We discuss why and how each method can produce a valid esti-
mate of the counterfactual, in which policy context each can be imple-
mented, and the main limitations of each method. Throughout this part 
of the book, a case study—the Health Insurance Subsidy Program—is used 
to illustrate how the methods can be applied. In addition, we present spe-
ciﬁ c examples of impact evaluations that have used each method. 
Part 3 outlines the steps to implement, manage, or commission an 
impact evaluation. We assume at this point that the objectives of the eval-
uation have been deﬁ ned, the theory of change formulated, and the evalu-
ation questions speciﬁ ed. We review key questions that need to be 
answered when formulating an impact evaluation plan. We start by pro-
viding clear rules for deciding where comparison groups come from. A 
simple framework is set out to determine which of the impact evaluation 
methodologies presented in part 2 is most suitable for a given program, 
depending on its operational rules. We then review steps in four key 
phases of implementing an evaluation: putting the evaluation design into 
operation, choosing a sample, collecting data, and producing and dissemi-
nating ﬁ ndings.
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Note
1. University of Wisconsin-Extension (2010) contains a detailed discussion on 
how to build a results chain, as well as a comprehensive list of references. Imas 
and Rist (2009) provide a good review of theories of change.
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HOW TO EVALUATE
Now that we have established the reasons for evaluating the impact of 
 programs and policies, part 2 of this book explains what impact evaluations do, 
what questions they answer, what methods are available for conducting them, 
and the advantages and disadvantages of each. The menu of impact evaluation 
options discussed includes randomized selection methods, regression discon-
tinuity design, difference-in-differences, and matching. 
As we discussed in part 1, an impact evaluation seeks to establish and quan-
tify how an intervention affects the outcomes that are of interest to analysts 
and policy makers. In this part, we will introduce and examine as a case study 
the “Health Insurance Subsidy Program” (HISP). We will answer the same 
evaluation question with regard to the HISP several times using the same 
data sources, but different, and sometimes confl icting, answers will emerge 
depending on what methodology is used. (The reader should assume that the 
data have already been properly cleaned to eliminate any data-related prob-
lems.) Your task will be to determine why the estimate of the impact of the 
Part 2
HISP changes with each method and which results you consider suffi ciently 
reliable to serve as the basis for important policy recommendations.
The HISP case is an example of a government undertaking a large-scale health 
sector reform, with the ultimate objective of improving the health of its popula-
tion. Within that general objective, the reform aims to increase access to, and 
improve the quality of, health services in rural areas to bring them up to the 
standards and coverage that prevail in urban areas. The innovative—and poten-
tially costly—HISP is being piloted. The program subsidizes health insurance for 
poor rural households, covering costs related to primary health care and drugs. 
The central objective of HISP is to reduce the cost of health care for poor fami-
lies and, ultimately, to improve health outcomes. Policy makers are considering 
expanding the HISP to cover the whole country. Scaling up the program would 
cost hundreds of millions of dollars, but policy makers are concerned that poor 
rural households are unable to afford basic health care without a subsidy, with 
detrimental consequences for their health. The key evaluation question is, What 
is the effect of HISP on the out-of-pocket health care costs and the health status 
of poor families? Answers to questions like this guide policy makers in deciding 
what policies to adopt and what programs to implement. Those policies and 
programs in turn can affect the welfare of millions of people around the world. 
This part of the book will discuss how to answer such critical evaluation ques-
tions rigorously. 
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Causal Inference 
and Counterfactuals
CHAPTER 3
We begin by examining two concepts that are integral to the process of conduct-
ing accurate and reliable evaluations—causal inference and counterfactuals.
Causal Inference
The basic impact evaluation question essentially constitutes a causal 
 inference problem. Assessing the impact of a program on a series of out-
comes is equivalent to assessing the causal eff ect of the program on those 
outcomes. Most policy questions involve cause-and-eff ect relationships: 
Does teacher training improve students’ test scores? Do conditional cash 
transfer programs cause better health outcomes in children? Do vocational 
training programs increase trainees’ incomes? 
Although cause-and-eff ect questions are common, it is not a straight-
forward matter to establish that a relationship is causal. In the context of a 
 vocational training program, for example, simply observing that a trainee’s 
income increases after he or she has completed such a program is not suffi  -
cient to establish causality. The trainee’s income might have increased even 
if he had not taken the training course because of his own eff orts, because of 
changing labor market conditions, or because of one of the myriad other 
 factors that can aff ect income. Impact evaluations help us to overcome the 
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challenge of establishing causality by empirically establishing to what 
extent a particular program—and that program alone—contributed to the 
change in an outcome. To establish causality between a program and an out-
come, we use impact evaluation methods to rule out the possibility that any 
factors other than the program of interest explain the observed impact. 
The answer to the basic impact evaluation question—What is the impact 
or causal eff ect of a program P on an outcome of interest Y?—is given by the 
basic impact evaluation formula:
α = (Y | P = 1) − (Y | P = 0).
This formula says that the causal impact (α) of a program (P) on an out-
come (Y) is the diff erence between the outcome (Y) with the program (in 
other words, when P = 1) and the same outcome (Y) without the program 
(that is, when P = 0).
For example, if P denotes a vocational training program and Y denotes 
income, then the causal impact of the vocational training program (α) is 
the diff erence between a person’s income (Y) after participating in the 
vocational training program (in other words, when P = 1) and the same 
person’s income (Y) at the same point in time if he or she had not partici-
pated in the program (in other words, when P = 0). To put it another way, 
we would like to measure income at the same point in time for the same 
unit of observation (a person, in this case), but in two diff erent states of the 
world. If it were possible to do this, we would be observing how much 
income the same individual would have had at the same point in time both 
with and without the program, so that the only possible explanation for 
any diff erence in that person’s income would be the program. By compar-
ing the same individual with herself at the same moment, we would have 
managed to eliminate any outside factors that might also have explained 
the diff erence in outcomes. We could then be conﬁ dent that the relation-
ship between the vocational training program and income is causal.
The basic impact evaluation formula is valid for anything that is being 
analyzed—a person, a household, a community, a business, a school, a hos-
pital, or any other unit of observation that may receive or be aff ected by a 
program. The formula is also valid for any outcome (Y) that is plausibly 
related to the program at hand. Once we measure the two key components 
of this formula—the outcome (Y) both with the program and without it—
we can answer any question about the program’s impact.
The Counterfactual  
As discussed above, we can think of the impact (α) of a program as the dif-
ference in outcomes (Y) for the same individual with and without partici-
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pation in a program. Yet we know that measuring the same person in two 
diff erent states at the same time is impossible. At any given moment in 
time, an individual either participated in the program or did not partici-
pate. The person cannot be observed simultaneously in two diff erent 
states (in other words, with and without the program). This is called “the 
counterfactual problem”: How do we measure what would have happened 
if the other circumstance had prevailed? Although we can observe and 
measure the outcome (Y) for program participants (Y | P = 1), there are no 
data to establish what their outcomes would have been in the absence of 
the program (Y | P = 0). In the basic impact evaluation formula, the term 
(Y | P = 0) represents the counterfactual. We can think of this as what would 
have happened if a participant had not participated in the program. In 
other words, the counterfactual is what the outcome (Y) would have been 
in the absence of a program (P).
For example, imagine that “Mr. Unfortunate” takes a red pill and then 
dies ﬁ ve days later. Just because Mr. Unfortunate died after taking the red 
pill, you cannot conclude that the red pill caused his death. Maybe he was 
very sick when he took the red pill, and it was the illness rather than the 
red pill that caused his death. Inferring causality will require that you rule 
out other potential factors that can aff ect the outcome under consider-
ation. In the simple example of determining whether taking the red pill 
caused Mr. Unfortunate’s death, an evaluator would need to establish 
what would have happened to Mr. Unfortunate had he not taken the pill. 
Inasmuch as Mr. Unfortunate did in fact take the red pill, it is not possible 
to observe directly what would have happened if he had not done so. What 
would have happened to him had he not taken the red pill is the counter-
factual, and the evaluator’s main challenge is determining what this coun-
terfactual state of the world actually looks like (see box 3.1).
When conducting an impact evaluation, it is relatively easy to obtain the 
ﬁ rst term of the basic formula (Y | P = 1)—the outcome under treatment. We 
simply measure the outcome of interest for the population that participated 
in the program. However, the second term of the formula (Y | P = 0) cannot 
be directly observed for program participants—hence, the need to ﬁ ll in this 
missing piece of information by estimating the counterfactual. To do this, we 
typically use comparison groups (sometimes called “control groups”). The 
remainder of part 2 of this book will focus on the diff erent methods or 
approaches that can be used to identify valid comparison groups that accu-
rately reproduce or mimic the counterfactual. Identifying such comparison 
groups is the crux of any impact evaluation, regardless of what type of pro-
gram is being evaluated.  Simply put, without a valid estimate of the coun-
terfactual, the impact of a program cannot be established. 
Key Concept:
The counterfactual is 
an estimate of what 
the outcome (Y ) would 
have been for a 
program participant 
in the absence of 
the program (P ). 
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Estimating the Counterfactual  
To further illustrate the estimation of the counterfactual, we turn to a 
 hypothetical example that, while not of any policy importance, will help 
us think through this key concept a bit more fully. On a conceptual level, 
solving the counterfactual problem requires the evaluator to identify a 
Box 3.1: Estimating the Counterfactual 
Miss Unique and the Cash Transfer Program
Miss Unique is a newborn baby girl whose 
mother is offered a monthly cash transfer so 
long as she ensures that Miss Unique re-
ceives regular health checkups at the local 
health center, that she is immunized, and 
that her growth is monitored. The govern-
ment posits that the cash transfer will moti-
vate Miss Unique’s mother to seek the 
health services required by the program and 
will help Miss Unique grow strong and tall. 
For its impact evaluation, the government 
selects height as an outcome indicator for 
long-term health, and it measures Miss 
Unique’s height 3 years into the cash trans-
fer program. 
Assume that you are able to measure 
Miss Unique’s height at the age of 3. Ideally, 
to evaluate the impact of the program, you 
would want to measure Miss Unique’s height 
at the age of 3 with her mother having 
received the cash transfer, and also Miss 
Unique’s height at the age of 3 had her 
mother not received the cash transfer. You 
would then compare the two heights. If you 
were able to compare Miss Unique’s height 
at the age of 3 with the program to Miss 
Unique’s height at the age of 3 without the 
program, you would know that any difference 
in height had been caused only by the pro-
gram. Because everything else about Miss 
Unique would be the same, there would be 
no other characteristics that could explain the 
difference in height.
Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to 
observe Miss Unique both with and without 
the cash transfer program: either her family 
receives the program or it does not. In other 
words, we do not know what the counterfac-
tual is. Since Miss Unique’s mother actually 
received the cash transfer program, we can-
not know how tall she would have been had 
her mother not received the cash transfer. 
Finding an appropriate comparison for Miss 
Unique will be challenging because Miss 
Unique is, precisely, unique. Her exact socio-
economic background, genetic attributes, and 
personal characteristics cannot be found in 
anybody else. If we were simply to compare 
Miss Unique with a child who is not enrolled 
in the cash transfer program, say, Mr. Inimi-
table, the comparison may not be adequate. 
Miss Unique is not identical to Mr. Inimitable. 
Miss Unique and Mr. Inimitable may not look 
the same, they may not live in the same 
place, they may not have the same parents, 
and they may not have been the same height 
when they were born. So if we observe that 
Mr. Inimitable is shorter than Miss Unique at 
the age of 3, we cannot know whether the 
difference is due to the cash transfer pro-
gram or to one of the many other differences 
between these two children.
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“perfect clone” for each program participant (ﬁ gure 3.1). For example, let 
us say that Mr. Fulanito receives an additional $12 in his pocket money 
allowance, and we want to measure the impact of this treatment on his 
consumptions of candies. If you could identify a perfect clone for Mr. 
Fulanito, the evaluation would be easy: you could just compare the num-
ber of candies eaten by Mr. Fulanito (say, 6) with the number of candies 
eaten by his clone (say, 4). In this case, the impact of the additional pocket 
money would be the diff erence between those two numbers, or 2 candies. 
In practice, we know that it is impossible to identify perfect clones: even 
between genetically identical twins there are important diff erences. 
Although no perfect clone exists for a single individual, statistical tools 
exist that can be used to generate two groups of individuals that, if their 
numbers are large enough, are statistically indistinguishable from each 
other. In practice, a key goal of an impact evaluation is to identify a group of 
program participants (the treatment group) and a group of nonparticipants 
(the comparison group) that are statistically identical in the absence of the 
program. If the two groups are identical, excepting only that one group par-
ticipates in the program and the other does not, then we can be sure that any 
diff erence in outcomes must be due to the program.
The key challenge, then, is to identify a valid comparison group that has 
the same characteristics as the treatment group. Speciﬁ cally, the treatment 
and comparison groups must be the same in at least three ways: First, the 
Figure 3.1   The Perfect Clone
Source: Authors.
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treatment group and the comparison group must be identical in the absence 
of the program. Although it is not necessary that every unit in the treatment 
group be identical to every unit in the comparison group, on average the 
characteristics of treatment and comparison groups should be the same. For 
example, the average age in the treatment group should be the same as the 
average age in the comparison group. Second, the treatment and compari-
son groups should react to the program in the same way. For example, the 
incomes of units in the treatment group should be as likely to beneﬁ t from 
training as the incomes of the comparison group. Third, the treatment and 
comparison groups cannot be diff erentially exposed to other interventions 
during the evaluation period. For example, if we are to isolate the impact of 
the additional pocket money on candy consumption, the treatment group 
could not also have been provided with more trips to the candy store than 
the controls, as that could confound the eff ects of the pocket money with 
the eff ect of increased access to candy. 
When these three conditions are met, then only the existence of the 
program of interest will explain any diff erences in the outcome (Y) 
between the two groups once the program has been implemented. The 
reason is that the only diff erence between the treatment and comparison 
groups is that the members of the treatment group will receive the pro-
gram, while the members of the comparison group will not. When the dif-
ferences in outcomes can be entirely attributed to the program, the causal 
impact of the program has been identiﬁ ed. So instead of looking at the 
impact of additional pocket money only for Mr. Fulanito, you may be look-
ing at the impact for a group of children (ﬁ gure 3.2). If you could identify 
another group of children that is totally similar, except that they do not 
receive additional pocket money, your estimate of the impact of the pro-
gram would be the diff erence between the two groups in average con-
sumption of candies. Thus, if the treated group consumes an average of 6 
candies per person, while the comparison group consumes an average of 4, 
the average impact of the additional pocket money on candy consumption 
would be 2.
Now that we have deﬁ ned a valid comparison group, it is important to 
consider what would happen if we decided to go ahead with an evaluation 
without identifying such a group. Intuitively, this should now be clear: an 
invalid comparison group is one that diff ers from the treatment group in 
some way other than the absence of the treatment. Those additional dif-
ferences can cause our impact estimate to be invalid or, in statistical terms, 
biased: it will not estimate the true impact of the program. Rather, it will 
estimate the eff ect of the program mixed with the eff ect of those other 
diff erences.
Key Concept:
A valid comparison 
group will have the 
same characteristics 
as the group of 
participants in the 
program (“treatment 
group”), except for the 
fact that the units in 
the comparison group 
do not benefi t from the 
program.
Key Concept:
When the comparison 
group for an evaluation 
is invalid, then the 
estimate of the impact 
of the program will 
also be invalid: it will 
not estimate the true 
impact of the program. 
In statistical terms, it 
will be “biased.”
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Two Types of Impact Estimates
Having estimated the impact of the program, the evaluator needs to know 
how to interpret the results. An evaluation always estimates the impact of a 
program by comparing the outcomes for the treatment group with the esti-
mate of the counterfactual obtained from a valid comparison group, using 
the basic impact evaluation equation. Depending on what the treatment and 
the counterfactual actually represent, the interpretation of the impact of a 
program will vary.
The estimated impact α is called the “intention-to-treat” estimate (ITT) 
when the basic formula is applied to those units to whom the program has 
been off ered, regardless of whether or not they actually enroll in it. The ITT 
is important for those cases in which we are trying to determine the average 
impact of a program on the population targeted by the program. By contrast, 
the estimated impact α is called the “treatment-on-the-treated” (TOT) 
when the basic impact evaluation formula is applied to those units to whom 
the program has been off ered and who have actually enrolled. The ITT and 
TOT estimates will be the same when there is full compliance, that is, when 
all units to whom a program has been off ered actually decide to enroll in it. 
We will return to the diff erence between the ITT and TOT estimates in 
detail in future sections, but let us begin with an example.
Consider the health insurance subsidy program, or HISP, example 
described in the introduction to part 2, in which any household in a treat-
ment village can sign up for a health insurance subsidy. Even though all 
Figure 3.2   A Valid Comparison Group
Source: Authors.
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households in treatment villages are eligible to enroll in the program, some 
fraction of households, say 10 percent, may decide not to do so (perhaps 
because they already have insurance through their jobs, because they are 
healthy and do not anticipate the need for health care, or because of one of 
many other possible reasons). In this scenario, 90 percent of households 
in the treatment village decide to enroll in the program and actually 
receive the services that the program provides. The ITT estimate would 
be obtained by computing the basic impact evaluation formula for all 
households who were off ered the program, that is, for 100 percent of the 
households in treatment villages. By contrast, the TOT estimate would be 
obtained by calculating the basic impact evaluation formula only for the 
subset of households who actually decided to enroll in the program, that 
is, for the 90 percent of households in treatment villages that enroll.
Two Counterfeit Estimates of the Counterfactual
In the remainder of part 2 of this book, we will discuss the various methods 
that can be used to construct valid comparison groups that will allow you to 
estimate the counterfactual. Before doing so, however, it is useful to discuss 
two common, but highly risky, methods of constructing comparison groups 
that can lead to inappropriate estimates of the counterfactual. These two 
“counterfeit” estimates of the counterfactuals are (1) before-and-after, or 
pre-post, comparisons that compare the outcomes of program participants 
prior to and subsequent to the introduction of a program and (2) with-and-
without comparisons between units that choose to enroll and units that 
choose not to enroll. 
Counterfeit Counterfactual 1: Comparing Before and After
A before-and-after comparison attempts to establish the impact of a pro-
gram by tracking changes in outcomes for program participants over time. 
To return to the basic impact evaluation formula, the outcome for the treat-
ment group (Y | P = 1) is simply the postintervention outcome. However, the 
counterfactual (Y | P = 0) is estimated using the preintervention outcome. In 
essence, this comparison assumes that if the program had never existed, the 
outcome (Y) for program participants would have been exactly the same as 
their preprogram situation. Unfortunately, in the vast majority of cases that 
assumption simply does not hold. 
Take the evaluation of a microﬁ nance program for poor, rural farmers. 
Let us say that the program provides microloans to farmers to enable them 
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to buy fertilizer to increase their rice production. You observe that in the 
year before the start of the program, farmers harvested an average of 1,000 
kilograms (kg) of rice per hectare. The microﬁ nance scheme is launched, 
and a year later rice yields have increased to 1,100 kg per hectare. If you were 
trying to evaluate impact using a before-and-after comparison, you would 
use the preintervention outcome as a counterfactual. Applying the basic 
impact evaluation formula, you would conclude that the program had 
increased rice yields by 100 kg per hectare. 
However, imagine that rainfall was normal during the year before the 
program was launched, but a drought occurred in the year the program 
started. In this context, the preintervention outcome cannot constitute an 
appropriate counterfactual. Figure 3.3 illustrates why. Because farmers 
received the program during a drought year, their average yield without the 
microloan scheme would have been even lower, at level D, and not level B as 
the before-and-after comparison assumes. In that case, the true impact of 
the program is larger than 100 kg. By contrast, if environmental conditions 
had actually improved over time, the counterfactual rice yield might have 
been at level C, in which case the true program impact would have been 
smaller than 100 kg. In other words, unless we can statistically account for 
rice yield (kg per ha)
1,100
observed change
counterfactual B
counterfactual C
counterfactual D
1,000
A
C?
B
D?
year
T = 1
(2009)
T = 0
(2007)
α = 100
Figure 3.3   Before and After Estimates of a Microfi nance Program
Source: Authors, based on the hypothetical example in the text.
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rainfall and every other factor that can aff ect rice yields over time, we simply 
cannot calculate the true impact of the program by making a before-and-
after comparison.
Although before-and-after comparisons may be invalid in impact eval-
uation, that does not mean they are not valuable for other purposes. In 
fact, administrative data systems for many programs typically record data 
about participants over time. For example, an education management 
information system may routinely collect data on student enrollment in 
the set of schools where a school meal program is operating. Those data 
allow program managers to observe whether the number of children 
enrolled in school is increasing over time. This is important and valuable 
information for managers who are planning and reporting about the edu-
cation system. However, establishing that the school meal program has 
caused the observed change in enrollment is much more challenging 
because many diff erent factors aff ect student enrollment over time. Thus, 
although monitoring changes in outcomes over time for a group of par-
ticipants is extremely valuable, it does not usually allow us to determine 
conclusively whether—or by how much—a particular program of interest 
contributed to that improvement as long as other time-varying factors 
exist that are aff ecting the same outcome. 
We saw in the example of the microﬁ nance scheme and rice yields 
that many factors can aff ect rice yields over time. Likewise, many factors 
can aff ect the majority of outcomes of interest to development programs. 
For that reason, the preprogram outcome is almost never a good esti-
mate of the counterfactual, and that is why we label it a “counterfeit 
counterfactual.”
Doing a Before-and-After Evaluation of the Health Insurance 
Subsidy Program
Recall that the HISP is a new program in your country that subsidizes the 
purchase of health insurance for poor rural households and that this 
insurance covers expenses related to primary health care and drugs for 
those enrolled. The objective of the HISP is to reduce the out-of-pocket 
health expenditures of poor families and ultimately to improve health out-
comes. Although many outcome indicators could be considered for the 
program evaluation, your government is particularly interested in analyz-
ing the eff ects of the HISP on what poor families spend on primary care 
and drugs measured as a household’s yearly out-of-pocket expenditures 
per capita (subsequently referred to simply as “health expenditures”).
The HISP will represent a hefty proportion of the national budget if 
scaled up nationally—up to 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 
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some estimates. Furthermore, substantial administrative and logistical com-
plexities are involved in running a program of this nature. For these reasons, 
a decision has been made at the highest levels of government to introduce 
the HISP ﬁ rst as a pilot program and then, depending on the results of the 
ﬁ rst phase, to scale it up gradually over time. Based on the results of ﬁ nan-
cial and cost-beneﬁ t analyses, the president and her cabinet have announced 
that for the HISP to be viable and to be extended nationally, it must reduce 
the average yearly per-capita health expenditures of poor rural households 
by at least $9 below what they would have spent in the absence of the pro-
gram and it must do so within 2 years.
The HISP will be introduced in 100 rural villages during the initial pilot 
phase. Just before the start of the program, your government hires a survey 
ﬁ rm to conduct a baseline survey of all 4,959 households in these villages. 
The survey collects detailed information on every household, including 
their demographic composition, assets, access to health services, and health 
expenditures in the past year. Shortly after the baseline survey is conducted, 
the HISP is introduced in the 100 pilot villages with great fanfare, including 
community events and other promotional campaigns to encourage eligible 
households to enroll. 
Of the 4,959 households in the baseline sample, a total of 2,907 enroll in 
the HISP during the ﬁ rst 2 years of the program. Over the 2 years, the HISP 
operates successfully by most measures. Coverage rates are high, and sur-
veys show that most enrolled households are satisﬁ ed with the program. At 
the end of the 2-year pilot period, a second round of evaluation data is col-
lected on the same sample of 4,959 households.1  
The president and the minister of health have put you in charge of over-
seeing the impact evaluation for the HISP and recommending whether or 
not to extend the program nationally. Your impact evaluation question of 
interest is, By how much did the HISP lower health expenditures for poor rural 
households? Remember that the stakes are high. If the HISP is found to 
reduce health expenditures by $9 or more, it will be extended nationally. If 
the program did not reach the $9 target, you will recommend against scaling 
up the HISP.
The ﬁ rst “expert” evaluation consultant you hire indicates that to esti-
mate the impact of the HISP, you must calculate the change in health 
 expenditures over time for the households that enrolled. The consultant 
argues that because the HISP covers all health costs related to primary 
care and medication, any decrease in expenditures over time must be 
largely attributable to the eff ect of the HISP. Using only the subset of 
 enrolled households, therefore, you estimate their average health expen-
ditures before the implementation of the program and 2 years later. In 
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other words, you perform a before-and-after evaluation. The results are 
shown in table 3.1.
You observe that the households that enrolled in the HISP reduced their 
out-of-pocket health expenditures from $14.4 before the introduction of 
HISP, to $7.8 two years later, a reduction of $6.6 (or 45 percent) over the 
period. As denoted by the value of the t-statistic, the diff erence between 
health expenditures before and after the program is statistically signiﬁ cant, 
that is, the probability that the estimated eff ect is statistically equal to zero 
is very low. 
Even though the before-and-after comparison is for the same group of 
households, you are concerned that some other factors may have changed 
over time that aff ected health expenditures. For example, a number of 
health interventions have been operating simultaneously in the villages in 
question. Alternatively, some changes in household expenditures may have 
resulted from the ﬁ nancial crisis that your country recently experienced. To 
address some of these concerns, your consultant conducts more sophisti-
cated regression analysis that will control for the additional external factors. 
The results appear in table 3.2.
Here, the linear regression is of health expenditures on a binary (0-1) 
variable for whether the observation is baseline (0) or follow-up (1). The 
multivariate linear regression additionally controls for, or holds constant, 
other characteristics that are observed for the households in your sample, 
including indicators for wealth (assets), household composition, and so on. 
You note that the simple linear regression is equivalent to the simple before-
and-after diff erence in health expenditures (a reduction of $6.59). Once you 
control for other factors available in your data, you ﬁ nd a similar result—a 
decrease of $6.65.
Table 3.1  Case 1—HISP Impact Using Before-After (Comparison of Means)
After Before Difference t-stat
Household health expenditures 7.8 14.4 −6.6 −28.9
Source: Authors’ calculations from hypothetical data set.
Table 3.2  Case 1—HISP Impact Using Before-After (Regression Analysis)
 Linear regression Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on 
household health 
expenditures
−6.59**
(0.22)
−6.65**
(0.22)
Source: Authors.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
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QUESTION 1
A. Based on these results from case 1, should the HISP be scaled up nationally?
B. Does this analysis likely control for all the factors that affect health expenditures 
over time?
Counterfeit Counterfactual 2: Comparing Enrolled and Nonenrolled
Comparing units that receive a program to units that do not receive it (“with-
and-without”) constitutes another counterfeit counterfactual. Consider, for 
example, a vocational training program for unemployed youth. Assume that 
2 years after the launching of the scheme, an evaluation attempts to estimate 
the impact of the program on income by comparing the average incomes of 
a group of youth who chose to enroll in the program versus those of a group 
who chose not to enroll. Assume that the results show that the youths who 
enrolled in the program make twice as much as those who did not enroll.
How should these results be interpreted? In this case, the counterfac-
tual is estimated based on the incomes of individuals who decided not to 
enroll in the program. Yet the two groups of young people are likely to be 
fundamentally diff erent. Those individuals who chose to participate may 
be highly motivated to improve their livelihoods and may expect a high 
return to training. In contrast, those who chose not to enroll may be dis-
couraged youth who do not expect to beneﬁ t from this type of program. It 
is likely that these two types of young people would perform quite diff er-
ently in the labor market and would have diff erent incomes even without 
the vocational training program. 
Therefore, the group that chose not to enroll does not provide a good 
estimate of the counterfactual. If a diff erence in incomes is observed 
between the two groups, we will not be able to determine whether it comes 
from the training program or from the underlying diff erences in motivation 
and other factors that exist between the two groups. The fact that less-
motivated individuals chose not to enroll in the training program therefore 
leads to a bias in our assessment of the program’s impact.2 This bias is called 
“selection bias.” In this case, if the young people who enrolled would have 
had higher incomes even in the absence of the program, the selection bias 
would be positive; in other words, we would overestimate the impact of the 
vocational training program on incomes.
Comparing Units that Chose to Enroll in the Health Insurance 
Subsidy Program with Those that Chose Not to Enroll
Having thought through the before-after comparison a bit further with your 
evaluation team, you realize that there are still many time-varying factors 
Key Concept:
Selection bias occurs 
when the reasons for 
which an individual 
participates in a 
program are correlated 
with outcomes. This 
bias commonly occurs 
when the comparison 
group is ineligible for 
the program or decides 
not to participate in it.
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that can explain part of the change in health expenditures over time (in par-
ticular, the minister of ﬁ nance is concerned that the recent ﬁ nancial crisis 
may have aff ected households’ health expenditures and may explain the 
observed change). Another consultant suggests that it would be more appro-
priate to estimate the counterfactual in the postintervention period, that is, 
2 years after the program started. The consultant correctly notes that of the 
4,959 households in the baseline sample, only 2,907 actually enrolled in the 
program, and so approximately 41 percent of the households in the sample 
remain without the HISP coverage. The consultant argues that households 
within the same locality would be exposed to the same supply-side health 
interventions and the same local economic conditions, so that the postinter-
vention outcomes of the nonenrolled group would help to control for many 
of the environmental factors that aff ect both enrolled and nonenrolled 
households.
You therefore decide to calculate average health expenditures in the 
postintervention period for both the households that enrolled in the pro-
gram and the households that did not, producing the observations shown 
in table 3.3.
Using the average health expenditures of the nonenrolled households as 
the estimate of the counterfactual, you ﬁ nd that the program has reduced 
average health expenditures by approximately $14. When discussing this 
result further with the consultant, you raise the question of whether the 
households that chose not to enroll in the program may be systematically 
diff erent from the ones that did enroll. For example, the households that 
signed up for the HISP may be ones that expected to have higher health 
expenditures, or people who were better informed about the program, or 
people who care more for the health of their families. Alternatively, perhaps 
the households that enrolled were poorer, on average, than those who did 
not enroll, given that the HISP is targeted to poor households. Your consul-
tant assures you that regression analysis can control for the potential diff er-
ences between the two groups. Controlling for all household characteristics 
that are in the data set, the consultant estimates the impact of the program 
as shown in table 3.4.
Table 3.3  Case 2—HISP Impact Using Enrolled-Nonenrolled 
(Comparison of Means)
Enrolled Nonenrolled Difference t-stat
Household health expenditures 7.8 21.8 −13.9 −39.5
Source: Authors.
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Table 3.4  Case 2—HISP Impact Using Enrolled-Nonenrolled 
(Regression Analysis)
 Linear regression Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on 
household health 
expenditures
−13.9**
(0.35)
−9.4**
(0.32)
Source: Authors.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
With a simple linear regression of health expenditures on an indicator 
variable for whether or not a household enrolled in the program, you ﬁ nd an 
estimated impact of minus $13.90; in other words, you estimate that the pro-
gram has decreased average health expenditures by $13.90. However, when 
all other characteristics of the sample population are held constant, you 
estimate that the program has reduced the expenditures of the enrolled 
households by $9.40 per year.
QUESTION 2
A. Based on these results from case 2, should the HISP be scaled up nationally?
B. Does this analysis likely control for all the factors that determine differences in 
health expenditures between the two groups?
Notes
1. Note that we are assuming zero sample attrition over 2 years, that is, no 
households will have left the sample. This is not a realistic assumption for 
most household surveys. In practice, families who move sometimes cannot be 
tracked to their new location, and some households break up and cease to exist 
altogether.
2. As another example, if youth who anticipate beneﬁ ting considerably from 
the training scheme are also more likely to enroll (for example, because they 
anticipate higher wages with training), then we will be comparing a group of 
individuals who anticipated higher income with a group of individuals who did 
not anticipate higher income.
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Randomized Selection Methods
CHAPTER 4
Having discussed two approaches to constructing counterfactuals that are 
commonly used but have a high risk of bias—before-and-after comparisons 
and with-and-without comparisons—we now turn to a set of methods that 
can be applied to estimate program impacts more accurately. As we will see, 
however, such estimation is not always as straightforward as it might seem 
at ﬁ rst glance. Most programs are designed and implemented in a complex 
and changing environment, in which many factors can inﬂ uence outcomes 
both for program participants and for those who do not participate. 
Droughts, earthquakes, recessions, changes in government, and changes in 
international and local policies are all part of the real world, and as evalua-
tors, we want to make sure that the estimated impact of our program remains 
valid despite these myriad factors. 
As we will see throughout this part of the book, a program’s rules for 
enrolling participants will be the key parameter for selecting the impact 
evaluation method. We believe that in most cases the evaluation methods 
should try to ﬁ t within the context of a program’s operational rules (with a 
few tweaks here and there) and not the other way around. However, we also 
start from the premise that all social programs should have fair and transpar-
ent rules for program assignment. One of the fairest and most transparent 
rules for allocating scarce resources among equally deserving populations 
turns out to be giving everyone who is eligible an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in the program. One way to do that is simply to run a lottery. In this 
chapter, we will examine several randomized selection methods; these are 
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akin to running lotteries that decide who enters a program at a given time 
and who does not. These randomized selection methods not only provide 
program administrators with a fair and transparent rule for allocating scarce 
resources among equally deserving populations, but also represent the stron-
gest methods for evaluating the impact of a program. 
Randomized selection methods can often be derived from a program’s 
operational rules. For many programs, the population of intended partici-
pants—that is, the set of all units that the program would like to serve—is 
larger than the number of participants that the program can actually accom-
modate at a given time. For example, in a single year an education program 
may provide school materials and an upgraded curriculum to 500 schools 
out of thousands of eligible schools in the country. Or a youth employment 
program may have a goal of reaching 2,000 unemployed youths within its 
ﬁ rst year of operation, although there are tens of thousands of unemployed 
young people that the program ultimately would like to serve. For any of a 
variety of reasons, programs may be unable to reach the entire population of 
interest. Budgetary constraints may simply prevent the administrators from 
off ering the program to all eligible units from the beginning. Even if budgets 
are available to cover an unlimited number of participants, capacity con-
straints will sometimes prevent a program from rolling out to everyone at 
the same time. In the youth employment training program example, the 
number of unemployed youth who want vocational training may be greater 
than the number of slots available in technical colleges during the ﬁ rst year 
of the program, and that may limit the number who can enroll.
In reality, most programs have budgetary or operational capacity con-
straints that prevent reaching every intended participant at the same 
moment. In this context, where the population of eligible participants is 
larger than the number of program places available, program administrators 
must deﬁ ne a rationing mechanism to allocate the program’s services. In 
other words, someone must make a decision about who will enter the pro-
gram and who will not. The program could be assigned on a ﬁ rst-come-ﬁ rst-
served basis, or based on observed characteristics (for example, women and 
children ﬁ rst, or the poorest municipalities ﬁ rst); or selection could be based 
on unobserved characteristics (for example, letting individuals sign up 
based on their own motivation and knowledge), or even on a lottery. 
Randomized Assignment of the Treatment
When a program is assigned at random over a large eligible population, we 
can generate a robust estimate of the counterfactual, considered the gold 
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standard of impact evaluation. Randomized assignment of treatment essen-
tially uses a lottery to decide who among the equally eligible population 
receives the program and who does not.1 Every eligible unit of treatment 
(for example, an individual, household, community, school, hospital, or 
other) has an equal probability of selection for treatment.2 
Before we discuss how to implement randomized assignment in practice 
and why it generates a strong counterfactual, let us take a few moments to 
consider why randomized assignment is also a fair and transparent way to 
assign scarce program services. Once a target population has been deﬁ ned 
(say, households below the poverty line, or children under the age of 5, or 
schools in rural areas), randomized assignment is a fair allocation rule 
because it allows program managers to ensure that every eligible person or 
unit has the same chance of receiving the program and that the program is 
not assigned using arbitrary or subjective criteria, or even through patron-
age or other unfair practices. When excess demand for a program exists, 
randomized assignment is a rule that can be easily explained by program 
managers and easily understood by key constituents. When the selection 
process is conducted through an open and replicable process, the random-
ized assignment rule cannot easily be manipulated, and therefore it shields 
program managers from potential accusations of favoritism or corruption. 
Randomized assignment thus has its own merits as a rationing mechanism 
that go well beyond its utility as an impact evaluation tool. In fact, we have 
come across a number of programs that routinely use lotteries as a way to 
select participants from the pool of eligible individuals, primarily because of 
their advantages for administration and governance.3 
Why Does Randomized Assignment Produce an Excellent 
Estimate of the Counterfactual?
As discussed previously, the ideal comparison group will be as similar as 
possible to the treatment group in all respects, except with respect to its 
enrollment in the program that is being evaluated. The key is that when we 
randomly select units to assign them to the treatment and comparison 
groups, that randomized assignment process in itself will produce two 
groups that have a high probability of being statistically identical, as long as 
the number of potential participants to which we apply the randomized 
assignment process is suffi  ciently large. Speciﬁ cally, with a large enough 
number of observations, the randomized assignment process will produce 
groups that have statistically equivalent averages for all their characteristics. 
In turn, those averages also tend toward the average of the population from 
which they are drawn.4 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates why randomized assignment produces a compari-
son group that is statistically equivalent to the treatment group. Suppose the 
population of eligible units (the potential participants) consists of 1,000 
people, of whom half are randomly selected and assigned to the treatment 
group and the other half to the comparison group. For example, one could 
imagine writing the names of all 1,000 people on individual pieces of paper, 
mixing them up in a bowl, and then asking someone to blindly draw out 500 
names. If it was determined that the ﬁ rst 500 names would constitute the 
treatment group, then you would have a randomly assigned treatment group 
(the ﬁ rst 500 names drawn), and a randomly assigned comparison group 
(the 500 names left in the bowl).
Now assume that of the original 1,000 people, 40 percent were women. 
Because the names were selected at random, of the 500 names drawn from 
the bowl, approximately 40 percent will also be women. If among the 1,000 
people, 20 percent had blue eyes, then approximately 20 percent of both the 
treatment and the comparison groups should have blue eyes, too. In general, 
if the population of eligible units is large enough, then any characteristic of 
the population will ﬂ ow through to both the treatment group and the com-
parison groups. We can imagine that if observed characteristics such as 
sex or the color of a person’s eyes ﬂ ow through to both the treatment and 
the comparison group, then logically characteristics that are more diffi  cult 
to observe (unobserved variables), such as motivation, preferences, or 
other diffi  cult-to-measure personality traits, would also ﬂ ow through 
equally to both the treatment and the comparison groups. Thus, treatment 
and comparison groups that are generated through randomized assign-
ment will be similar not only in their observed characteristics but also in 
 Figure 4.1 Characteristics of Groups under Randomized Assignment 
of Treatment
Source: Authors.
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their unobserved characteristics. For example, you may not be able to 
observe or measure how “nice” people are, but you know that if 20 percent 
of the people in the population of eligible units are nice, then approximately 
20 percent of the people in the treatment group will be nice, and the same 
will be true of the comparison group. Randomized assignment will help 
guarantee that, on average, the treatment and comparison groups are simi-
lar in every way, in both observed and unobserved characteristics. 
When an evaluation uses randomized assignment to treatment and com-
parison groups, we know that theoretically the process should produce two 
groups that are equivalent. With baseline data on our evaluation sample, we 
can test this assumption empirically and verify that in fact there are no sys-
tematic diff erences in observed characteristics between the treatment and 
comparison groups before the program starts. Then, after we launch the 
program, if we observe diff erences in outcomes between the treatment and 
comparison groups, we will know that those diff erences can be explained 
only by the introduction of the program, since by construction the two 
groups were identical at baseline and are exposed to the same external envi-
ronmental factors over time. In this sense, the comparison group controls 
for all factors that might also explain the outcome of interest. We can be 
very conﬁ dent that our estimated average impact, given as the diff erence 
between the outcome under treatment (the mean outcome of the randomly 
assigned treatment group), and our estimate of the counterfactual (the 
mean outcome of the randomly assigned comparison group) constitute the 
true impact of the program, since by construction we have eliminated all 
observed and unobserved factors that might otherwise plausibly explain the 
diff erence in outcomes. 
In ﬁ gure 4.1 it is assumed that all units in the eligible population would 
be assigned to either the treatment or the comparison group. In some 
cases, however, it is not necessary to include all of them in the evaluation. 
For example, if the population of eligible units includes a million mothers, 
and you want to evaluate the eff ectiveness of cash bonuses on the proba-
bility of their vaccinating their children, it may be suffi  cient to take a rep-
resentative sample of, say, 1,000 mothers and assign those 1,000 to either 
the treatment or the comparison group. Figure 4.2 illustrates this process. 
By the same logic explained above, taking a random sample from the pop-
ulation of eligible units to form the evaluation sample preserves the char-
acteristics of the population of eligible units. The random selection of the 
treatment and comparison groups from the evaluation sample again pre-
serves the characteristics.
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External and Internal Validity
The steps outlined above for randomized assignment of treatment will 
ensure both the internal and the external validity of the impact evaluation, 
as long as the evaluation sample is large enough (ﬁ gure 4.2). 
Internal validity means that the estimated impact of the program is net of 
all other potential confounding factors, or that the comparison group repre-
sents the true counterfactual, so that we are estimating the true impact of 
the program. Remember that randomized assignment produces a compari-
son group that is statistically equivalent to the treatment group at baseline, 
before the program starts. Once the program starts, the comparison group is 
exposed to the same set of external factors over time, the only exception 
being the program. Therefore, if any diff erences in outcomes appear 
between the treatment and comparison groups, they can only be due to the 
existence of the program in the comparison group. In other words, the 
internal validity of an impact evaluation is ensured through the process of 
randomized assignment of treatment. 
External validity means that the impact estimated in the evaluation 
sample can be generalized to the population of all eligible units. For this 
to be possible, the evaluation sample must be representative of the popu-
lation of eligible units; in practice, it means that the evaluation sample 
must be selected from the population by using one of several variations 
of random sampling.5
Note that we have brought up two diff erent types of randomization: one 
for the purpose of sampling (for external validity) and one as an impact eval-
Key Concept:
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externally valid if the 
evaluation sample 
accurately represents 
the population of 
eligible units. The 
results are then 
generalizable to the 
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Figure 4.2 Random Sampling and Randomized Assignment of Treatment
Source: Authors.
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uation method (for internal validity). An impact evaluation can produce 
internally valid estimates of impact through randomized assignment of 
treatment; however, if the evaluation is performed on a nonrandom sample 
of the population, the estimated impacts may not be generalizable to the 
population of eligible units. Conversely, if the evaluation uses a random 
sample of the population of eligible units, but treatment is not assigned in a 
randomized way, then the sample would be representative, but the com-
parison group may not be valid.
When Can Randomized Assignment Be Used?
In practice, randomized assignment should be considered whenever a pro-
gram is oversubscribed, that is, when the number of potential participants is 
larger than the number of program spaces available at a given time and the 
program needs to be phased in. Some circumstances also merit randomized 
assignment as an evaluation tool even if program resources are not limited. 
For example, governments may want to use randomized assignment to test 
new or potentially costly programs whose intended and unintended conse-
quences are unknown. In this context, randomized assignment is justiﬁ ed 
during a pilot evaluation period to rigorously test the eff ects of the program 
before it is rolled out to a larger population. 
Two scenarios commonly occur in which randomized assignment is fea-
sible as an impact evaluation method:
1. When the eligible population is greater than the number of program spaces 
available. When the demand for a program exceeds the supply, a simple 
lottery can be used to select the treatment group within the eligible pop-
ulation. In this context, every unit in the population receives an equal 
chance of being selected for the program. The group that wins the lottery 
is the treatment group, and the rest of the population that is not off ered 
the program is the comparison group. As long as a resource constraint 
exists that prevents scaling the program up to the entire population, the 
comparison groups can be maintained to measure the short-, medium-, 
and long-term impacts of the program. In this context, no ethical dilem-
ma arises from holding a comparison group indeﬁ nitely, since a subset of 
the population will necessarily be left out of the program.
 As an example, suppose the ministry of education wants to provide 
school libraries to public schools throughout the country, but the minis-
try of ﬁ nance budgets only enough funds to cover one-third of them. If 
the ministry of education wants each public school to have an equal 
chance of receiving a library, it would run a lottery in which each school 
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has the same chance (1 in 3) of being selected. Schools that win the lottery 
receive a new library and constitute the treatment group, and the remain-
ing two-thirds of public schools in the country are not off ered the library 
and serve as the comparison group. Unless additional funds are allocated 
to the library program, a group of schools will remain that do not have 
funding for libraries through the program, and they can be used as a com-
parison group to measure the counterfactual.
2. When a program needs to be gradually phased in until it covers the entire 
eligible population. When a program is phased in, randomization of the 
order in which participants receive the program gives each eligible unit 
the same chance of receiving treatment in the ﬁ rst phase or in a later 
phase of the program. As long as the “last” group has not yet been phased 
into the program, it serves as a valid comparison group from which we 
can estimate the counterfactual for the groups that have already been 
phased in. 
 For example, suppose that the ministry of health wants to train all 
15,000 nurses in the country to use a new health protocol but needs 
three years to train them all. In the context of an impact evaluation, the 
ministry could randomly select one-third of the nurses to receive train-
ing in the ﬁ rst year, one-third to receive training in the second year, and 
one-third to receive training in the third year. To evaluate the eff ect of the 
training program one year after its implementation, the group of nurses 
trained in year 1 would constitute the treatment group, and the group of 
nurses randomly assigned to training in year 3 would be the comparison 
group, since they would not yet have received the training. 
How Do You Randomly Assign Treatment?
Now that we have discussed what randomized assignment does and why 
it produces a good comparison group, we will turn to the steps in success-
fully assigning treatment in a randomized way. Figure 4.3 illustrates this 
process. 
Step 1 in randomized assignment is to deﬁ ne the units that are eligible for 
the program. Depending on the particular program, a unit can be a person, a 
health center, a school, or even an entire village or municipality. The popu-
lation of eligible units consists of those for which you are interested in 
knowing the impact of your program. For example, if you are implementing 
a training program for primary school teachers in rural areas, then second-
ary school teachers or primary school teachers in urban areas would not 
belong to your population of eligible units.
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Once you have determined the population of eligible units, it will be nec-
essary to compare the size of the group with the number of observations 
required for the evaluation. This number is determined through power cal-
culations and is based on the types of questions you would like answered (see 
chapter 11). If the eligible population is small, all of the eligible units may 
need to be included in the evaluation. Alternatively, if there are more eligible 
units than are required for the evaluation, then step 2 is to select a sample of 
units from the population to be included in the evaluation sample. Note that 
this second step is done mainly to limit data collection costs. If it is found that 
data from existing monitoring systems can be used for the evaluation, and 
that those systems cover the population of eligible units, then you will not 
need to draw a separate evaluation sample. However, imagine an evaluation 
in which the population of eligible units includes tens of thousands of teach-
ers in every public school in the country, and you need to collect detailed 
information on teacher pedagogical knowledge. Interviewing each and every 
teacher may not be practically feasible, but you may ﬁ nd that it is suffi  cient to 
take a sample of 1,000 teachers distributed over 100 schools. As long as the 
sample of schools and teachers is representative of the whole population of 
public school teachers, any results found in the evaluation can be generalized 
to the rest of the teachers and public schools in the country. Collecting data 
Figure 4.3 Steps in Randomized Assignment to Treatment
Source: Authors.
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on this sample of 1,000 teachers will of course be much cheaper than collect-
ing data on every teacher in all public schools in the country.
Finally, step 3 will be forming the treatment and comparison groups 
among the units in the evaluation sample. This requires that you ﬁ rst decide 
on a rule for how to assign participants based on random numbers. For 
example, if you need to assign 40 out of 100 units from the evaluation sam-
ple to the treatment group, you may decide to assign those 40 units with the 
highest random numbers to the treatment group and the rest to the com-
parison group. You then assign a random number to each unit of observation 
in the evaluation sample, using a spreadsheet or specialized statistical soft-
ware (ﬁ gure 4.4), and use your previously chosen rule to form the treatment 
and comparison groups. Note that it is important to decide on the rule before 
you run the software that gives units their random numbers; otherwise, you 
may be tempted to decide on a rule based on the random numbers you see, 
and that would invalidate the randomized assignment. 
The logic behind the automated process is no diff erent from randomized 
assignment based on a coin toss or picking names out of a hat: it is a mecha-
nism that determines randomly whether each unit is in the treatment or the 
Figure 4.4 Randomized Assignment to Treatment Using a Spreadsheet
Source: Authors.
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* type the formula =RAND(). Note that the random numbers in Column C are volatile: they change everytime you do a calculation.
Random number
Goal
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If random number is above 0.5: assign
person to treatment group; otherwise: assign
Assign 50% of evaluation sample to treatment
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1001
1002
1008
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1010
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1013
0.0526415
0.0161464
0.4945841
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0.8387493
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0.4798531
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0.479467635
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0.955775449
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1
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1
0
* type the formula =RAND(). Note that the random numbers in Column C are volatile: they change everytime you do a calculation.
** Copy the numbers in column C and “Paste Special>Values” into Column D. Column D then gives the final random numbers.
*** type the formula =IF(C{row number}>0.5,1,0)
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Anna
Jung
Tuya
Nilu
Roberto
Priya
Grace
Fathia
John
Alex
Nafula
Name Random number*
Final random
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Assignment
A19
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comparison group. In cases where randomized assignment needs to be done 
in a public forum, some more “artisanal” techniques for randomized assign-
ment might be used. The following examples assume that the unit of ran-
domization is an individual person:
1. If you want to assign 50 percent of individuals to the treatment group and 
50 percent to the comparison group, ﬂ ip a coin for each person. You must 
decide in advance whether heads or tails on the coin will assign a person 
to the treatment group.
2. If you want to assign one-third of the evaluation sample to the treat-
ment group, you can roll dice for each person. First, you must decide on 
a rule. For example, a thrown die that shows a 1 or a 2 could mean an 
assignment to the treatment group, whereas a 3, 4, 5, or 6 would mean 
an assignment to the comparison group. You would roll the die once for 
each person in the evaluation sample and assign them based on the 
number that comes up.
3. Write the names of all of the people on pieces of paper of identical size 
and shape. Fold the papers so that the names cannot be seen, and mix 
them thoroughly in a hat or some other container. Before you start 
drawing, decide on your rule, that is, how many pieces of paper you will 
draw and that one’s name being drawn means being assigned to the 
treatment group. Once the rule is clear, ask someone in the crowd 
(someone unbiased, such as a child) to draw out as many pieces of pa-
per as you need participants in the treatment group.
Whether you use a public lottery, a roll of dice, or computer-generated ran-
dom numbers, it is important to document the process to ensure that it is 
transparent. That means, ﬁ rst, that the assignment rule has to be decided in 
advance and communicated to any members of the public. Second, you must 
stick to the rule once you draw the random numbers; and third, you must be 
able to show that the process was really random. In the cases of lotteries and 
throwing dice, you could videotape the process; computer-based assign-
ment of random numbers requires that you provide a log of your computa-
tions, so that the process can be replicated by auditors.6
At What Level Do You Perform Randomized Assignment?
Randomized assignment can be done at the individual, household, com-
munity, or regional level. In general, the level at which we randomly 
assign units to treatment and comparison groups will be greatly aff ected 
by where and how the program is being implemented. For example, if a 
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health program is being implemented at the health clinic level, you 
would ﬁ rst choose a random sample of health clinics and then randomly 
assign some of them to the treatment group and others to the compari-
son group. 
When the level of the randomized assignment is higher, for example, at 
the level of regions or provinces in a country, it can become very diffi  cult to 
perform an impact evaluation because the number of regions or provinces 
in most countries is not suffi  ciently large to yield balanced treatment and 
comparison groups. For example, if a country has only six provinces, that 
would permit only three treatment and three comparison provinces, num-
bers that are insuffi  cient to ensure that the characteristics of the treatment 
and comparison groups are balanced. 
But as the level of randomized assignment gets lower, for example, 
down to the individual or household level, the chances of spillovers and 
contamination increase.7 For example, if the program consists of providing 
deworming medicine to households, and a household in the treatment 
group is located close to a household in the comparison group, then the 
comparison household may be positively aff ected by a spillover from the 
treatment provided to the treatment household because its chances of 
contracting worms from the neighbors will be reduced. Treatment and 
comparison households need to be located suffi  ciently far from each other 
to avoid such spillovers. Yet, as the distance between the households 
increases, it will become more costly both to implement the program and 
to administer surveys. As a rule of thumb, if spillovers can be reasonably 
ruled out, it is best to perform randomized assignment of the treatment at 
the lowest possible level of program implementation; that will ensure that 
the number of units in both the treatment and comparison groups is as 
large as possible. Spillovers are discussed in chapter 8.
Estimating Impact under Randomized Assignment
Once you have drawn a random evaluation sample and assigned treatment 
in a randomized fashion, it is quite easy to estimate the impact of the pro-
gram. After the program has run for some time, outcomes for both the treat-
ment and comparison units will need to be measured. The impact of the 
program is simply the diff erence between the average outcome (Y) for the 
treatment group and the average outcome (Y) for the comparison group. For 
instance, in ﬁ gure 4.5, average outcome for the treatment group is 100, and 
average outcome for the comparison group is 80, so that the impact of the 
program is 20.
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Estimating the Impact of the Health Insurance Subsidy Program 
under Randomized Assignment
Let us now turn back to the example of the health insurance subsidy pro-
gram (HISP) and check what “randomized assignment” means in its con-
text. Recall that you are trying to estimate the impact of the program from a 
pilot that involves 100 treatment villages.
Having conducted two impact assessments using potentially biased 
counterfactuals (and having reached conﬂ icting policy recommendations; 
see chapter 3), you decide to go back to the drawing board to rethink how to 
obtain a more precise counterfactual. After further deliberations with your 
evaluation team, you are convinced that constructing a valid estimate of the 
counterfactual will require identifying a group of villages that are identical 
to the 100 treatment villages in all respects, with the only exception being 
that one group took part in the HISP and the other did not. Because the 
HISP was rolled out as a pilot, and the 100 treatment villages were selected 
randomly from among all of the rural villages in the country, you note that 
the villages should, on average, have the same characteristics as the general 
population of rural villages. The counterfactual can therefore be estimated 
in a valid way by measuring the health expenditures of eligible households 
in villages that did not take part in the program. 
Luckily, at the time of the baseline and follow-up surveys, the survey 
ﬁ rm collected data on an additional 100 rural villages that were not off ered 
the program in the ﬁ rst round. Those 100 additional villages were also 
randomly chosen from the population of eligible villages, which means 
that they too will, on average, have the same characteristics as the general 
population of rural villages. Thus, the way that the two groups of villages 
were chosen ensures that they have identical characteristics, except that 
the 100 treatment villages received the HISP and the 100 comparison vil-
lages did not. Randomized assignment of the treatment has occurred.  
Figure 4.5 Estimating Impact under Randomized Assignment
Source: Authors.
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Given randomized assignment of the treatment, you are quite conﬁ dent 
that no external factors other than the HISP would explain any diff erences 
in outcomes between the treatment and comparison villages. To validate 
this assumption, you test whether eligible households in the treatment and 
comparison villages have similar characteristics at the baseline as shown in 
table 4.1.
You observe that the average characteristics of households in the treat-
ment and comparison villages are in fact very similar. The only statistically 
signiﬁ cant diff erence is for the number of years of education of the spouse, 
and that diff erence is small. Note that even with a randomized experiment 
on a large sample, a small number of diff erences can be expected.8 With the 
validity of the comparison group established, your estimate of the counter-
factual is now the average health expenditures of eligible households in the 
100 comparison villages (table 4.2). 
Table 4.1 Case 3—Balance between Treatment and Comparison Villages 
at Baseline
Household 
characteristics
Treatment
villages
(N = 2964)
Comparison 
villages
(N = 2664) Difference t-stat
Health expenditures 
($ yearly per capita) 14.48 14.57 −0.09 −0.39
Head of household’s 
age (years) 41.6 42.3 −0.7 −1.2
Spouse’s age (years) 36.8 36.8 0.0 0.38
Head of household’s 
education (years) 2.9 2.8 0.1 2.16*
Spouse’s education 
(years) 2.7 2.6 0.1 0.006
Head of household 
is female = 1 0.07 0.07 −0.0 −0.66
Indigenous = 1 0.42 0.42 0.0 0.21
Number of household 
members 5.7 5.7 0.0 1.21
Has bathroom = 1 0.57 0.56 0.01 1.04
Hectares of land 1.67 1.71 −0.04 −1.35
Distance to 
hospital (km) 109 106 3 1.02
Source: Authors’ calculation.
* Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 4.2 Case 3—HISP Impact Using Randomized Assignment 
(Comparison of Means)
Treatment Comparison Difference t-stat
Household health 
expenditures baseline 14.48 14.57 −0.09 −0.39
Household health 
expenditures follow-up 7.8 17.9 −10.1** −25.6
Source: Authors’ calculation.
** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
Given that you now have a valid estimate of the counterfactual, you can 
ﬁ nd the impact of the HISP simply by taking the diff erence between the out-
of-pocket health expenditures of eligible households in the treatment vil-
lages and the estimate of the counterfactual. The impact is a reduction of 
$10.10 over two years. Replicating this result through regression analysis 
yields the same result, as shown in table 4.3. 
With randomized assignment, we can be conﬁ dent that no factors are 
present that are systematically diff erent between the treatment and com-
parison groups that might also explain the diff erence in health expendi-
tures. Both sets of villages have been exposed to the same set of national 
policies and programs during the two years of treatment. Thus, the most 
plausible reason that poor households in treatment communities have 
lower expenditures than households in comparison villages is that the ﬁ rst 
group received the health insurance program and the other group did not.
QUESTION 3
A. Why is the impact estimate derived using a multivariate linear regression basically 
unchanged when controlling for other factors?
B. Based on the impact estimated in case 3, should the HISP be scaled up nationally?
Table 4.3 Case 3—HISP Impact Using Randomized Assignment 
(Regression Analysis)
Linear 
regression Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on 
household health 
expenditures
−10.1**
(0.39)
−10.0**
(0.34)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
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Randomized Assignment at Work
Randomized assignment is often used in rigorous impact evaluation work, 
both in large-scale evaluations and in smaller ones. The evaluation of the 
Mexico Progresa program (Schultz 2004) is one of the most well-known, 
large-scale evaluations using randomized assignment (box 4.1). 
Two Variations on Randomized Assignment 
We now consider two variations that draw on many of the properties of ran-
domized assignment: randomized off ering of treatment and randomized 
promotion of treatment.
Box 4.1: Conditional Cash Transfers and Education in Mexico
The Progresa program, now called “Oportuni-
dades,” began in 1998 and provides cash 
transfers to poor mothers in rural Mexico con-
ditional on their children’s enrollment in school, 
with their attendance confi rmed by the 
teacher. This large-scale social program was 
one of the fi rst to be designed with a rigorous 
evaluation in mind, and randomized assign-
ment was used to help identify the effect of 
conditional cash transfers on a number of out-
comes, in particular school enrollment.
The grants, for children in grades 3 through 
9, amount to about 50 percent to 75 per-
cent of the private cost of schooling and 
are guaranteed for three years. The com-
munities and households eligible for the 
program were determined based on a pov-
erty index created from census data and 
baseline data collection. Because of a need 
to phase in the large-scale social program, 
about two-thirds of the localities (314 out of 
495) were randomly selected to receive the 
program in the fi rst two years, and the re-
maining 181 served as a control group be-
fore entering the program in the third year.
Based on the randomized assignment, 
Schultz (2004) found an average increase 
in enrollment of 3.4 percent for all students 
in grades 1–8, with the largest increase 
among girls who had completed grade 6, at 
14.8 percent.a The likely reason is that girls 
tend to drop out of school at greater rates as 
they get older, and so they were given a 
slightly larger transfer to stay in school past 
the primary grade levels. These short-run im-
pacts were then extrapolated to predict the 
longer-term impact of the Progresa program 
on lifetime schooling and earnings. 
Source: Schultz 2004.
a.  To be precise, Schultz combined randomized assignment with difference-in-difference methods. Chapter 8 
discusses the benefi ts of combining various impact evaluation methodologies.
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Randomized Offering: When Not Everyone Complies with Their 
Assignment
In the earlier, discussion of randomized assignment, we have assumed that 
the program administrator has the power to assign units to treatment and 
comparison groups, with those assigned to the treatment taking the pro-
gram and those assigned to the comparison group not taking the program. 
In other words, units that were assigned to the treatment and comparison 
groups complied with their assignment. Full compliance is more frequently 
attained in laboratory settings or medical trials, where the researcher can 
carefully make sure, ﬁ rst, that all subjects in the treatment group take the 
pill, and second, that none of the subjects in the comparison group take it.9
In real-life social programs, full compliance with a program’s selection 
criteria (and hence, adherence to treatment or comparison status) is opti-
mal, and policy makers and impact evaluators alike strive to come as close to 
that ideal as possible. In practice, however, strict 100 percent compliance to 
treatment and comparison assignments may not occur, despite the best 
eff orts of the program implementer and the impact evaluator. Just because 
a teacher is assigned to the treatment group and is off ered training does not 
mean that she or he will actually show up on the ﬁ rst day of the course. 
Similarly, a teacher who is assigned to the comparison group may ﬁ nd a way 
to attend the course anyway. Under these circumstances, a straight com-
parison of the group originally assigned to treatment with the group origi-
nally assigned to comparison will yield the “intention-to-treat” estimate 
(ITT). The reason is that we will be comparing those whom we intended to 
treat (those assigned to the treatment group) with those whom we intended 
not to treat (those assigned to the comparison group). By itself, this is a very 
interesting and relevant measure of impact, since most policy makers and 
program managers can only off er a program and cannot force the program 
on their target population. 
But at the same time, we may also be interested in estimating the impact 
of the program on those who actually take up or accept the treatment. Doing 
that requires correcting for the fact that some of the units assigned to the 
treatment group did not actually receive the treatment, or that some of the 
units assigned to the comparison group actually did receive it. In other 
words, we want to estimate the impact of the program on those to whom 
treatment was off ered and who actually enrolled. This is the “treatment-on-
the-treated” estimate (TOT).
Randomized Offering of a Program and Final Take-Up
Imagine that you are evaluating the impact of a job training program on 
individuals’ wages. The program is randomly assigned at the individual 
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level, and the treatment group is off ered the program while the compari-
son group is not. Most likely, you will ﬁ nd three types of individuals in the 
population:
• Enroll-if-off ered. These are the individuals who comply with their assign-
ment. If they are assigned to the treatment group (off ered the program), 
they take it up, or enroll; if they are assigned to the comparison group 
(not off ered the program), they do not enroll.
• Never. These are the individuals that never enroll in or take up the pro-
gram, even if they are assigned to the treatment group. They are noncom-
pliers in the treatment group. 
• Always. These are the individuals who will ﬁ nd a way to enroll in the 
program or take it up, even if they are assigned to the comparison group. 
They are noncompliers in the comparison group.
In the context of the job training program, the Never group might be unmo-
tivated people who, even if off ered a place in the course, do not show up. 
The Always group, in contrast, are so motivated that they ﬁ nd a way to enter 
the program even if they were originally assigned to the comparison group. 
The Enroll-if-off ered group are those who would enroll in the course if it is 
off ered (the treatment group) but do not seek to enroll if they are assigned 
to the comparison group.
Figure 4.6 presents the randomized off ering of the program and the ﬁ nal 
enrollment, or take-up, when Enroll-if-off ered, Never, and Always groups 
are present. We assume that the population of units has 80 percent Enroll-
if-off ered, 10 percent Never, and 10 percent Always. If we take a random 
sample of the population for the evaluation sample, then the evaluation 
sample will also have approximately 80 percent Enroll-if-off ered, 10 percent 
Never, and 10 percent Always. Then if we randomly divide the evaluation 
sample into a treatment group and a comparison group, we should again 
have approximately 80 percent Enroll-if-off ered, 10 percent Never, and 10 
percent Always in both groups. In the group that is off ered treatment, the 
Enroll-if-off ered and Always individuals will enroll, and only the Never peo-
ple will stay away. In the group that is not off ered treatment, the Always 
will enroll, while the Enroll-if-off ered and Never groups will stay out.
Estimating Impact under Randomized Offering
Having established the diff erence between off ering a program and actual 
enrollment or take-up, we turn to a technique that can be used to estimate 
the impact of treatment on the treated, that is, the impact of the program on 
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Figure 4.6 Randomized Offering of a Program
Source: Authors.
Figure 4.7 Estimating the Impact of Treatment on the Treated under 
Randomized Offering
Source: Authors.
Note: ITT is the “intention-to-treat” estimate obtained by comparing outcomes for those to whom treat-
ment was offered with those to whom treatment was not offered (irrespective of actual enrollment). TOT 
is the “treatment-on-the-treated” estimate, i.e., the impact of the program estimated on those who were 
offered treatment and who actually enroll. Characters on shaded background are those that actually enroll.
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those who were off ered treatment and who actually enroll. This estimation 
is done in two steps, which are illustrated in ﬁ gure 4.7.10 
First, we estimate the impact of intention to treat. Remember that this 
is just the straight diff erence in the outcome indicator (Y) for the group to 
whom we off ered treatment and the same indicator for the group to 
whom we did not off er treatment. For example, if the average income (Y) 
for the treatment group is $110, and the average income for the compari-
son group is $70, then the intention-to-treat estimate of the impact (ITT) 
would be $40. 
Second, we need to recover the treatment-on-the-treated estimate (TOT) 
from the intention-to-treat estimate. To do that, we will need to identify 
where the $40 diff erence came from. Let us proceed by elimination. First, 
we know that the diff erence cannot be caused by any diff erences between 
the Nevers in the treatment and comparison groups. The reason is that the 
Nevers never enroll in the program, so that for them, it makes no diff erence 
whether they are in the treatment group or in the comparison group. Sec-
ond, we know that the $40 diff erence cannot be caused by diff erences 
between the Always people in the treatment and comparison groups because 
the Always people always enroll in the program. For them, too, it makes no 
diff erence whether they are in the treatment group or the comparison 
group. Thus, the diff erence in outcomes between the two groups must nec-
essarily come from the eff ect of the program on the only group aff ected by 
their assignment to treatment or comparison, that is, the Enroll-if-off ered 
group. So if we can identify the Enroll-if-off ered in both groups, it will be 
easy to estimate the impact of the program on them.
In reality, although we know that these three types of individuals exist in 
the population, we cannot uniquely separate out individuals by whether 
they are Enroll-if-off ered, Never, or Always. In the group that was off ered 
treatment, we can identify the Nevers (because they have not enrolled), but 
we cannot diff erentiate between the Always and the Enroll-if-off ered 
(because both are enrolled). In the group that was not off ered treatment, we 
can identify the Always group (because they enroll in the program), but we 
cannot diff erentiate between the Nevers and the Enroll-if-off ered. 
However, once we observe that 90 percent of units in the group off ered 
treatment enroll, we can deduce that 10 percent of the units in our popula-
tion must be Nevers (that is the fraction of individuals in the group off ered 
treatment that did not enroll). In addition, if we observe that 10 percent of 
units in the group not off ered treatment enroll, we know that 10 percent are 
Always (again, the fraction of individuals in our group that was not off ered 
treatment who did enroll). This leaves 80 percent of the units in the Enroll-
if-off ered group. We know that the entire impact of $40 came from a diff er-
ence in enrollment for the 80 percent of the units in our sample who are 
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Enroll-if-off ered. Now if 80 percent of the units are responsible for an aver-
age impact of $40 for the entire group off ered treatment, then the impact on 
those 80 percent of Enroll-if-off ered must be 40/0.8, or $50. Put another way, 
the impact of the program for the Enroll-if-off ered is $50, but when this 
impact is spread across the entire group off ered treatment, the average 
eff ect is watered down by the 20 percent that was noncompliant with the 
original randomized assignment. 
Remember that one of the basic issues with self-selection into pro-
grams is that you cannot always know why some people choose to partici-
pate and others do not. When we randomly assign units to the program, 
but actual participation is voluntary or a way may exist for units in the 
comparison group to get into the program, then we have a similar prob-
lem: we will not always understand the behavioral processes that deter-
mine whether an individual behaves like a Never, an Always, or an 
Enroll-if-off ered in our example above. However, provided that the non-
compliance is not too large, the initial randomized assignment still pro-
vides a powerful tool for estimating impact. The downside of randomized 
assignment with imperfect compliance is that this impact estimate is no 
longer valid for the entire population. Instead, it applies only to a speciﬁ c 
subgroup within our target population, the Enroll-if-off ered. 
Randomized off ering of a program has two important characteristics that 
allow us to estimate impact even without full compliance (see box 4.2):11
1. It can serve as a predictor of actual enrollment in the program if most 
people behave as Enroll-if-off ered, enrolling in the program when off ered 
treatment and not enrolling when not off ered treatment.
2. Since the two groups (off ered and not off ered treatment) are generated 
through a random selection process, the characteristics of individuals in 
the two groups are not correlated with anything else, such as ability or 
motivation, that may also aff ect the outcomes (Y).
Randomized Promotion or Encouragement Design
In the previous section, we saw how to estimate impact based on random-
ized assignment of treatment, even when compliance with the originally 
assigned treatment and comparison groups is incomplete. Next we propose 
a very similar approach that can be applied to evaluate programs that have 
universal eligibility or open enrollment or in which the program adminis-
trator cannot control who participates and who does not. 
Governments commonly implement programs for which it is diffi  cult 
either to exclude any potential participants or to force them to participate. 
Many programs allow potential participants to choose to enroll and are 
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not, therefore, able to exclude potential participants who want to enroll. 
In addition, some programs have a budget that is big enough to supply the 
program to the entire eligible population immediately, so that randomly 
choosing treatment and comparison groups and excluding potential par-
ticipants for the sake of an evaluation would not be ethical. We therefore 
need an alternative way to evaluate the impact of these kinds of programs—
those with voluntary enrollment and those with universal coverage. 
Voluntary enrollment programs typically allow individuals who are 
interested in the program to approach on their own to enroll and partici-
pate. Imagine again the job training program discussed earlier, but this time 
randomized assignment is not possible, and any individual who wishes to 
enroll in the program is free to do so. Very much in line with our previous 
example, we will expect to encounter three types of people: compliers, a 
Never group, and an Always group. As in the previous case, Always people 
Box 4.2: Randomized Offering of School Vouchers in Colombia
The Program for Extending the Coverage of 
Secondary School (Programa de Ampliación 
de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria 
[PACES]), in Colombia, provided more than 
125,000 students with vouchers covering 
slightly over half the cost of attending pri-
vate secondary school. Because of the lim-
ited PACES budget, the vouchers were 
allocated via a lottery. Angrist et al. (2002) 
took advantage of this randomly assigned 
treatment to determine the effect of the 
voucher program on educational and social 
outcomes.  
They found that lottery winners were 
10 percent more likely to complete the 
8th grade and scored, on average, 0.2 stan-
dard deviations higher on standardized tests 
three years after the initial lottery. They also 
found that the educational effects were 
greater for girls than boys. The researchers 
then looked at the impact of the program on 
several noneducational outcomes and found 
that lottery winners were less likely to be 
married and worked about 1.2 fewer hours 
per week.  
There was some noncompliance with the 
randomized design, in that about 90 percent 
of the lottery winners had actually used the 
voucher or another form of scholarship and 
24 percent of the lottery losers had actually 
received scholarships. Angrist and colleagues 
therefore also used intent-to-treat, or a stu-
dent’s lottery win or loss status, as an in-
strumental variable for the treatment-on-
the-treated, or actual scholarship receipt. 
Finally, the researchers were able to calcu-
late a cost-benefi t analysis to better under-
stand the impact of the voucher program on 
both household and government expendi-
tures. They concluded that the total social 
costs of the program are small and are out-
weighed by the expected returns to partici-
pants and their families, thus suggesting 
that demand-side programs such as PACES 
can be a cost-effective way to increase edu-
cational attainment. 
Source: Angrist et al. 2002.
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will always enroll in the program and Never people will never enroll. But 
how about the compliers? In this context, any individual who would like to 
enroll in the program is free to do so. And what about individuals who may 
be very interested in enrolling but who, for a variety of reasons, may not 
have suffi  cient information or the right incentive to enroll? The compliers in 
this context will be precisely that group. The compliers here are those who 
enroll-if-promoted: they are a group of individuals who only enroll in the 
program if given an additional incentive, or promotion, that motivates them 
to enroll. Without this additional stimulus, the Enroll-if-promoted would 
simply remain out of the program.  
Again coming back to the job training example, if the agency that orga-
nizes the training is well funded and has suffi  cient capacity to train every-
one who wants to be trained, then the job training program will be open to 
every unemployed person who wants to participate. It is unlikely, however, 
that every unemployed person will actually want to participate or will even 
know of the existence of the program. Some unemployed people may be 
reluctant to enroll because they know very little about the content of the 
training and ﬁ nd it hard to obtain additional information. Now assume that 
the job training agency hires a community outreach worker to go around 
town to enlist unemployed persons into the job training program. Carrying 
a list of unemployed people, she knocks on their doors, describes the train-
ing program, and off ers to help the person to enroll in the program on the 
spot. Of course, she cannot force anyone to participate. In addition, the 
unemployed persons whom the outreach worker does not visit can also 
enroll, although they will have to go to the agency themselves to do so. So we 
now have two groups of unemployed people—those who were visited by the 
outreach worker and those who were not visited. If the outreach eff ort is 
eff ective, the enrollment rate among unemployed people who were visited 
should be higher than the rate among unemployed people who were not 
visited.
Now let us think about how we can evaluate this job training program. As 
we know, we cannot just compare those unemployed people who enroll 
with those who do not enroll. The reason is that the unemployed who enroll 
are probably very diff erent from those who do not enroll in both observed 
and nonobserved ways: they may be more educated (this can be observed 
easily), and they are probably more motivated and eager to ﬁ nd a job (this is 
hard to observe and measure). 
However, we do have some additional variation that we can exploit to 
ﬁ nd a valid comparison group. Let us consider for a moment whether we 
can compare the group that was visited by the outreach worker with the 
group that was not visited. Both groups contain very motivated persons 
72 Impact Evaluation in Practice
(Always) who will enroll whether or not the outreach worker knocks on 
their door. Both groups also contain unmotivated persons (Never) who will 
not enroll in the program despite the eff orts of the outreach worker. And 
ﬁ nally, some people (Enroll-if-promoted) will enroll in the training if the 
outreach worker visits them but will not enroll if the worker does not come 
knocking. 
If the outreach worker randomly selected the people on her list to 
visit, we would be able to use the treatment-on-the-treated method dis-
cussed earlier. The only diff erence would be that, instead of randomly 
off ering the program, we would be randomly promoting it. As long as 
Enroll-if-promoted people (who enroll when we reach out to them but do 
not enroll when we do not reach out to them) appear, we would have a 
variation between the group with the promotion or outreach and the 
group without the promotion or outreach that would allow us to identify 
the impact of the training on the Enroll-if-promoted. Instead of complying 
with the off er of the treatment, the Enroll-if-promoted are now complying 
with the promotion. 
We want the outreach strategy to be eff ective and to increase enrollment 
substantially among the Enroll-if-promoted group. At the same time, we do 
not want the promotion activities to be so widespread and eff ective that 
they inﬂ uence the outcome of interest. For example, if the outreach workers 
off ered large amounts of money to unemployed people to get them to enroll, 
it would be hard to tell whether any later changes in income were caused by 
the training or by the outreach or promotion itself. 
Randomized promotion is a creative strategy that generates the equiva-
lent of a comparison group for the purposes of impact evaluation. It can be 
used when it is feasible to organize a promotion campaign aimed at a ran-
dom sample of the population of interest. Readers with a background in 
econometrics may again recognize the terminology introduced in the previ-
ous section: the randomized promotion is an instrumental variable that 
allows us to create variation between units and exploit that variation to cre-
ate a valid comparison group.
You Said “Promotion”?
Randomized promotion seeks to increase the take-up of a voluntary pro-
gram in a subsample of the population. It can take several forms. For 
instance, we may choose to initiate an information campaign to reach those 
individuals who had not enrolled because they did not know or fully under-
stand the content of the program. Alternatively, we may choose to provide 
incentives to sign up, such as off ering small gifts or prizes or making trans-
portation or other help available. 
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A number of conditions must be met for the randomized promotion 
methodology to produce a valid impact evaluation. 
1. The promoted and nonpromoted groups must be comparable. The char-
acteristics of the two groups must be similar. This is achieved by ran-
domly assigning the outreach or promotion activities among the units in 
the evaluation sample. 
2. The promotion campaign must increase enrollment by those in the pro-
moted group substantially above the rate of the nonpromoted group. This 
can be veriﬁ ed by checking that enrollment rates are higher in the group 
that receives the promotion than in the group that does not. 
3. It is important that the promotion itself does not directly aff ect the out-
comes of interest, so that we can tell that changes in the outcomes of in-
terest are caused by the program itself and not by the promotion.
The Randomized Promotion Process
The process of randomized promotion is presented in ﬁ gure 4.8. As in the 
previous methods, we begin with the population of eligible units for the pro-
gram. In contrast with randomized assignment, we can no longer randomly 
choose who will receive the program and who will not receive the program 
because the program is fully voluntary. However, within the population of 
eligible units, there will be three types of units: 
• Always—those who will always want to enroll in the program
• Enroll-if-promoted—those who will sign up for the program only when 
given additional promotion
• Never—those who never want to sign up for the program, whether or not 
we off er them promotion
Again, note that being an Always, an Enroll-if-promoted, or a Never is an 
intrinsic characteristic of units that cannot be measured by the program 
evaluator because it is related to factors such as intrinsic motivation and 
intelligence. 
Once the eligible population is deﬁ ned, the next step is to randomly select 
a sample from the population to be part of the evaluation. These are the 
units on whom we will collect data. In some cases—for example, when we 
have data for the entire population of eligible units—we may decide to 
include this entire population in the evaluation sample. 
Key Concept:
Randomized promotion 
is a method similar to 
randomized offering. 
Instead of randomly 
selecting units to 
whom we offer the 
treatment, we 
randomly select units 
to whom we promote 
the treatment. In this 
way, we can leave the 
program open to every 
unit.
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Once the evaluation sample is deﬁ ned, randomized promotion randomly 
assigns the evaluation sample into a promoted group and a nonpromoted 
group. Since we are randomly choosing the members of both the promoted 
group and the nonpromoted group, both groups will share the characteris-
tics of the overall evaluation sample, and those will be equivalent to the 
characteristics of the population of eligible units. Therefore, the promoted 
group and the nonpromoted group will have similar characteristics.
After the promotion campaign is over, we can observe the enrollment 
rates in the promoted and nonpromoted groups. In the nonpromoted group, 
only the Always will enroll. Although we thus will be able to know which 
units are Always in the nonpromoted group, we will not be able to distin-
guish between the Never and Enroll-if-promoted in that group. By contrast, 
in the promoted group both the Enroll-if-promoted and the Always will 
enroll, whereas the Never will not enroll. So in the promoted group we will 
be able to identify the Never group, but we will not be able to distinguish 
between the Enroll-if-promoted and the Always. 
Estimating Impact under Randomized Promotion
Estimating the impact of a program using randomized promotion is a spe-
cial case of the treatment-on-the-treated method (ﬁ gure 4.9). Imagine that 
the promotion campaign raises enrollment from 30 percent in the nonpro-
moted group (3 Always) to 80 percent in the promoted group (3 Always and 
5 Enroll-if-promoted). Assume that average outcome for all individuals in 
Figure 4.8 Randomized Promotion
Source: Authors. 
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the nonpromoted group (10 individuals) is 70, and that average outcome for 
all individuals in the promoted group (10 individuals) is 110. Then what 
would the impact of the program be?
First, we can compute the straight diff erence between the promoted and 
the nonpromoted groups, which is 40. We also know that none of this diff er-
ence of 40 comes from the Nevers because they do not enroll in either group. 
We also know that none of this diff erence of 40 comes from the Enroll-if-
promoted because they enroll in both groups. 
The second step is to recover the impact that the program has had on 
the Enroll-if-promoted. We know the entire average eff ect of 40 can be 
attributed to the Enroll-if-promoted, who make up only 50 percent of the 
population. To assess the average eff ect of the program on a complier, we 
divide 40 by the percentage of Enroll-if-promoted in the population. 
Although we cannot directly identify the Enroll-if-promoted, we are able to 
deduce what must be their percentage of the population: it is the diff erence 
in the enrollment rates of the promoted and the nonpromoted groups 
(50 percent or 0.5). Therefore, the average impact of the program on a 
complier is 40/0.5 = 80 
Given that the promotion is assigned randomly, the promoted and non-
promoted groups have equal characteristics, on average. Thus, the diff er-
ences that we observe in average outcomes between the two groups must be 
caused by the fact that in the promoted group the Enroll-if-promoted enroll, 
while in the nonpromoted group they do not.12
Figure 4.9 Estimating Impact under Randomized Promotion
Source: Authors.
Note: Characters on shaded background are those that enroll.
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Using Randomized Promotion to Estimate the Impact of the 
Health Insurance Subsidy Program
Let us now try using the randomized promotion method to evaluate the 
impact of the HISP. Assume that the ministry of health makes an executive 
decision that the health insurance subsidy should be made available imme-
diately to any household that wants to enroll. However, you know that real-
istically this national scale-up will be incremental over time, and so you 
reach an agreement to accelerate enrollment in a random subset of villages 
through a promotion campaign. You undertake an intensive promotion 
eff ort in a random subsample of villages, including communication and 
social marketing campaigns aimed at increasing awareness of the HISP. 
After two years of promotion and program implementation, you ﬁ nd that 
49.2 percent of households in villages that were randomly assigned to the 
promotion have enrolled in the program, while only 8.4 percent of house-
holds in nonpromoted villages have enrolled (table 4.4).
Because the promoted and nonpromoted villages were assigned at ran-
dom, you know that the average characteristics of the two groups should be 
the same in the absence of the program. You can verify that assumption by 
comparing the baseline health expenditures (as well as any other character-
istics) of the two populations. After two years of program implementation, 
you observe that the average health expenditure in the promoted villages is 
$14.9 compared with $18.8 in nonpromoted areas (a diff erence of minus 
$3.9). However, because the only diff erence between the promoted and non-
promoted villages is that promoted villages have greater enrollment in the 
program (thanks to the promotion), this diff erence of $3.9 in health expen-
ditures must be due to the 40.4 percent of households that enrolled in the 
promoted villages because of the promotion. Therefore, we need to adjust 
Table 4.4 Case 4—HISP Impact Using Randomized Promotion (Comparison 
of Means)
Promoted
villages
Nonpromoted
villages Difference t-stat
Household health 
expenditures baseline 17.1 17.2 −0.1 −0.47
Household health 
expenditures follow-up 14.9 18.8 −3.9 −18.3
Enrollment in HISP 49.2% 8.4% 40.4%
Source: Authors’ calculation.
** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
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the diff erence in health expenditures to be able to ﬁ nd the impact of the 
program on the Enroll-if-promoted. To do this, we divide the straight diff er-
ence between the promoted groups by the percentage of Enroll-if-promoted: 
−3.9/0.404 = −$9.65. Your colleague, who took an econometrics class, then 
estimates the impact of the program through two-stage least squares and 
ﬁ nds the results shown in table 4.5. This estimated impact is valid for those 
households that enrolled in the program because of the promotion but 
who otherwise would not have done so, in other words, for the Enroll-if-
promoted. To extrapolate this result for the full population, we must assume 
that all other households would have reacted in a similar way had they 
enrolled in the program. 
QUESTION 4
A. What are the basic assumptions required to accept the result from case 4?
B. Based on the result from case 4, should the HISP be scaled up nationally?
Randomized Promotion at Work
The randomized promotion method can be used in various settings. Gertler, 
Martinez, and Vivo (2008) used it to evaluate a maternal and child health 
insurance program in Argentina. Following the 2001 economic crisis, the 
government of Argentina observed that the population’s health indicators 
had started deteriorating and, in particular, that infant mortality was 
increasing. It decided to introduce a national insurance scheme for mothers 
and their children, which was to be scaled up to the entire country within a 
year. Still, government offi  cials wanted to evaluate the impact of the pro-
gram to make sure that it was really improving the health status of the popu-
lation. How could a comparison group be found if every mother and child in 
the country was entitled to enroll in the insurance scheme if they so desired? 
Data for the ﬁ rst provinces implementing the intervention showed that only 
Table 4.5 Case 4—HISP Impact Using Randomized Promotion
(Regression Analysis)
Linear regression
Multivariate linear 
regression
Estimated impact on house-
hold health expenditures
−9.4**
(0.51)
−9.7**
(0.45)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. 
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40 percent to 50 percent of households were actually enrolling in the pro-
gram. So the government launched an intensive promotion campaign seek-
ing to inform households about the program. However, the promotion 
campaign was implemented only in a random sample of villages, not in the 
entire country. 
Other examples include assistance from nongovernmental organizations 
in a community-based school management evaluation, in Nepal, and the 
Bolivian Social Investment Fund (detailed in box 4.3).
Limitations of the Randomized Promotion Method
Randomized promotion is a useful strategy for evaluating the impact of vol-
untary programs and programs with universal eligibility, particularly 
because it does not require the exclusion of any eligible units. Nevertheless, 
the approach has some noteworthy limitations compared to randomized 
assignment of the treatment. 
First, the promotion strategy must be eff ective. If the promotion cam-
paign does not increase enrollment, then no diff erence between the pro-
Box 4.3: Promoting Education Infrastructure Investments in Bolivia
In 1991, Bolivia institutionalized and scaled 
up a successful Social Investment Fund 
(SIF) which provided fi nancing to rural com-
munities to carry out small-scale invest-
ments in education, health, and water 
infrastructure. The World Bank, which was 
helping to fi nance SIF, was able to build an 
impact evaluation into the program design. 
As part of the impact evaluation of the 
education component, communities in the 
Chaco region were randomly selected for ac-
tive promotion of the SIF intervention and 
received additional visits and encourage-
ment to apply from program staff. The pro-
gram was open to all eligible communities in 
the region and was demand driven in that 
communities had to apply for funds for a 
specifi c project. Not all communities took up 
the program, but take-up was higher among 
promoted communities. 
Newman et al. (2002) used the random-
ized promotion as an instrumental variable. 
They found that the education investments 
succeeded in improving measures of school 
infrastructure quality such as electricity, 
sanitation facilities, textbooks per student, 
and student-teacher ratios. However they 
detected little impact on educational out-
comes, except for a decrease of about 
2.5 percent in the dropout rate. As a result 
of these fi ndings, the ministry of education 
and the SIF now focus more attention and 
resources on the “software” of education, 
funding physical infrastructure improve-
ments only when they form part of an inte-
grated intervention. 
Source: Newman et al. 2002.
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moted and the nonpromoted groups will appear, and there will be nothing 
to compare. It is thus crucial to pilot the promotion campaign extensively to 
make sure that it will be eff ective. On the positive side, the design of the 
promotion campaign can help program managers by teaching them how to 
increase enrollment. 
Second, the methodology estimates the impact of the program only for a 
subset of the population of eligible units. Speciﬁ cally, the program’s average 
impact is computed from the group of individuals who sign up for the pro-
gram only when encouraged to do so. However, individuals in this group 
may have very diff erent characteristics than those individuals who always 
or never enroll, and therefore the average treatment eff ect for the entire 
population may be diff erent from the average treatment eff ect estimated for 
individuals who participate only when encouraged.
Notes
 1. Randomized assignment of treatment is also commonly referred to as “ran-
domized control trials,” “randomized evaluations,” “experimental evaluations,” 
and “social experiments,” among other terms.
 2. Note that this probability does not necessarily mean a 50-50 chance of winning 
the lottery. In fact, most randomized assignment evaluations will give each 
eligible unit a probability of selection that is determined so that the number 
of winners (treatments) equals the total available number of beneﬁ ts. For 
example, if a program has enough funding to serve only 1,000 communities, out 
of a population of 10,000 eligible communities, then each community will be 
given a chance of 1 in 10 of being selected for treatment. Statistical power (a 
concept discussed in more detail in chapter 11) will be maximized when the 
evaluation sample is divided equally between the treatment and control groups. 
In the example here, for a total sample size of 2,000 communities, statistical 
power will be maximized by sampling all 1,000 treatment communities and 
a subsample of 1,000 control communities, rather than by taking a simple 
random sample of 20 percent of the original 10,000 eligible communities 
(which would produce an evaluation sample of roughly 200 treatment 
communities and 1,800 control communities).
 3. For example, housing programs that provide subsidized homes routinely use 
lotteries to select program participants. 
 4. This property comes from the Law of Large Numbers.
 5. An evaluation sample can be stratiﬁ ed by population subtypes and can also be 
clustered by sampling units. The sample size will depend on the particular type 
of random sampling used (see part 3).
 6. Most software programs allow you to set a “seed number” to make the results 
of the randomized assignment fully transparent and replicable.
 7. We will discuss concepts such as spillovers or contamination in more detail in 
chapter 8.
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 8. For statistical reasons, not all observed characteristics have to be similar in the 
treatment and comparison groups for randomization to be successful. As a rule 
of thumb, randomization will be considered successful if about 95 percent of 
the observed characteristics are similar. By “similar,” we mean that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the means are diff erent between the two groups 
when using a 95 percent conﬁ dence interval. Even when the characteristics of 
the two groups are truly equal, one can expect that about 5 percent of the 
characteristics will show up with a statistically signiﬁ cant diff erence.
 9. Note that in the medical sciences, patients in the comparison group typically 
receive a placebo, that is, something like a sugar pill that should have no eff ect 
on the intended outcome. That is done to additionally control for the “placebo 
eff ect,” meaning the potential changes in behavior and outcomes from receiv-
ing a treatment, even if the treatment itself is ineff ective.
 10. These two steps correspond to the econometric technique of two-stage-least-
squares, which produces a local average treatment eff ect.
 11. Readers with a background in econometrics may recognize the concept: in 
statistical terms, the randomized off ering of the program is used as an instru-
mental variable for actual enrollment. The two characteristics listed are exactly 
what would be required from a good instrumental variable:
 • The instrumental variable must be correlated with program participation.
 •  The instrumental variable may not be correlated with outcomes (Y) (except 
through program participation) or with unobserved variables.
 12. Again, readers familiar with econometrics may recognize that the impact is 
estimated by using “randomized assignment to the promoted and nonpromoted 
groups” as an instrumental variable for actual enrollment in the program.
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CHAPTER 5
Social programs often use an index to decide who is eligible to enroll in the 
program and who is not. For example, antipoverty programs are typically 
targeted to poor households, which are identiﬁ ed by a poverty score or 
index. The poverty score can be based on a proxy means formula that mea-
sures a set of basic household assets. Households with low scores are clas-
siﬁ ed as poor, and households with higher scores are considered relatively 
well-off . The program authorities typically determine a threshold or cut-
off  score, below which households are deemed poor and are eligible for the 
program. Examples include the Mexico Progresa program (Buddelmeyer 
and Skouﬁ as 2004) and Colombia’s system for selecting beneﬁ ciaries of 
social spending, the so-called SISBEN (Barrera-Osorio, Linden, and 
Usquiola 2007). 
Pension programs are another example of a type of program that tar-
gets units based on an eligibility index, albeit one of a diff erent kind. Age 
constitutes a continuous index, and the retirement age constitutes the 
cutoff  that determines eligibility. In other words, only people above a cer-
tain age are eligible to receive the pension. A third example of a continu-
ous eligibility index would be test scores. Many countries award 
scholarships or prizes to the top performers on a standardized test, whose 
results are ranked from the lowest to the highest performer. If the num-
ber of scholarships is limited, then only students who score above a cer-
tain threshold score (such as the top 15 percent of students) will be 
eligible for the scholarship.
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The regression discontinuity design (RDD) is an impact evaluation 
method that can be used for programs that have a continuous eligibility 
index with a clearly deﬁ ned cutoff  score to determine who is eligible and 
who is not. To apply a regression discontinuity design, two main conditions 
are needed:
1. A continuous eligibility index, in other words, a continuous measure on 
which the population of interest can be ranked, such as a poverty index, 
a test score, or age.
2. A clearly deﬁ ned cutoff  score, that is, a point on the index above or below 
which the population is classiﬁ ed as eligible for the program. For exam-
ple, households with a poverty index score less than 50 out of 100 might 
be classiﬁ ed as poor, individuals age 67 and older might be classiﬁ ed as 
pensioners, and students with a test score of 90 or more out of 100 might 
be eligible for a scholarship. The cutoff  scores in these examples are 50, 
67, and 90, respectively. 
Case 1: Subsidies for Fertilizer in Rice Production
Consider an agriculture program that subsidizes rice farmers’ purchase of 
fertilizer with the objective of improving total yields. The program targets 
small and medium-size farms, which it classiﬁ es as farms with fewer than 
50 acres of total land. Before the program starts, we might expect the rela-
tionship between farm size and total rice production to be as shown in 
ﬁ gure 5.1, in that smaller farms have lower total outputs than larger farms. 
The eligibility score in this case is the number of acres of the farm, and the 
cutoff  is 50 acres. Under program eligibility rules, farms below the 50-acre 
cutoff  are eligible to receive fertilizer subsidies, and farms with 50 or more 
acres are not. In this case, we might expect to see a number of farms with 
48, 49, or even 49.9 acres that participate in the program. Another group of 
farms with 50, 50.1, and 50.2 acres will not participate in the program 
because they fell just to the wrong side of the cutoff . The group of farms 
with 49.9 acres is likely to be very similar to the group of farms with 50.1 
acres in all respects, except that one group received the fertilizer subsidy 
and the other group did not. As we move further away from the eligibility 
cutoff , eligible and ineligible units will become more diff erent by con-
struction, but we have a measure of how diff erent they are based on the 
eligibility criteria and therefore we can control for those diff erences.
Once the program rolls out and subsidizes the cost of fertilizer for small 
and medium farms, the program evaluators could use a regression discon-
Key Concept:
Regression 
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Figure 5.1 Rice Yield
tinuity method to evaluate its impact. The regression discontinuity mea-
sures the diff erence in postintervention outcomes, such as total rice yields, 
between the units near the eligibility cutoff , which in our example is a 
farm size of 50 acres. The farms that were just too large to enroll in the 
program constitute the comparison group and generate an estimate of the 
counterfactual outcome for those farms in the treatment group that were 
just small enough to enroll. Given that these two groups of farms were 
very similar at baseline and are exposed to the same set of external factors 
over time (such as weather, price shocks, local and national agricultural 
policies, and so on), the only plausible reason for diff erent outcomes in the 
postintervention period must be the program itself. 
The regression discontinuity method allows us to successfully estimate 
the impact of a program without excluding any eligible population. How-
ever, note that the estimated impact is only valid in the neighborhood 
around the eligibility cutoff  score. In our example, we have a valid esti-
mate of the impact of the fertilizer subsidy program for the larger of 
the medium-size farms, that is, those with just under 50 acres of land. 
The impact evaluation will not necessarily be able to directly identify 
the impact of the program on small farms, say, those with 1 or 2 acres of 
land, where the eff ects of a fertilizer subsidy may diff er in important 
ways from the eff ects observed on medium-size farms with 48 or 49 acres. 
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No comparison group exists for the small farms, since all of them are eli-
gible to enroll in the program. The only valid comparison is for the farms 
near the cutoff  score of 50. 
Case 2: Cash Transfers
Assume that we are trying to evaluate the impact of a cash transfer program 
on the daily food expenditures of poor households. Also assume that we can 
use a poverty index,1 which takes observations of a household’s assets and 
summarizes them into a score between 0 and 100 that is used to rank house-
holds from the poorest to the richest. At the baseline, you would expect the 
poorer households to spend less on food, on average, than the richer ones. 
Figure 5.2 presents a possible relationship between the poverty index and 
daily household expenditures (the outcome) on food. 
Now assume that the program targets only poor households, which are 
determined to be those with a score below 50. In other words, the poverty 
index can be used to determine eligibility: treatment will be off ered only to 
households with a score of 50 or less. Households with a score above 50 are 
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Figure 5.2 Household Expenditures in Relation to Poverty (Preintervention)
Source: Authors.
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ineligible. In this example, the continuous eligibility index is simply the pov-
erty index, and the cutoff  score is 50. The continuous relationship between 
the eligibility index and the outcome variable (daily food expenditures) is 
illustrated in ﬁ gure 5.3. Households just below the cutoff  score are eligible 
for the program, while those just above the cutoff  score are ineligible, even 
though the two types of households are very similar. 
The RDD strategy exploits the discontinuity around the cutoff  score to 
estimate the counterfactual. Intuitively, eligible households with scores just 
below the cutoff  (50 and just below) will be very similar to households with 
a score just above the cutoff  (for example, those scoring 51). On the continu-
ous poverty index, the program has decided on one particular point (50) at 
which there is a sudden change, or discontinuity, in eligibility for the pro-
gram. Since the households just above the cutoff  score of 50 are similar to 
the ones that are just below it, except that they do not receive the cash trans-
fers, the households just above can be used as a comparison group for the 
households just below. In other words, households ineligible for the pro-
gram but close enough to the cutoff  will be used as a comparison group to 
estimate the counterfactual (what would have happened to the group of eli-
gible households in the absence of the program). 
 Figure 5.3 A Discontinuity in Eligibility for the Cash Transfer Program
Source: Authors.
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Figure 5.4 presents a possible postintervention situation conveying the 
intuition behind the RDD identiﬁ cation strategy. Average outcomes for 
(eligible) households with baseline poverty scores below the cutoff  score 
are now higher than average outcomes for (ineligible) households with 
baseline scores just above the cutoff . Given the continuous relationship 
between scores on the poverty index and daily expenditures on food before 
the program, the only plausible explanation for the discontinuity that 
we observe postintervention must be the existence of the cash transfer 
program. In other words, since households in the vicinity (right and left) 
of the cutoff  score had similar baseline characteristics, the diff erence in 
average food expenditures between the two groups is a valid estimate of 
the program’s impact.
Using the Regression Discontinuity Design 
Method to Evaluate the Health Insurance 
Subsidy Program
Let us apply RDD to our health insurance subsidy program (HISP). After 
doing some more investigation into the design of the HISP, you ﬁ nd that in 
practice the authorities targeted the program to low-income households 
using the national poverty line. The poverty line is based on a poverty 
index that assigns each household in the country a score between 20 and 
100 based on its assets, housing conditions, and sociodemographic struc-
Figure 5.4 Household Expenditures in Relation to Poverty (Postintervention)
Source: Authors.
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ture. The poverty line has been offi  cially set at 58. This means that all 
households with a score of less than 58 are classiﬁ ed as poor, and all house-
holds with a score of more than 58 are considered to be nonpoor. Even in 
the treatment villages, only poor households were eligible to enroll in the 
HISP; nonetheless, your sample includes data on both poor and nonpoor 
households in the treatment villages.
Using the households in your sample of treatment villages, a colleague 
helps you run a multivariate regression and plot the relationship between 
the poverty index and predicted household health expenditures before 
HISP started (ﬁ gure 5.5). The ﬁ gure shows clearly that as a household’s 
score on the poverty index rises, the regression predicts a higher level of 
health expenditures, reﬂ ecting the fact that wealthier households tended to 
have higher expenditures on, and consumption of, drugs and primary health 
services. Note that the relationship between the poverty index and health 
expenditures is continuous, that is, there is no evidence of a change in the 
relationship around the poverty line. 
Figure 5.5 Poverty Index and Health Expenditures at the Health Insurance 
Subsidy Program Baseline
Source: Authors.
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Two years after the start of the pilot, you observe that only households 
with a score below 58 (that is, to the left of the poverty line) have been 
allowed to enroll in the HISP. Using follow-up data, you again plot the rela-
tionship between the scores on the poverty index and predicted health 
expenditures and ﬁ nd the relation illustrated in ﬁ gure 5.6. This time, the 
relationship between the poverty index and the predicted health expendi-
Figure 5.6 Poverty Index and Health Expenditures – Health Insurance 
Subsidy Program Two Years Later
Source: Authors.
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Table 5.1 Case 5—HISP Impact Using Regression Discontinuity Design 
(Regression Analysis)
Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on household 
health expenditures
−9.05**
(0.43)
Source: Authors.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
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tures is no longer continuous—there is a clear break, or “discontinuity,” at 
the poverty line. 
The discontinuity reﬂ ects a decrease in health expenditures for those 
households eligible to receive the program. Given that households on both 
sides of the cutoff  score of 58 are very similar, the only plausible explanation 
for the diff erent level of health expenditures is that one group of households 
was eligible to enroll in the program and the other was not. You estimate 
this diff erence through a regression with the ﬁ ndings shown in table 5.1.
QUESTION 5
A. Is the result shown in table 5.1 valid for all eligible households?
B. Compared with the impact estimated with randomized assignment, what does this 
result say about those households with a poverty index of just under 58?
C. Based on this result from case 5, should the HISP be scaled up nationally?
The RDD Method at Work
Regression discontinuity design has been used in various contexts. 
Lemieux and Milligan (2005) analyzed the eff ects of social assistance on 
labor supply in Quebec. Martinez (2004) studied the eff ect of old age 
Box 5.1: Social Assistance and Labor Supply in Canada
One of the classic studies using the RDD method took advantage of a sharp 
discontinuity in a social assistance program in Quebec, Canada, to understand 
the effects of the program on labor market outcomes. The welfare program, 
funded through the Canadian Assistance Plan, provides help to the unem-
ployed. For many years, the program offered signifi cantly lower payments to 
individuals under the age of 30 with no children, compared to individuals older 
than 30—$185 a month versus $507.  
To rigorously evaluate this program, Lemieux and Milligan (2005) limited the 
sample to men without children and without a high school diploma and gath-
ered data from the Canadian Census and the Labor Force Survey. To justify 
using the RDD approach, they showed that men close to the discontinuity 
(between the ages of 25 and 39) are very similar on observable characteristics.
Comparing men on both sides of the eligibility threshold, the authors found 
that access to greater social assistance benefi ts actually reduced employment 
by about 4.5 percent for men in this age range without children. 
Source: Lemieux and Milligan 2005.
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pensions on consumption in Bolivia. Filmer and Schady (2009) assessed 
the impact of a program that provided scholarships to poor students to 
encourage school enrollment and increase test scores in Cambodia. Bud-
delmeyer and Skouﬁ as (2004) examined the performance of regression 
discontinuity relative to the randomized experiment in the case of Pro-
gresa and found that the impacts estimated using the two methods are 
similar for a large majority of the outcomes analyzed. A few of these exam-
ples are described in detail in boxes 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3.
Box 5.2: School Fees and Enrollment Rates in Colombia
In Colombia, Barrera-Osorio, Linden, and 
Urquiola (2007) used regression discontinui-
ty design to evaluate the impact of a school 
fee reduction program (Gratuitad) on school 
enrollment rates in the city of Bogota. That 
program is targeted based on an index called 
the SISBEN, which is a continuous poverty 
index whose value is determined by house-
hold characteristics, such as location, the 
building materials of the home, the services 
that are available there, demographics, 
health, education, income, and the occupa-
tions of household members. The govern-
ment established two cutoff scores along 
the SISBEN index: children of households 
with scores below cutoff score no. 1 are eli-
gible for free education from grades 1 to 11; 
children of households with scores between 
cutoff scores no. 1 and no. 2 are eligible for 
a 50 percent subsidy on fees for grades 10 
and 11; and children from households with 
scores above cutoff score no. 2 are not eli-
gible for free education or subsidies.
The authors used regression discontinu-
ity design for four reasons. First, household 
characteristics such as income or the educa-
tion level of the household head are continu-
ous along the SISBEN score at the baseline; 
in other words, there are no “jumps” in char-
acteristics along the SISBEN score. Second, 
households on both sides of the cutoff 
scores have similar characteristics, suggest-
ing that the design had produced credible 
comparison groups. Third, a large sample of 
households was available. Finally, the gov-
ernment kept the formula used to calculate 
the SISBEN index secret, so that house-
holds would not be able to manipulate their 
scores.
Using the RDD method, the researchers 
found that the program had a signifi cant 
positive impact on school enrollment rates. 
Specifi cally, enrollment was three percent-
age points higher for primary school stu-
dents from households below cutoff score 
no. 1 and 6 percent higher for high school 
students from households between cutoff 
scores no. 1 and no. 2. This study provides 
evidence on the benefi ts of reducing the di-
rect costs of schooling, particularly for at-risk 
students. However, its authors also call for 
further research on price elasticities to bet-
ter inform the design of subsidy programs 
such as this one.
Source: Barrera-Osorio, Linden, and Urquiola 2007.
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Limitations and Interpretation of the Regression 
Discontinuity Design Method
Regression discontinuity design estimates local average impacts around the 
eligibility cutoff  at the point where treatment and comparison units are 
most similar. As we get closer to the cutoff , the units that are to the left and 
right of it will look more similar. In fact, when we get extremely close to the 
cutoff  score, the units on the left and right of the line will be so similar that 
our comparison will be as good as if we had chosen the treatment and com-
parison groups using randomized assignment of the treatment.
Box 5.3: Social Safety Nets Based on a Poverty Index in Jamaica
The RDD method was also used to evaluate 
the impact of a social safety net initiative in 
Jamaica. In 2001, the government of Jamai-
ca initiated the Programme of Advancement 
through Health and Education (PATH) to in-
crease investments in human capital and 
improve the targeting of welfare benefi ts to 
the poor. The program provided health and 
education grants to children in eligible poor 
households, conditional on school atten-
dance and regular health care visits. The av-
erage monthly benefi t for each child was 
about $6.50 in addition to government waiv-
er of certain health and education fees. 
Because eligibility for the program was 
determined by a scoring formula, Levy and 
Ohls (2007) were able to compare house-
holds just below the eligibility threshold to 
households just above (between 2 and 15 
points from the cutoff). The researchers jus-
tify using the RDD method with baseline 
data showing that the treatment and com-
parison households had similar levels of 
poverty, measured by proxy means scores, 
and similar levels of motivation, in that all of 
the households in the sample had applied to 
the program. The researchers also used the 
program eligibility score in the regression 
analysis to help control for any differences 
between the two groups. 
Levy and Ohls (2007) found that the 
PATH program increased school attendance 
for children ages 6 to 17 by an average of 0.5 
days per month, which is signifi cant given an 
already fairly high attendance rate of 85 per-
cent. Also, health care visits by children ages 
0 to 6 increased by approximately 38 per-
cent. While the researchers were unable to 
fi nd any longer-term impacts on school 
achievement or health care status, they con-
cluded that the magnitude of the impacts 
they did fi nd was broadly consistent with 
conditional cash transfer programs imple-
mented in other countries. A fi nal interesting 
aspect of this evaluation is that it gathered 
both quantitative and qualitative data, using 
information systems, interviews, focus 
groups, and household surveys. 
Source: Levy and Ohls 2007.
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Because the RDD method estimates the impact of the program around 
the cutoff  score, or locally, the estimate cannot necessarily be generalized to 
units whose scores are further away from the cutoff  score, this is, where 
eligible and ineligible individuals may not be as similar. The fact that the 
RDD method will not be able to compute an average treatment eff ect for all 
program participants can be seen as both a strength and a limitation of the 
method, depending on the evaluation question of interest. If the evaluation 
primarily seeks to answer the question, Should the program exist or not?, 
then the average treatment eff ect for the entire eligible population may be 
the most relevant parameter, and clearly the RDD will fall short of being 
perfect. However, if the policy question of interest is, Should the program be 
cut or expanded at the margin?, then the RDD produces precisely the local 
estimate of interest to inform this important policy decision. 
The fact that the RDD method produces local average treatment eff ects 
also raises challenges in terms of the statistical power of the analysis. Since 
eff ects are estimated only around the cutoff  score, fewer observations can be 
used than in other methods that would include all units. Relatively large 
evaluation samples are required to obtain suffi  cient statistical power when 
applying RDD. In practice, we determine a bandwidth around the cutoff  
score that will be included in the estimation by considering the balance in 
observed characteristics of the population above and below the cutoff . We 
can then do the estimation again using diff erent bandwidths to check 
whether the estimates are sensitive to the chosen bandwidth. As a general 
rule, the wider the bandwidth, the greater the statistical power of the analy-
sis, since more observations are included. However, moving further from 
the cutoff  may also require additional functional form assumptions to obtain 
a credible estimate of impact. 
An additional caveat when using the RDD method is that the speciﬁ ca-
tion may be sensitive to the functional form used in modeling the relation-
ship between the eligibility score and the outcome of interest. In the example 
of the cash transfer program, we assumed that the baseline relation between 
the poverty index of households and their daily expenditures on food was 
simple and linear. In reality, the relation between the eligibility index and 
the outcome of interest (Y) at the baseline could be much more complex 
and could involve nonlinear relationships and interactions between vari-
ables. If we do not account for these complex relationships in the estima-
tion, they might be mistaken for a discontinuity in the postintervention 
outcomes. In practice, we can estimate program impact using various func-
tional forms (linear, quadratic, cubic, etc.) to assess whether, in fact, the 
impact estimates are sensitive to functional form.
Even with these limitations, regression discontinuity design yields unbi-
ased estimates of the impact in the vicinity of the eligibility cutoff . The 
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regression discontinuity strategy takes advantage of the program assign-
ment rules, using continuous eligibility indexes, which are already common 
in many social programs. When index-based targeting rules are applied, it is 
not necessary to exclude a group of eligible households or individuals from 
receiving the treatment for the sake of the evaluation because regression 
discontinuity design can be used instead.
Note
1. This is sometimes called a “proxy-means test” because it takes the household’s 
assets as a proxy or estimator for its means or purchasing power.
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Diff erence-in-Diff erences
CHAPTER 6
The three impact evaluation methods discussed up to this point—randomized 
assignment, randomized promotion, and regression discontinuity design 
(RDD)—all produce estimates of the counterfactual through explicit pro-
gram assignment rules that the evaluator knows and understands. We have 
discussed why these methods off er credible estimates of the counterfactual 
with relatively few assumptions and conditions. The next two types of 
methods—diff erence-in-diff erences (DD) and matching methods—off er the 
evaluator an additional set of tools that can be applied in situations in which 
the program assignment rules are less clear or in which none of the three 
methods previously described is feasible. As we will see, both DD and 
matching methods can be powerful statistical tools; many times they will be 
used together or in conjunction with other impact evaluation methods. 
Both diff erence-in-diff erences and matching are commonly used; how-
ever, both also typically require stronger assumptions than randomized 
selection methods. We also stress at the outset that both of these methods 
absolutely require the existence of baseline data.1
The diff erence-in-diff erences method does what its name suggests. It 
compares the changes in outcomes over time between a population that is 
enrolled in a program (the treatment group) and a population that is not (the 
comparison group). Take, for example, a road construction program that 
cannot be randomly assigned and is not assigned based on an index with a 
clearly deﬁ ned cutoff  that would permit an RDD. One of the program’s 
objectives is to improve access to labor markets, with one of the outcome 
Key Concept:
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indicators being employment. As we saw in chapter 3, simply observing the 
before-and-after change in employment rates for areas aff ected by the pro-
gram will not give us the program’s causal impact because many other fac-
tors are also likely to inﬂ uence employment over time. At the same time, 
comparing areas that received and did not receive the roads program will be 
problematic if unobserved reasons exist for why some areas received the 
program and others did not (the selection bias problem discussed in the 
enrolled–versus–not-enrolled scenario). 
However, what if we combined the two methods and compared the 
before-and-after changes in outcomes for a group that enrolled in the pro-
gram to the before-and-after changes for a group that did not enroll in the 
program? The diff erence in the before-and-after outcomes for the enrolled 
group—the ﬁ rst diff erence—controls for factors that are constant over time 
in that group, since we are comparing the same group to itself. But we are 
still left with the outside time-varying factors. One way to capture those 
time-varying factors is to measure the before-and-after change in outcomes 
for a group that did not enroll in the program but was exposed to the same 
set of environmental conditions—the second diff erence. If we “clean” the 
ﬁ rst diff erence of other time-varying factors that aff ect the outcome of 
interest by subtracting the second diff erence, then we have eliminated the 
main source of bias that worried us in the simple before-and-after compari-
sons. The diff erence-in-diff erences approach thus combines the two coun-
terfeit counterfactuals (before-and-after comparisons and comparisons 
between those who choose to enroll and those who choose not to enroll) 
to produce a better estimate of the counterfactual. In our roads case, the DD 
method might compare the change in employment before and after the pro-
gram is implemented for individuals living in areas aff ected by the road con-
struction program to changes in employment in areas where the roads 
program was not implemented. 
It is important to note that the counterfactual being estimated here is the 
change in outcomes for the comparison group. The treatment and com-
parison groups do not necessarily need to have the same preintervention 
conditions. But for DD to be valid, the comparison group must accurately 
represent the change in outcomes that would have been experienced by 
the treatment group in the absence of treatment. To apply diff erence-in-
diff erences, all that is necessary is to measure outcomes in the group that 
receives the program (the treatment group) and the group that does not (the 
comparison group) both before and after the program. The method does not 
require us to specify the rules by which the treatment is assigned. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the diff erence-in-diff erences method. A treatment 
group is enrolled in a program, and a comparison group is not enrolled. The 
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Figure 6.1 Difference-in-Differences
before-and-after outcome variables for the treatment group are A and B, 
respectively, while the outcome for the comparison group goes from C, 
before the program, to D after the program has been implemented.
You will remember our two counterfeit counterfactuals—the diff er-
ence in outcomes before and after the intervention for the treatment 
group (B − A) and the diff erence in outcomes2 after the intervention 
between the treatment and comparison groups (B − D). In diff erence-in-
diff erences, the estimate of the counterfactual is obtained by computing 
the change in outcomes for the comparison group (D − C). This counter-
factual change is then subtracted from the change in outcomes for the 
treatment group (B - A). 
In summary, the impact of the program is simply computed as the diff er-
ence between two diff erences:
DD impact = (B − A) − (D − C) = (B − E) = (0.74 − 0.60) − (0.81 − 0.78) = 0.11.
The relationships presented in ﬁ gure 6.1 can also be presented in a 
simple table. Table 6.1 disentangles the components of the diff erence-in-
diff erences estimates. The ﬁ rst row contains outcomes for the treatment 
group before (A) and after (B) the intervention. The before-and-after 
comparison for the treatment group is the ﬁ rst diff erence (B − A). The 
second row contains outcomes for the comparison group before the inter-
vention (C) and after the intervention (D), so the second (counterfactual) 
diff erence is (D − C).
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Table 6.1 The Difference-in-Differences Method
After Before Difference
Treatment/enrolled B A B − A
Comparison/
nonenrolled D C D − C
Difference B − D A − C DD = (B − A) − (D − C)
After Before Difference
Treatment enrolled 0.74 0.60 0.14
Comparison/
nonenrolled 0.81 0.78 0.03
Difference −0.07 −0.18 DD = 0.14 − 0.03 = 0.11
Source: Authors.
The diff erence-in-diff erences method computes the impact estimate as 
follows:
1. We calculate the diff erence in the outcome (Y) between the before and 
after situations for the treatment group (B − A).
2. We calculate the diff erence in the outcome (Y) between the before and 
after situations for the comparison group (D − C).
3. Then we calculate the diff erence between the diff erence in outcomes for 
the treatment group (B − A) and the diff erence for the comparison group 
(D − C), or DD = (B − A) − (D − C). This “diff erence-in-diff erences” is our 
impact estimate. 
How Is the Difference-in-Differences Method 
Helpful?
To understand how diff erence-in-diff erences is helpful, let us start with our 
second counterfeit counterfactual, which compared units that were enrolled 
in a program with those that were not enrolled in the program. Remember 
that the primary concern with this was that the two sets of units may have 
had diff erent characteristics and that it may be those characteristics rather 
than the program that explain the diff erence in outcomes between the two 
groups. The unobserved diff erences in characteristics were particularly 
worrying: by deﬁ nition, it is impossible for us to include unobserved diff er-
ences in characteristics in the analysis. 
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The diff erence-in-diff erences method helps resolve this problem to the 
extent that many characteristics of units or individuals can reasonably be 
assumed to be constant over time (or time-invariant). Think, for example, of 
observed characteristics, such as a person’s year of birth, a region’s location 
close to the ocean, a town’s level of economic development, or a father’s 
level of education. Most of these types of variables, although plausibly 
related to outcomes, will probably not change over the course of an evalua-
tion. Using the same reasoning, we might conclude that many unobserved 
characteristics of individuals are also more or less constant over time. 
Consider, for example, a person’s intelligence or such personality traits as 
motivation, optimism, self-discipline, or family health history. It is plausible 
that many of these intrinsic characteristics of a person would not change 
over time.
When the same individual is observed before and after a program and we 
compute a simple diff erence in outcome for that individual, we cancel out 
the eff ect of all of the characteristics that are unique to that individual and 
that do not change over time. Interestingly, we are canceling out (or control-
ling for) not only the eff ect of observed time-invariant characteristics but 
also the eff ect of unobserved time-invariant characteristics such as those 
mentioned above. 
The “Equal Trends” Assumption in Difference-in-Differences
Although diff erence-in-diff erences allows us to take care of diff erences 
between the treatment and the comparison group that are constant over 
time, it will not help us eliminate the diff erences between the treatment and 
comparison groups that change over time. In the roads example above, if 
treatment areas also beneﬁ t from the construction of a new seaport at the 
same time as the road construction, we will not be able to account for the 
seaport construction by using a diff erence-in-diff erences approach. For 
the method to provide a valid estimate of the counterfactual, we must 
assume that no such time-varying diff erences exist between the treatment 
and comparison groups. 
Another way to think about this is that in the absence of the program, the 
diff erences in outcomes between the treatment and comparison groups 
would need to move in tandem. That is, without treatment, outcomes would 
need to increase or decrease at the same rate in both groups; we require that 
outcomes display equal trends in the absence of treatment.
Unfortunately, there is no way for us to prove that the diff erences between 
the treatment and comparison groups would have moved in tandem in the 
absence of the program. The reason is that we cannot observe what would 
100 Impact Evaluation in Practice
have happened to the treatment group in the absence of the treatment—in 
other words, we cannot observe the counterfactual!
Thus, when we use the diff erence-in-diff erences method, we must 
assume that, in the absence of the program, the outcome in the treatment 
group would have moved in tandem with the outcome in the comparison 
group. Figure 6.2 illustrates a violation of this fundamental assumption, 
which is needed for the diff erence-in-diff erences method to produce 
credible impact estimates. If outcome trends are diff erent for the treat-
ment and comparison groups, then the estimated treatment eff ect obtained 
by diff erence-in-diff erence methods would be invalid, or biased. The rea-
son is that the trend for the comparison group is not a valid estimate of the 
counterfactual trend that would have prevailed for the treatment group in 
the absence of the program. As we see in ﬁ gure 6.2, outcomes for the com-
parison group grow faster than outcomes for the treatment group in the 
absence of the program, so using the trend for the comparison group as a 
counterfactual for the trend for the treatment group leads to an underesti-
mation of the program’s impact. 
Testing the Validity of the “Equal Trends” Assumption 
in Difference-in-Differences
The validity of the underlying assumption of equal trends can be assessed 
even though it cannot be proved. A good validity check is to compare 
F igure 6.2 Difference-in-Differences when Outcome Trends Differ
Source: Authors.
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changes in outcomes for the treatment and comparison groups before the 
program is implemented. If the outcomes moved in tandem before the pro-
gram started, we gain conﬁ dence that outcomes would have continued to 
move in tandem in the postintervention period. To check for equality of pre-
intervention trends, we need at least two serial observations on the treat-
ment and comparison groups before the start of the program. This means 
that the evaluation would require three serial observations—two preinter-
vention observations to assess the preprogram trends and at least one post-
intervention observation to assess impact with the diff erence-in-diff erences 
formula. 
A second way to test the assumption of equal trends would be to perform 
what is known as a “placebo” test. For this test, you perform an additional 
diff erence-in-diff erences estimation using a “fake” treatment group, that is, 
a group that you know was not aff ected by the program. Say, for example, 
that you estimate how additional tutoring for grade 7 students aff ects their 
probability of attending school, and you choose grade 8 students as the com-
parison group. To test whether seventh and eighth graders have the same 
trends in terms of school attendance, you could test whether eighth graders 
and sixth graders have the same trends. You know that sixth graders are not 
aff ected by the program, so if you perform a diff erence-in-diff erences esti-
mation using grade 8 students as the comparison group and grade 6 stu-
dents as the fake treatment group, you have to ﬁ nd a zero impact. If you do 
not, then the impact that you ﬁ nd must come from some underlying diff er-
ence in trends between sixth graders and eighth graders. This, in turn, casts 
doubt on whether seventh graders and eighth graders can be assumed to 
have parallel trends in the absence of the program. 
A placebo test can be performed not only with a fake treatment group but 
also with a fake outcome. In the tutoring example, you may want to test the 
validity of using the grade 8 students as a comparison group by estimating 
the impact of the tutoring on an outcome that you know is not aff ected by it, 
such as the number of siblings that the students have. If your diff erence-in-
diff erences estimation ﬁ nds an “impact” of the tutoring on the number of 
siblings that the students have, then you know that your comparison group 
must be ﬂ awed.
A fourth way to test the assumption of parallel trends would be to per-
form the diff erence-in-diff erences estimation using diff erent comparison 
groups. In the tutoring example, you would ﬁ rst do the estimation using 
grade 8 students as the comparison group, and then do a second estimation 
using grade 6 students as the comparison group. If both groups are valid 
comparison groups, you would ﬁ nd that the estimated impact is approxi-
mately the same in both calculations.
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Using Difference-in-Differences to Evaluate the 
Health Insurance Subsidy Program
Diff erence-in-diff erences can be used to evaluate our health insurance sub-
sidy program (HISP). In this scenario, you have two rounds of data on two 
groups of households, one group that enrolled in the program and another 
that did not. Remembering the case of the selected enrolled and nonenrolled 
groups, you realize that you cannot simply compare the average health 
expenditures of the two groups because of selection bias. Because you have 
data for two periods for each household in the sample, you can use those data 
to solve some of these challenges by comparing the change in expenditures 
for the two groups, assuming that the change in the health expenditures of 
the nonenrolled group reﬂ ects what would have happened to the expendi-
tures of the enrolled group in the absence of the program (see table 6.2). Note 
that it does not matter which way you calculate the double diff erence.
Next, you estimate the eff ect using regression analysis (table 6.3). Using 
a simple linear regression, you ﬁ nd that the program reduced household 
health expenditures by $7.8. You then reﬁ ne your analysis by using multi-
variate linear regression to take into account a host of other factors, and 
you ﬁ nd the same reduction in household health expenditures.
QUESTION 6
A. What are the basic assumptions required to accept this result from case 6?
B. Based on the result from case 6, should the HISP be scaled up nationally?
Table 6.2 Case 6—HISP Impact Using Difference-in-Differences 
(Comparison of Means)
After
(follow-up)
Before
(baseline) Difference
Enrolled 7.8 14.4 −6.6
Nonenrolled 21.8 20.6 1.2
Difference DD = −6.6 − 1.2 = −7.8
Source: Authors.
Table 6.3 Case 6—HISP Impact Using Difference-in-Differences 
(Regression Analysis)
Linear regression Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on 
household health expenditures
−7.8**
(0.33)
−7.8**
(0.33)
Source: Authors.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. 
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The Difference-in-Differences Method at Work
Despite its limitations, the diff erence-in-diff erences method remains one 
of the most frequently used impact evaluation methodologies, and many 
examples appear in the literature. For example, Duﬂ o (2001) analyzed the 
schooling and labor market impacts of school construction in Indonesia. 
DiTella and Schargrodsky (2005) examined whether an increase in police 
forces reduces crime. Another key example from the literature is described 
in box 6.1.
Box 6.1:  Water Privatization and Infant Mortality in Argentina
Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) 
used the difference-in-differences method to 
address an important policy question: 
whether privatizing the provision of water 
services can improve health outcomes and 
help alleviate poverty. During the 1990s, 
Argentina initiated one of the largest privati-
zation campaigns ever, transferring local 
water companies to regulated private com-
panies covering about 30 percent of the 
country’s municipalities and 60 percent of 
the population. The privatization process took 
place over a decade, with the largest number 
of privatizations occurring after 1995. 
Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) 
took advantage of that variation in owner-
ship status over time to determine the 
impact of privatization on under-age-5 mor-
tality. Before 1995, the rates of child mortal-
ity were declining at about the same pace 
throughout Argentina; after 1995, mortality 
rates declined faster in municipalities that 
had privatized their water services. The 
researchers argue that, in this context, the 
identifi cation assumptions behind difference-
in-differences are likely to hold true. First, 
they show that the decision to privatize was 
uncorrelated with economic shocks or his-
torical levels of child mortality. Second, they 
show that no differences in child mortality 
trends are observed between the compari-
son and treatment municipalities before the 
privatization movement began.
They checked the strength of their fi nd-
ings by decomposing the effect of privatiza-
tion on child mortality by cause of death and 
found that the privatization of water services 
is correlated with reductions in deaths from 
infectious and parasitic diseases but not 
from causes unrelated to water conditions, 
such as accidents or congenital diseases. In 
the end, the evaluation determined that child 
mortality fell about 8 percent in areas that 
privatized and that the effect was largest, 
about 26 percent, in the poorest areas, 
where the expansion of the water network 
was the greatest. This study shed light on a 
number of important policy debates sur-
rounding the privatization of public services. 
The researchers concluded that in Argentina, 
the regulated private sector proved more 
successful than the public sector in improv-
ing indicators of access, service, and most 
signifi cantly, child mortality. 
Source: Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005.
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Limitations of the Difference-in-Differences 
Method
Diff erence-in-diff erences is generally less robust than the randomized 
selection methods (randomized assignment, randomized off ering, and 
randomized promotion). Even when trends are parallel before the start of 
the intervention, bias in the estimation may still appear. The reason is that 
DD attributes to the intervention any diff erences in trends between the treat-
ment and comparison groups that occur from the time intervention begins. If 
any other factors are present that aff ect the diff erence in trends between the 
two groups, the estimation will be invalid or biased. 
Let us say that you are trying to estimate the impact on rice production 
of subsidizing fertilizer and are doing this by measuring the rice produc-
tion of subsidized (treatment) farmers and unsubsidized (comparison) 
farmers before and after the distribution of the subsidies. If in year 1 the 
subsidized farmers are aff ected by drought, whereas the unsubsidized 
farmers are not, then the diff erence-in-diff erences estimate will produce 
an invalid estimate of the impact of subsidizing fertilizer. In general, any 
factor that aff ects only the treatment group, and does so at the same time 
that the group receives the treatment, has the potential to invalidate or 
bias the estimate of the impact of the program. Diff erence-in-diff erences 
assumes that no such factor is present. 
Notes
1. Although randomized assignment, randomized promotion, and regression 
discontinuity design theoretically do not require baseline data, in practice 
having a baseline is very useful for conﬁ rming that the characteristics of the 
treatment and comparison groups are balanced. For this reason, we recommend 
including a baseline as part of the evaluation. In addition to verifying balance, 
a number of other good reasons argue for collecting baseline data, even when 
the method does not absolutely require them. First, having preintervention 
(exogenous) population characteristics can enable the evaluator to determine 
whether the program has a diff erent impact on diff erent groups of the eligible 
population (so-called heterogeneity analysis). Second, the baseline data can also 
be used to perform analysis that can guide policy even before the intervention 
starts, and collecting the baseline data can serve as a massive pilot for the 
postintervention data collection. Third, baseline data can serve as an “insurance 
policy” in case randomized assignment is not implemented; as a second 
option, the evaluator could use a combination of matching and diff erences-in-
diff erences. Finally, baseline data can add statistical power to the analysis when 
the number of units in the treatment and comparison groups is limited.
2. All diff erences between points should be read as vertical diff erences in out-
comes on the vertical axis.
Difference-in-Differences  105
References
DiTella, Rafael, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2005. “Do Police Reduce Crime? 
Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces after a Terrorist Attack.” 
American Economic Review 94 (1): 115–33.
Duﬂ o, Esther. 2001. “Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School 
Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment.” 
American Economic Review 91 (4): 795–813.
Galiani, Sebastian, Paul Gertler, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2005. “Water for Life: 
The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality.” Journal 
of Political Economy 113 (1): 83–120.

 107
Matching
CHAPTER 7
The method described in this chapter consists of a set of statistical tech-
niques that we will refer to collectively as “matching.” Matching methods 
can be applied in the context of almost any program assignment rules, so 
long as a group exists that has not participated in the program. Matching 
methods typically rely on observed characteristics to construct a compari-
son group, and so the methods require the strong assumption of no unob-
served diff erences in the treatment and comparison populations that 
are also associated with the outcomes of interest. Because of that strong 
assumption, matching methods are typically most useful in combination 
with one of the other methodologies that we have discussed. 
Matching essentially uses statistical techniques to construct an artiﬁ cial 
comparison group by identifying for every possible observation under treat-
ment a nontreatment observation (or set of nontreatment observations) that 
has the most similar characteristics possible. Consider a case in which you 
are attempting to evaluate the impact of a program and have a data set that 
contains both households that enrolled in the program and households that 
did not enroll, for example, the Demographic and Health Survey. The pro-
gram that you are trying to evaluate does not have any clear assignment 
rules (such as randomized assignment or an eligibility index) that explain 
why some households enrolled in the program and others did not. In such a 
context, matching methods will enable you to identify the set of nonenrolled 
households that look most similar to the treatment households, based on 
the characteristics that you have available in your data set. These “matched” 
Key Concept:
Matching uses large 
data sets and heavy 
statistical techniques 
to construct the best 
possible artifi cial 
comparison group for a 
given treatment group.
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nonenrolled households then become the comparison group that you use to 
estimate the counterfactual. 
Finding a good match for each program participant requires approxi-
mating as closely as possible the variables or determinants that explain 
that individual’s decision to enroll in the program. Unfortunately, this is 
easier said than done. If the list of relevant observed characteristics is very 
large, or if each characteristic takes on many values, it may be hard to 
identify a match for each of the units in the treatment group. As you 
increase the number of characteristics or dimensions against which you 
want to match units that enrolled in the program, you may run into what 
is called “the curse of dimensionality.” For example, if you use only three 
important characteristics to identify the matched comparison group, such 
as age, gender, and region of birth, you will probably ﬁ nd matches for all 
program enrollees in the pool of nonenrollees, but you run the risk of 
leaving out other potentially important characteristics. However, if you 
increase the list of variables, say, to include number of children, number of 
years of education, age of the mother, age of the father, and so forth, your 
database may not contain a good match for most of the program enrollees, 
unless it contains a very large number of observations. Figure 7.1 illustrates 
matching based on four characteristics: age, gender, months unemployed, 
and secondary school diploma. 
Fortunately, the curse of dimensionality can be quite easily solved using 
a method called “propensity score matching” (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
In this approach, we no longer need to try to match each enrolled unit to a 
nonenrolled unit that has exactly the same value for all observed control 
characteristics. Instead, for each unit in the treatment group and in the pool 
of nonenrollees we compute the probability that a unit will enroll in the 
Treated units
Age
19
35
41
23
55
27
24
46
33
40
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
3
12
17
6
21
4
8
3
12
2
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
Gender
Months
unemployed
Secondary
diploma
Untreated units
Age
24
38
58
21
34
41
46
41
19
27
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
8
2
7
2
20
17
9
11
3
4
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
Gender
Months
unemployed
Secondary
diploma
Figure 7.1 Exact Matching on Four Characteristics
Source: Authors, drawing from multiple sources.
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program based on the observed values of its characteristics, the so-called 
propensity score. This score is a single number ranging from 0 to 1 that sum-
marizes all of the observed characteristics of the units as they inﬂ uence the 
likelihood of enrolling in the program. 
Once the propensity score has been computed for all units, then units in 
the treatment group can be matched with units in the pool of nonenrollees 
that have the closest propensity score.1 These “closest units” become the 
comparison group and are used to produce an estimate of the counterfac-
tual. The propensity score matching method tries to mimic the randomized 
assignment to treatment and comparison groups by choosing for the com-
parison group those units that have similar propensities to the units in the 
treatment group. Since propensity score matching is not a real randomized 
assignment method, but tries to imitate one, it belongs to the category of 
quasi-experimental methods. 
The diff erence in outcomes (Y) between the treatment or enrolled units 
and their matched comparison units produces the estimated impact of the 
program. In summary, the program’s impact is estimated by comparing the 
average outcomes of a treatment or enrolled group and the average outcome 
among a statistically matched subgroup of units, the match being based on 
observed characteristics available in the data at hand. 
For propensity score matching to produce externally valid estimates of a 
program’s impact, all treatment or enrolled units need to be successfully 
matched to a nonenrolled unit.2 It may happen that for some enrolled units, 
no units in the pool of nonenrollees have similar propensity scores. In tech-
nical terms, there may be a “lack of common support,” or lack of overlap, 
between the propensity scores of the treatment or enrolled group and those 
of the pool of nonenrollees.
Figure 7.2 provides an example of lack of common support. The likeli-
hood that each unit in the sample enrolls in the program is ﬁ rst estimated 
based on the observed characteristics of the unit. Based on that, each unit is 
assigned a propensity score, in other words, the estimated probability of the 
unit’s participating in the program. The ﬁ gure shows the distribution of 
propensity scores separately for enrollees and nonenrollees. Crucially, these 
distributions do not overlap perfectly. In the middle of the distribution, 
matches are relatively easy to ﬁ nd because enrollees and nonenrollees have 
similar characteristics. However, units with predicted propensity scores 
close to 1 cannot be matched to any nonenrollees with similar propensity 
scores. Intuitively, units who are highly likely to enroll in the program are so 
dissimilar to nonenrolling units that we cannot ﬁ nd a good match for them. 
A lack of common support thus appears at the extremes, or tails, of the dis-
tribution of propensity scores.
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Jalan and Ravallion (2003a) summarize the steps to be taken when 
applying propensity score matching.3 First, you will need representative 
and highly comparable surveys to identify the units that enrolled in the 
program and those that did not. Second, you must pool the two samples 
and estimate the probability that each individual enrolls in the program, 
based on individual characteristics observed in the survey. This step yields 
the propensity score. Third, you restrict the sample to units for which 
common support appears in the propensity score distribution. Fourth, for 
each enrolled unit, you locate a subgroup of nonenrolled units that have 
similar propensity scores. Fifth, you compare the outcomes for the treat-
ment or enrolled units and their matched comparison or nonenrolled 
units. The diff erence in average outcomes for these two subgroups is the 
measure of the impact that can be attributed to the program for that par-
ticular treated observation. Sixth, the mean of these individual impacts 
yields the estimated average treatment eff ect. 
Overall, it is important to remember two crucial issues about matching. 
First, matching must be done using baseline characteristics. Second, the 
matching method is only as good as the characteristics that are used for 
matching, so that having a large number of background characteristics 
is crucial.
de
ns
ity
nonenrolled enrolled
propensity score0 1
common support
F igure 7.2 Propensity Score Matching and Common Support
Source: Authors, drawing from multiple sources.
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Using Matching Techniques to Select Participant 
and Nonparticipant Households in the Health 
Insurance Subsidy Program 
Having learned about matching techniques, you may wonder whether you 
could improve on the previous estimates of the impact of the Health Insur-
ance Subsidy Program (HISP). You decide to use some matching techniques 
to select a group of enrolled and nonenrolled households that look similar 
based on observed characteristics. First, you estimate the probability that a 
unit will enroll in the program based on the observed values of characteris-
tics (the “explanatory variables”), such as the age of the household head and 
of the spouse, their level of education, whether the head of the household is 
a female, whether the household is indigenous, and so on. As shown in table 
7.1, the likelihood that a household is enrolled in the program is smaller if 
the household is older, more educated, female headed, or owns a bathroom 
or larger amounts of land. By contrast, being indigenous, having more 
household members, and having a dirt ﬂ oor all increase the likelihood that a 
Table 7.1 Estimating the Propensity Score Based on Observed Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Enrolled = 1
Explanatory variables / characteristics Coeffi cient
Head of household’s age (years) −0.022**
Spouse’s age (years) −0.017**
Head of household’s education (years) −0.059**
Spouse’s education (years) −0.030**
Head of household is female = 1 −0.067
Indigenous = 1 0.345**
Number of household members 0.216**
Dirt fl oor = 1 0.676**
Bathroom = 1 −0.197**
Hectares of land −0.042**
Distance to hospital (km) 0.001*
Constant 0.664**
Source: Authors.
Note: Probit regression. The dependent variable is 1 if the household enrolled in HISP, and 0 otherwise. 
The coeffi cients represent the contribution of each listed explanatory variable / characteristic to the 
probability that a household enrolled in HISP. 
* Signifi cant at the 5 percent level; ** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 7.2 Case 7—HISP Impact Using Matching (Comparison of Means)
Enrolled
Matched 
comparison Difference t-stat
Household health 
expenditures 7.8 16.1 −8.3 −13.1
Source: Authors.
Table 7.3 Case 7—HISP Impact Using Matching (Regression Analysis)
Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on household 
health expenditures
−8.3**
(0.63)
Source: Authors.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
household is enrolled in the program. So overall, it seems that poorer and 
less-educated households are more likely to be enrolled, which is good news 
for a program that targets poor people.
Now that you have estimated the probability that each household is 
enrolled in the program (the propensity score), you restrict the sample to 
those households in the enrolled and nonenrolled groups for which you 
can ﬁ nd a match in the other group. For each enrolled household, you 
locate a subgroup of nonenrolled households that have similar propensity 
scores. Table 7.2 compares the average outcomes for the enrolled house-
holds and their matched comparison or nonenrolled households.
To obtain the estimated impact using the matching method, you need 
ﬁ rst to compute the impact for each treated household individually 
(using each household’s matched comparison households), and then 
average those individual impacts. Table 7.3 shows that the impact esti-
mated from applying this procedure is a reduction of $8.3 in household 
health expenditures.
QUESTION 7
A. What are the basic assumptions required to accept this result from case 7?
B. Compare the result from case 7 with the result from case 3. Why do you think the 
results are so different?
C. Based on the result from case 7, should the HISP be scaled up nationally?
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The Matching Method at Work
Although the matching technique requires a signiﬁ cant amount of data and 
has other statistical limitations, it is a relatively versatile method that has 
been used to evaluate development programs in a number of settings. Two 
illustrative cases are detailed in boxes 7.1 and 7.2. 
Limitations of the Matching Method
Although matching procedures can be applied in many settings, regardless 
of a program’s assignment rules, they have several serious shortcomings. 
Box 7.1:  Workfare Program and Incomes in Argentina
Jalan and Ravallion (2003a) used propensity 
score matching techniques to evaluate the 
impact of the Argentinean workfare program 
A Trabajar on income. In response to the 
1996–97 macroeconomic crisis in Argentina, 
the government introduced A Trabajar rapidly, 
without using any randomized selection 
techniques or collecting any baseline data. 
For these reasons, the researchers chose to 
use matching techniques to evaluate the 
impact of the program. In this kind of con-
text, using matching techniques also makes 
it possible to analyze how income gains vary 
among households across the preinterven-
tion income distribution.
In mid-1997 a survey was administered 
to both participants and nonparticipants. To 
estimate the impact of the program by pro-
pensity score matching, Jalan and Ravallion 
considered a large set of about 200 back-
ground characteristics (at both the house-
hold and community levels) that were mea-
sured in the survey. For instance, estimating 
the propensity score equation showed that 
program participants were poorer and 
were more likely to be married, male house-
hold heads, and active in neighborhood 
associations.
After computing the estimated propensi-
ty scores, the authors restricted their analy-
sis to units whose propensity scores fell in 
the area of common support, where the pro-
pensity scores of participants and nonpar-
ticipants overlap. By matching participants to 
their nearest nonparticipant neighbors in the 
area of common support, and by averaging 
the differences in income between all of 
these matched groups, they estimated that 
the program resulted in an average income 
gain equivalent to about half of the workfare 
program wage. The researchers checked the 
robustness of results to various matching 
procedures. They stress that their estimates 
might be biased because of some unob-
served characteristics. Indeed, when using 
matching methods we can never rule out 
bias caused by unobserved variables, and 
that is their most serious limitation. 
Source: Jalan and Ravallion 2003a.
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First, they require extensive data sets on large samples of units, and even 
when those are available, a lack of common support between the treatment 
or enrolled group and the pool of nonparticipants may appear. Second, 
matching can only be performed based on observed characteristics; by deﬁ -
nition, we cannot incorporate unobserved characteristics in the calculation 
of the propensity score. So for the matching procedure to identify a valid 
comparison group, we must be sure that no systematic diff erences in unob-
served characteristics between the treatment units and the matched com-
parison units exist4 that could inﬂ uence the outcome (Y). Since we cannot 
prove that no such unobserved characteristics that aff ect both participation 
and outcomes exist, we have to assume that none exist. This is usually a very 
strong assumption. Although matching helps to control for observed back-
ground characteristics, we can never rule out bias that stems from unob-
served characteristics. In summary, the assumption that no selection bias 
Box 7.2: Piped Water and Child Health in India
Jalan and Ravallion (2003b) used matching 
methods to look at the effect of having piped 
water on the prevalence and duration of diar-
rhea among children under age 5 in rural 
India. In particular, the researchers evaluated 
a policy intervention to expand access to 
piped water to understand how gains may 
vary depending on household circumstances 
such as income and education level. This 
impact is diffi cult to detect because it may 
also depend on privately provided health 
inputs from parents that also affect the inci-
dence of diarrhea, such as boiling water, pro-
viding good nutrition, or using oral 
rehydration salts when a child is sick. 
The researchers used data from a large 
survey conducted in 1993–94 by India’s 
National Council of Applied Economic 
Research that contained data on the health 
and education status of 33,000 rural house-
holds from 16 states in India. This rich body 
of data allowed the researchers to use pro-
pensity score matching at both the individual 
and the village level, balancing the treatment 
and comparison groups by their predicted 
probability of receiving piped water through 
the national campaign. 
The evaluation found that having piped 
water reduced diarrheal disease—its preva-
lence would be 21 percent higher and dura-
tion 29 percent longer without piped water. 
However, these impacts are not seen by the 
low-income groups unless the woman in the 
household has more than a primary school 
education. In fact, Jalan and Ravallion found 
that the health impacts of piped water are 
larger and more signifi cant in households 
with better-educated women. They con-
cluded that their study illustrates the need to 
combine infrastructure investments, such as 
piped water, with other programs to improve 
education and reduce poverty. 
Source: Jalan and Ravallion 2003b.
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has occurred stemming from unobserved characteristics is very strong, and 
most problematic, it cannot be tested.
Matching is generally less robust than the other evaluation methods we 
have discussed. For instance, randomized selection methods do not require 
the untestable assumption that there are no unobserved variables that 
explain both participation in the program and outcomes. They also do not 
require such large samples or as extensive background characteristics as 
propensity score matching. 
In practice, matching methods are typically used when randomized 
selection, regression discontinuity design, and diff erence-in-diff erences 
options are not possible. Many authors use so-called ex-post matching when 
no baseline data are available on the outcome of interest or on background 
characteristics. They use a survey that was collected after the start of the 
program (that is, ex-post) to infer what people’s background characteristics 
were at baseline (for example, age, marital status), and then match the 
treated group to a comparison group using those inferred characteristics. Of 
course, this is risky: they may inadvertently match based on characteristics 
that were also aff ected by the program, and in that case, the estimation 
result would be invalid or biased. 
By contrast, when baseline data are available, matching based on baseline 
background characteristics can be very useful when it is combined with 
other techniques, for instance, diff erence-in-diff erences, which accounts 
for time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity. Matching is also more useful 
when the program assignment rule is known, in which case matching can be 
performed on that rule (see chapter 8).
By now, it is probably clear to readers that impact evaluations are best 
designed before a program begins to be implemented. Once the program has 
started, if one has no way to inﬂ uence how it is allocated and no baseline 
data have been collected, very few, or no, solid options for the evaluation 
will be available. 
Notes
1. In practice, many deﬁ nitions of what constitutes the “closest” or “nearest” 
propensity score are used to perform matching. The nearest controls can be 
deﬁ ned based on a stratiﬁ cation of the propensity score—the identiﬁ cation of 
the treatment unit’s nearest neighbors, based on distance, within a given 
radius—or using kernel techniques. It is considered good practice to check the 
robustness of matching results by using various matching algorithms.
2. The discussion on matching in this book focuses on one-to-one matching. 
Various other types of matching, such as one-to-many matching or 
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replacement/nonreplacement matching, will not be discussed. In all cases, 
however, the conceptual framework described here would still apply.
3. Rosenbaum 2002 presents a detailed review of matching.
4. For readers with a background in econometrics, this means that participation is 
independent of outcomes, given the background characteristics used to do the 
matching.
References
Jalan, Jyotsna, and Martin Ravallion. 2003a. “Estimating the Beneﬁ t Incidence of 
an Antipoverty Program by Propensity-Score Matching.” Journal of Business & 
Economic Statistics 21 (1): 19–30.
———. 2003b. “Does Piped Water Reduce Diarrhea for Children in Rural India?” 
Journal of Econometrics 112 (1): 153–73.
Rosenbaum, Paul. 2002. Observational Studies. 2nd ed. Springer Series in Statistics. 
New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Rosenbaum, Paul, and Donald Rubin. 1983. “The Central Role of the Propensity 
Score in Observational Studies of Causal Eff ects.” Biometrika 70 (1): 41–55.
 117
Combining Methods
CHAPTER 8
We have seen that most impact evaluation methods only produce valid 
estimates of the counterfactual under speciﬁ c assumptions. The main risk 
in applying any method is that its underlying assumptions do not hold 
true, resulting in biased estimates of the program’s impact. This section 
reviews these methodological issues and discusses strategies to reduce the 
risk of bias. And since the risk of bias stems primarily from deviations 
from the underlying assumptions, we will focus on how you can go about 
verifying those assumptions.
In the cases of a number of evaluation methods, the validity of the 
assumptions on which they rely can be veriﬁ ed. For other methods, you can-
not verify validity outright, but you can still use various so-called falsiﬁ ca-
tion tests to improve conﬁ dence about whether the assumptions behind the 
methods hold. Falsiﬁ cation tests are like stress tests: failing them is a strong 
sign that the assumptions behind the method do not hold in that particular 
context. Nevertheless, passing them provides only tentative support for the 
assumptions: you can never be fully sure that they hold. Box 8.1 presents a 
checklist of veriﬁ cation and falsiﬁ cation tests that can be used to assess 
whether a method is appropriate in the context of your evaluation. The 
checklist contains practical questions that can be answered by analyzing 
baseline data. 
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Box 8.1: Checklist of Verifi cation and Falsifi cation Tests
Randomized Assignment
Randomized assignment is the most robust 
method for estimating counterfactuals; it is 
considered the gold standard of impact 
evaluation. Some basic tests should still be 
considered to assess the validity of this 
evaluation strategy in a given context.
• Are the baseline characteristics balanced? 
Compare the baseline characteristics of 
the treatment group and the comparison 
group.a
• Has any noncompliance with the assign-
ment occurred? Check whether all eligi-
ble units have received the treatment and 
that no ineligible units have received the 
treatment. If noncompliance appears, use 
the randomized offering method.
• Are the numbers of units in the treat-
ment and comparison groups suffi ciently 
large? If not, you may want to combine 
randomized assignment with difference-
in-differences.
Randomized Offering
Noncompliance in randomized assignment 
amounts to randomized offering.
• Are the baseline characteristics balanced? 
Compare the baseline characteristics of 
the units being offered the program and 
the units not being offered the program.
Randomized Promotion
Randomized promotion leads to valid esti-
mates of the counterfactual if the promotion 
campaign substantially increases take-up of 
the program without directly affecting the 
outcomes of interest.
• Are the baseline characteristics balanced 
between the units who received the pro-
motion campaign and those who did not? 
Compare the baseline characteristics of 
the two groups.
• Does the promotion campaign substan-
tially affect the take-up of the program? It 
should. Compare the program take-up 
rates in the promoted and the nonpro-
moted samples.
• Does the promotion campaign directly 
affect outcomes? It should not. This can-
not usually be directly tested, and so we 
need to rely on theory and common 
sense to guide us.
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
Regression discontinuity design requires that 
the eligibility index be continuous around the 
cutoff score and that units be comparable in 
the vicinity of the cutoff score.  
• Is the index continuous around the cutoff 
score at the time of the baseline? 
• Has any noncompliance with the cutoff 
for treatment appeared? Test whether all 
eligible units and no ineligible units have 
received the treatment. If you fi nd non-
compliance, you will need to combine 
RDD with more advanced techniques to 
correct for this “fuzzy discontinuity.”b
Difference-in-Differences (DD)
Difference-in-differences assumes that out-
come trends are similar in the comparison 
and treatment groups before the intervention 
and that the only factors explaining changes 
in outcomes between the two groups are 
constant over time.
• Would outcomes have moved in tandem 
in the treatment and comparison groups 
in the absence of the program? This can 
(continued)
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be assessed by using several falsifi cation 
tests, such as the following: (1) Are the 
outcomes in the treatment and compari-
son groups moving in tandem before the 
intervention? If two rounds of data are 
available before the start of the program, 
test to see if any difference in trends 
appears between the two groups. (2) 
How about fake outcomes that should 
not be affected by the program? Are they 
moving in tandem before and after the 
start of the intervention in the treatment 
and comparison groups?
• Perform the difference-in-differences 
analysis using several plausible compari-
son groups. Do you obtain similar esti-
mates of the impact of the program?
• Perform the difference-in-differences 
analysis using your chosen treatment and 
comparison groups and a fake outcome 
that should not be affected by the pro-
gram. You should fi nd zero impact of the 
program on that outcome.
• Perform the difference-in-differences 
analysis using your chosen outcome vari-
able with two groups that you know were 
not affected by the program. You should 
fi nd zero impact of the program.
Matching
Matching relies on the assumption that 
enrolled and nonenrolled units are similar in 
terms of any unobserved variables that 
could affect both the probability of participat-
ing in the program and the outcome (Y ).
• Is program participation determined by 
variables that cannot be observed? This 
cannot be directly tested, so we need to 
rely on theory and common sense.
• Are the observed characteristics well bal-
anced between matched subgroups? 
Compare the observed characteristics of 
each treatment and its matched compari-
son group of units. 
• Can a matched comparison unit be found 
for each treatment unit? Check whether 
suffi cient common support exists in 
the distribution of the propensity scores. 
Small areas of common support indicate 
that enrolled and nonenrolled persons are 
very different, and that casts doubt as to 
whether matching is a credible method.
Source: Authors.
a.  As mentioned earlier, for statistical reasons, not all observed characteristics have to be similar in the treatment 
and comparison groups for randomization to be successful. Even when the characteristics of the two groups 
are truly equal, one can expect that 5 percent of the characteristics will show up with a statistically signifi cant 
difference when we use a 95 percent confi dence level for the test.
b.  Although we will not elaborate on this technique here, readers may wish to know that one would combine 
RDD with an instrumental variables approach. One would use the location left or right of the cutoff point as an 
instrumental variable for actual program take-up in the fi rst stage of a two-stage least squares estimation.
Combining Methods 
Even though all evaluation methods have risks for bias, the risk can some-
times be reduced by using a combination of methods. By combining meth-
ods, we can often off set the limitations of a single method and thus increase 
the robustness of the estimated counterfactual. 
Box 8.1 continued
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Matched diff erence-in-diff erences (matched DD) is one example of com-
bining methods. As discussed previously, simple propensity score matching 
cannot account for unobserved characteristics that might explain why a 
group chooses to enroll in a program and that might also aff ect outcomes. By 
contrast, matching combined with diff erence-in-diff erences at least takes 
care of any unobserved characteristics that are constant across time between 
the two groups. It is implemented as follows:
• First, perform matching based on observed baseline characteristics (as 
discussed in chapter 7).
• Second, apply the diff erence-in-diff erences method to estimate a coun-
terfactual for the change in outcomes in each subgroup of matched units.
• Finally, average out those double diff erences across matched subgroups.
Box 8.2 provides an example of an evaluation that used the matched 
diff erence-in-diff erences method in practice. 
Diff erence-in-diff erences regression discontinuity design (DD RDD) is a 
second example of combining methods. Remember that simple RDD 
assumes that units on both sides of the eligibility threshold are very similar. 
Insofar as some diff erences remain between the units on either side of the 
threshold, adding diff erence-in-diff erences allows us to control for diff er-
ences in unobserved characteristics that do not vary over time. You can 
implement DD RDD by taking double-diff erence in outcomes for units on 
both sides of the eligibility cutoff .
Imperfect Compliance
Imperfect compliance is a discrepancy between intended treatment status 
and actual treatment status. We have discussed it in reference to random-
ized assignment, but in reality imperfect compliance is a potential problem 
in most impact evaluation methods. Before you are able to interpret the 
impact estimates produced by any method, you need to know whether 
imperfect compliance occurred in the program. 
Imperfect compliance has two manifestations: (1) some intended treatment 
units may not receive treatment, and (2) some intended comparison units 
may receive treatment. Imperfect compliance can occur in a variety of ways:
• Not all intended program participants actually participate in the program. 
Sometimes units that are off ered a program choose not to participate. 
• Some intended participants are not off ered the program through admin-
istrative or implementation errors. 
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Box 8.2: Matched Difference-in-Differences
Cement Floors, Child Health, and Maternal Happiness in Mexico
The Piso Firme program in Mexico offers 
households with dirt fl oors up to 50 square 
meters of concrete fl ooring. Piso Firme 
began as a local program in the state of Coa-
huila but then was adopted nationally. Cat-
taneo et al. (2009) took advantage of the 
geographic variation to evaluate the impact 
of this large-scale housing improvement 
effort on health and welfare outcomes. 
The researchers used the difference-in-
differences method in conjunction with 
matching to compare households in Coahuila 
to similar families in the neighboring state of 
Durango, which at the time of the survey 
had not yet implemented the program. To 
improve comparability between the treat-
ment and comparison groups, the research-
ers limited their sample to households in the 
neighboring cities that lie just on either side 
of the border between the two states. They 
sampled from the blocks in the two cities 
that had the most similar preintervention 
characteristics based on a 2002 census. 
Using the offer of a cement fl oor as 
an instrumental variable for actually having 
cement fl oors, the researchers recovered the 
treatment-on-the-treated from the intent-to-
treat and found that the program led to an 
18.2 percent reduction in the presence of 
parasites, a 12.4 percent reduction in the 
prevalence of diarrhea, and a 19.4 percent 
reduction in the prevalence of anemia. Fur-
thermore, they were able to use variability in 
the amount of total fl oor space actually cov-
ered by cement to predict that a complete 
replacement of dirt fl oors with cement fl oors 
in a household would lead to a 78 percent 
reduction in parasitic infestations, a 49 per-
cent reduction in diarrhea, an 81 percent 
reduction in anemia, and a 36 percent to 
96 percent improvement in cognitive devel-
opment. The authors also collected data on 
adult welfare and found that cement fl oors 
make mothers happier, with a 59 percent 
increase in self-reported satisfaction with 
housing, a 69 percent increase in self-
reported satisfaction with quality of life, a 52 
percent reduction on a depression assess-
ment scale, and a 45 percent reduction on a 
perceived stress assessment scale. 
Cattaneo et al. (2009) concluded by illus-
trating that Piso Firme has a larger absolute 
impact on child cognitive development at a 
lower cost than Mexico’s large-scale condi-
tional cash transfer program, Oportunidades/
Progresa, as well as comparable programs in 
nutritional supplementation and early child-
hood cognitive stimulation. The cement 
fl oors also prevented more parasitic infec-
tions than the common deworming treat-
ment. The authors state that programs to 
replace dirt fl oors with cement fl oors are 
likely to improve child health cost-effectively 
in similar contexts. 
Source: Cattaneo et al. 2009.
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• Some units of the comparison group are mistakenly off ered the program 
and enroll in it.
• Some units of the comparison group manage to participate in the pro-
gram even though it is not off ered to them. This is sometimes called “con-
tamination” of the comparison group. If contamination aff ects a large 
portion of the comparison group, unbiased estimates of the counterfac-
tual cannot be obtained. 
• The program is assigned based on a continuous prioritization score, but 
the eligibility cutoff  is not strictly enforced. 
• Selective migration takes place based on treatment status. For example, 
we may use the diff erence-in-diff erences method to compare outcomes 
for treated and nontreated municipalities, but individuals may choose to 
move to another municipality if they do not like the treatment status of 
their municipality.
In general, in the presence of imperfect compliance, standard impact evalu-
ation methods produce intention-to-treat estimates. However, treatment-
on-the-treated estimates can be recovered from the intention-to-treat 
estimates using the instrumental variable approach. 
In chapter 4 we presented the basic intuition for dealing with imperfect 
compliance in the context of randomized assignment. Using an adjustment 
for the percentage of compliers in the evaluation sample, we were able to 
recover the impact of treatment on the treated from the intention-to-treat 
estimate. This “ﬁ x” can be extended to other methods through application 
of the more general instrumental variable approach. The instrumental vari-
able is a variable that helps you clear up, or correct, the bias that may stem 
from imperfect compliance. In the case of randomized off ering, we use a 0/1 
(or “dummy”) variable that that takes value 1 if the unit was originally 
assigned to the treatment group, and 0 if the unit was originally assigned to 
the comparison group. During the analysis stage, the instrumental variable 
is often used in the context of a two-stage regression that allows you to iden-
tify the impact of the treatment on the compliers.
The logic of the instrumental variable approach can be extended in the 
context of other evaluation methods:
• In the context of regression discontinuity design, the instrumental vari-
able you would use is a 0/1 variable that indicates whether a unit is 
located on the ineligible side or the eligible side of the cutoff  score. 
• In the context of diff erence-in-diff erences and selective migration, a pos-
sible instrumental variable for the location of the individual after the 
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start of the program would be the location of the individual before the 
announcement of the program.
Despite the possibility of “ﬁ xing” imperfect compliance using instrumental 
variables, two points are important to remember: 
1. From a technical point of view, it is not desirable to have a large portion 
of the comparison group enroll in the program. Evaluators and policy 
makers involved in the impact evaluation must work together to keep 
this fraction to a minimum. 
2. The instrumental variable method is valid only under certain circum-
stances; it is deﬁ nitely not a universal solution.
Spillovers
Even when the comparison group is not directly provided with the pro-
gram, it may indirectly be aff ected by spillovers from the treatment group. 
An interesting example of this is discussed by Kremer and Miguel (2004), 
who examined the impact of administering deworming medicine to chil-
dren in Kenyan schools (box 8.3). Intestinal worms are parasites that can 
be transmitted from one person to another through contact with contami-
nated fecal matter. When a child receives deworming medicine, her “worm 
load” will decrease, but so will the worm load of persons living in the same 
environment, as they will no longer come in contact with the child’s worms. 
Thus, in the Kenya example, when the medicine was administered to the 
children in one school, it beneﬁ ted not only those children (direct beneﬁ t) 
but also those in neighboring schools (indirect beneﬁ t). 
As depicted in ﬁ gure 8.1, deworming in group A schools also diminishes 
the number of worms that aff ect nonprogram schools in group B, which are 
located close to group A schools. However, nonprogram schools farther 
away from group A schools—the so-called group C schools—do not experi-
ence such spillover eff ects because the medicine administered in group A 
does not kill any of the worms that aff ect group C. Kremer and Miguel 
(2004) found that deworming signiﬁ cantly reduced school absenteeism not 
only in program schools (by comparing group A with group C) but also in 
nearby nonprogram schools (by comparing group B with group C). 
Because spillovers occur, it is important that the evaluator verify that 
they do not aff ect the entire comparison group. As long as enough com-
parison units remain that are not aff ected by spillovers (group C in the 
deworming example), you will be able to estimate the impact of the pro-
gram by comparing outcomes for the treatment units with outcomes for 
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Box 8.3: Working with Spillovers 
Deworming, Externalities, and Education in Kenya
The Primary School Deworming Project in 
Busia, Kenya, was carried out by the Dutch 
nonprofi t International Child Support Africa, 
in cooperation with the ministry of health, 
and was designed to test a variety of aspects 
of worm treatment and prevention. The proj-
ect involved 75 schools with a total enroll-
ment of more than 30,000 students between 
the ages of 6 and 18. The schools were 
treated with worm medication in accordance 
with World Health Organization recommen-
dations and also received worm prevention 
education in the form of health lectures, wall 
charts, and teacher training.
Due to administrative and fi nancial con-
straints, the rollout was phased in alphabet-
ically, with the fi rst group of 25 schools 
starting in 1998, the second group in 1999, 
and the third group in 2001. By randomizing 
at the level of school, Kremer and Miguel 
(2004) were able both to estimate the impact 
of deworming on a school and to identify 
spillovers across schools using exogenous 
variation in the closeness of control schools 
to treatment schools. Although compliance 
to the randomized design was relatively 
high (with 75 percent of those assigned to 
the treatment receiving worm medication, 
and only a small percentage of the compari-
son group units receiving treatment), the 
researchers were also able to take advan-
tage of noncompliance to determine within-
school health externalities, or spillovers. 
Kremer and Miguel (2004) found that the 
within-school externality effect was a 12 per-
centage point reduction in the proportion of 
moderate-to-heavy worm infections, while 
the additional direct effect of actually taking 
the worm medication was about 14 percent-
age points more. Also, in terms of cross-
school externalities, the presence of each 
additional thousand students attending 
a treatment school was associated with 
26 percentage points fewer moderate-to-
heavy infections. These health effects also 
led to an increase in school participation of 
at least seven percentage points and reduced 
absenteeism by at least one-quarter. No 
signifi cant impact on test scores was 
found.
Because the cost of worm treatment is 
so low and the health and education effects 
relatively high, the researchers concluded 
that deworming is a relatively cost-effi cient 
way to improve participation rates in schools. 
The study also illustrates that tropical dis-
eases such as worms may play a signifi cant 
role in educational outcomes and strength-
ens claims that Africa’s high disease burden 
may be contributing to its low income. Thus, 
the study’s authors argue that it makes a 
strong case for public subsidies to disease 
treatments with similar spillover benefi ts in 
developing countries. 
Source: Kremer and Miguel 2004.
the “pure” comparison units. On the downside, the evaluation will not be 
able to generalize the estimated treatment eff ects to the entire population. 
If, at the design stage, you expect that a program will have spillover eff ects, 
you can adapt the evaluation design to produce better results. First, the 
design needs to identify a pure comparison group, so that it will be possi-
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ble to generalize the estimated program impact. Second, the design should 
also make it possible to estimate the magnitude of spillover eff ects by 
identifying a comparison group that is likely to receive spillovers. In fact, 
spillovers themselves are often of policy interest because they constitute 
indirect program impacts.
Figure 8.1 illustrates how it is possible to estimate both a program’s 
impact and any spillover eff ects. Group A receives the medication. The 
eff ect of the medication spills over to group B. Group C is farther away 
and, thus, receives no spillover eff ects of the medication. This design can 
be obtained by randomly assigning treatment between two nearby units 
and a similar unit farther away. In this simple framework, the impact of 
the program can be estimated by comparing outcomes for group A to out-
comes for group C, and spillover eff ects can be estimated by comparing 
outcomes for group B with those for group C.
Additional Considerations
In addition to imperfect compliance and spillovers, other factors also 
need to be considered when an impact evaluation is being designed. 
These factors are common to most of the methodologies that we have 
discussed, and they tend to be harder to mitigate.1
 Figure 8.1 Spillovers
Source: Authors.
Treatment group
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Pure control group
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Group B
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When planning an evaluation, you should determine the right time to 
collect data. If a program takes time to have an impact on outcomes, then 
collecting data too soon will result in no impact of the program being 
found (see, for example, King and Behrman 2009). Conversely, if the fol-
low-up survey is ﬁ elded too late, you will not be able capture the eff ects 
of the program in time to inform policy makers. In cases where you wish 
to estimate both the short-term and the long-term impact of a program, 
several rounds of postintervention or follow-up data will need to be col-
lected. Chapter 10 will off er further guidance on the best evaluation time 
frames. 
If you are estimating a program’s impact on an entire group, your results 
may mask some diff erences in responses to the treatment among diff erent 
recipients. Most impact evaluation methods assume that a program aff ects 
outcomes in a simple, linear way for all of the units in the population. 
However, problems can arise when the size of the response depends in a 
nonlinear way on the size of the intervention, or when a group with high 
treatment intensity is compared with a group with low treatment inten-
sity. If you think that diff erent subpopulations may have experienced the 
impact of a program very diff erently, then you may want to consider hav-
ing separate samples for each subpopulation. Say, for example, that you 
are interested in knowing the impact of a school meal program on girls, 
but only 10 percent of the students are girls. In that case, even a “large” 
random sample of students may not contain a suffi  cient number of girls to 
allow you to estimate the impact of the program on girls. For your evalua-
tion’s sample design, you would want to stratify the sample on gender and 
include a suffi  ciently large number of girls to allow you to detect a given 
eff ect size.
When conducting an impact evaluation, you may also induce unintended 
behavioral responses from the population that you are studying, and that 
may limit the external validity of the evaluation results. For instance, the 
“Hawthorne eff ect” occurs when the mere fact that you are observing units 
makes them behave diff erently (Levitt and List 2009). The “John Henry 
eff ect” happens when comparison units work harder to compensate for not 
being off ered a treatment. Anticipation can lead to another type of unin-
tended behavioral eff ect. In a randomized rollout, units in the comparison 
group may expect to receive the program in the future and begin changing 
their behavior before the program actually appears. If you have reason to 
believe that these unintended behavioral responses may be present, then 
building in additional comparison groups that are completely unaff ected by 
the intervention is sometimes an option, one that in fact allows you to 
explicitly test for such responses.
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A Backup Plan for Your Evaluation
Sometimes, even with the best impact evaluation design and the best inten-
tions, things do not go exactly as planned. In the recent experience of a job 
training program, the implementation agency planned to randomly select 
participants from the pool of applicants, based on presumed oversubscrip-
tion to the program. Because of high unemployment among the target popu-
lation, it was anticipated that the pool of applicants for the job training 
program would be much larger than the number of places available. Unfor-
tunately, advertisement for the program was not as eff ective as expected, 
and in the end, the number of applicants was just below the number of train-
ing slots available. Without oversubscription from which to draw a com-
parison group, and with no backup plan in place, the initial attempt to 
evaluate the program had to be dropped entirely. This kind of situation is 
common, as are unanticipated changes in the operational or political con-
text of a program. Therefore, it is useful to have a backup plan in case the 
ﬁ rst choice of methodology does not work out. Part 3 of this book discusses 
operational and political aspects of the evaluation in more detail.
Planning for using several impact evaluation methods is also good prac-
tice from the methodological point of view. If you have doubts about 
whether one of your methods may have remaining bias, you will be able to 
check the results against the other method. When a program is imple-
mented in a randomized rollout (see chapter 10), the comparison group 
will eventually be incorporated into the program. That limits the time 
during which the comparison group is available for the evaluation. If, 
however, in addition to the randomized assignment design, a randomized 
promotion design is also implemented, then a comparison group will be 
available for the entire period of the program. Before the incorporation of 
the ﬁ nal group of the rollout, two alternative comparison groups will exist 
(from the randomized assignment and the randomized promotion), 
though in the longer term only the randomized promotion comparison 
group will remain.
Note
1. In chapter 3 other sources of limited external validity related to sampling 
biases and biases resulting from diff erentiated attrition in treatment and 
comparison groups are discussed.
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Evaluating Multifaceted Programs
CHAPTER 9
Up to now, we have discussed programs that include only one kind of 
treatment. In reality, many highly relevant policy questions arise in the 
context of multifaceted programs, that is, programs that combine several 
treatment options.1 Policy makers may be interested in knowing not only 
whether or not a program works, but also whether the program works bet-
ter than another or at lower cost. For example, if we want to increase 
school attendance, is it more eff ective to implement demand-side inter-
ventions (such as cash transfers to families) or supply-side interventions 
(such as greater incentives for teachers)? And if we introduce the two 
interventions together, do they work better than each of them alone? In 
other words, are they complementary? Alternatively, if program cost-
eff ectiveness is a priority, you may well wonder what is the optimal level 
of services that the program should deliver. For instance, what is the opti-
mal duration of a vocational training program? Does a 6-month program 
have a greater eff ect on trainees’ ﬁ nding jobs than a 3-month program? If 
so, is the diff erence large enough to justify the additional resources needed 
for a 6-month program?
Beyond simply estimating the impact of an intervention on an outcome 
of interest, impact evaluations can help to answer broader questions such 
as these: 
• What is the impact of one treatment compared with that of another 
treatment? For example, what is the impact on children’s cognitive 
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development of a program providing parenting training as opposed to a 
nutrition intervention? 
• Is the joint impact of a ﬁ rst treatment and a second treatment larger than 
the sum of the two individual impacts? For example, is the total impact 
of the parenting intervention and the nutrition intervention greater 
than, less than, or equal to the sum of the eff ects of the two individual 
interventions?  
• What is the additional impact of a higher-intensity treatment compared to 
a lower-intensity treatment? For example, what is the eff ect on stunted 
children’s cognitive development if a social worker visits them at home 
every two weeks, as compared to visiting them only once a month? 
This chapter provides examples of how to design impact evaluations for 
two types of multifaceted programs: ones with multiple levels of the same 
treatment and ones with multiple treatments. First, we discuss how to 
design an impact evaluation for a program with various service levels, and 
then we turn to how to disentangle the various kinds of impact of a pro-
gram with multiple treatments. The discussion assumes that we are using 
the randomized assignment mechanism, but it can be generalized to other 
methods. 
Evaluating Programs with Different Treatment 
Levels
It is relatively easy to design an impact evaluation for a program with 
varying treatment levels. Imagine that you are trying to evaluate the 
impact of a program that has two levels of treatment: high (for example, 
biweekly visits) and low (say, monthly visits). You want to evaluate the 
impact of both options, and you also want to know how much the addi-
tional visits aff ect outcomes. To do this, you can run a lottery to decide who 
receives the high level of treatment, who receives the low level of treat-
ment, and who is assigned to the comparison group. Figure 9.1 illustrates 
this process.
As in standard randomized assignment, step 1 is to deﬁ ne the population 
of eligible units for your program. Step 2 is to select a random sample of 
units to be included in the evaluation, the so-called evaluation sample. Once 
you have the evaluation sample, in step 3 you then randomly assign units to 
the group receiving high-level treatment, the group receiving low-level 
treatment, or the comparison group. As a result of randomized assignment 
to multiple treatment levels, you will have created three distinct groups:
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• Group A constitutes the comparison group.
• Group B receives the low level of treatment.
• Group C receives the high level of treatment.
When correctly implemented, randomized assignment ensures that the 
three groups are similar. Therefore, you can estimate the impact of the high-
level treatment by comparing the average outcome for group C with the 
average outcome for group A. You can also estimate the impact of the low-
level treatment by comparing the average outcome for group B with that for 
group A. Finally, you can assess whether the high-level treatment has a 
larger impact than the low-level treatment by comparing the average out-
comes for groups B and C.
Estimating the impact of a program with more than two treatment levels 
will follow the same logic. If there are three levels of treatment, the random-
ization process will create three diff erent treatment groups, plus a compari-
son group. In general, with n diff erent treatment levels, there will be n 
treatment groups, plus a comparison group.
When randomized assignment is not feasible, other evaluation meth-
ods have to be used. Fortunately, all the evaluation methods described 
thus far are capable of analyzing the relative impact of diff erent treatment 
levels. For example, suppose you are interested in evaluating the impact of 
varying the amount of money off ered to students in a scholarship program 
that seeks to increase secondary school enrollment. A $60 scholarship is 
given to the 25 students with the highest test scores in each school at the 
 Figure 9.1 Steps in Randomized Assignment of Two Levels of Treatment
Source: Authors.
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end of primary school, and a $45 scholarship is given to the 25 students 
with the next-highest test scores. The lower-ranked students in the 
schools do not receive any scholarship. In this context, a regression dis-
continuity design can be used to compare the test scores of students not 
only around the $45 threshold but also around to the $60 threshold. 
Filmer and Schady (2009) presented the results from such an evaluation 
in Cambodia, in which they found no evidence that the $60 scholarship 
increased enrollment more than the $45 scholarship. 
Evaluating Multiple Treatments with Crossover 
Designs
In addition to comparing various levels of treatment, you may want to com-
pare entirely diff erent treatment options. In fact, policy makers usually pre-
fer to be able to compare the relative merits of diff erent interventions, rather 
than know the impact of only a single intervention. 
Imagine that you want to evaluate the impact on school enrollment of a 
program with two diff erent interventions, conditional cash transfers to the 
students’ families and free bus transportation to school. You may want to 
know the impact of each intervention separately, and you may also want to 
know whether the combination of the two is better than just the sum of the 
individual eff ects. Seen from the participants’ point of view, the program is 
available in three diff erent forms: conditional cash transfers only, free bus 
transportation only, or a combination of conditional cash transfers and free 
bus transportation. 
Randomized assignment for a program with two interventions is very 
much like the process for a program with a single intervention. The main 
diff erence is the need to conduct several independent lotteries instead of 
one. This produces a crossover design, sometimes also called a cross-cutting 
design. Figure 9.2 illustrates this process. As before, step 1 is to deﬁ ne the 
population of units eligible for the program. Step 2 is to select a random 
sample of eligible units from the population to form the evaluation sample. 
Once you obtain the evaluation sample, step 3 is to randomly assign units 
from the evaluation sample to a treatment group and a control group. In 
step 4, you use a second lottery to randomly assign a subset of the treatment 
group to receive the second intervention. Finally, in step 5 you conduct 
another lottery to assign a subset of the initial control group to receive the 
second intervention, while the other subset will remain as a “pure” control. 
As a result of the randomized assignment to the two treatments, you will 
have created four groups, as illustrated in ﬁ gure 9.3:
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• Group A receives both interventions (cash transfers and bus 
transportation). 
• Group B receives intervention 1 but not intervention 2 (cash transfers only).
• Group C does not receive intervention 2 but receives intervention 1 (bus 
transportation only).
• Group D receives neither intervention 1 nor intervention 2 and consti-
tutes the pure comparison group.
When correctly implemented, randomized assignment ensures that the 
four groups are similar. You can therefore estimate the impact of the ﬁ rst 
intervention by comparing the outcome for group B with the outcome for 
the pure comparison group, group D. You can also estimate the impact of the 
second intervention by comparing the outcome for group C to the outcome 
for the pure comparison group. In addition, this design also makes it possi-
ble to compare the incremental impact of receiving the second intervention 
when a unit already receives the ﬁ rst one. Comparing the outcomes of group 
A and group B will yield the impact of the second intervention for those 
units that have already received the ﬁ rst intervention, and comparing the 
outcomes of group A and group C will yield the impact of the ﬁ rst interven-
tion for those units that have already received the second intervention. 
 Figure 9.2 Steps in Randomized Assignment of Two Interventions
Source: Authors.
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The foregoing description has used the example of randomized assign-
ment to explain how an impact evaluation can be designed for a program 
with two diff erent interventions. When a program comprises more than 
two interventions, one can increase the number of lotteries and continue 
to subdivide the evaluation to construct groups that receive the various 
combinations of interventions. Designs with multiple treatments and 
multiple treatment levels can also be implemented. Even if the number of 
groups increases, the basic theory behind the design remains the same as 
described earlier.
However, evaluating more than one or two interventions will create 
practical challenges both for the evaluation and for program operation, as 
the complexity of the design will increase exponentially with the number 
of treatment arms. For the evaluation of one intervention, only two groups 
are needed: one treatment group and one comparison group. For the eval-
uation of two interventions, four groups are needed: three treatment 
groups and one comparison group. If you were to evaluate three interven-
tions, including all possible combinations among the three interventions, 
you would need 2 × 2 × 2 = 8 groups in the evaluation. In general, for an 
evaluation that is to include all possible combinations among n interven-
tions, one would need 2n groups. In addition, to be able to distinguish dif-
Figure 9.3 Treatment and Comparison Groups for a Program with Two 
Interventions
Source: Authors.
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Box 9.1: Testing Program Alternatives for HIV/AIDS 
Prevention in Kenya
Dufl o et al. (2006) used a crosscutting design to evaluate the impact of a num-
ber of HIV/AIDS prevention programs in two rural districts of western Kenya. 
The study was based on a sample of 328 schools, which were divided into six 
groups, as shown in the accompanying table summarizing the program de-
sign. Each group received a different, randomly assigned combination of three 
treatments. The treatments included providing a teacher training program to 
improve capacity to teach the national HIV/AIDS education curriculum, en-
couraging schools to hold debates on the role of condoms and essay contests 
on prevention, and reducing the cost of education by providing students with 
free school uniforms (see table).
Summary of Program Design
Group
Number 
of 
schools
National 
program
Teacher 
training 
reinforcement
Condom 
debate 
and 
essay 
(spring 
2005)
Reducing 
the cost 
of 
education 
(spring 
2003 and 
fall 2004)
1 88 Yes
2 41 Yes Yes
3 42 Yes Yes Yes
4 83 Yes
5 40 Yes Yes Yes
6 40 Yes Yes Yes Yes
The researchers found that after two years, the teacher training program had 
had little impact on students’ knowledge, self-reported sexual activity, condom 
use, or teen childbearing, though it did improve the teaching of the national cur-
riculum. The debates and essay competition increased self-reported knowledge 
and use of condoms without increasing self-reported sexual activity. Finally, 
reducing the cost of education by providing school uniforms reduced both drop-
out rates and teen childbearing. Thus, the researchers concluded that providing 
school uniforms proved more successful in reducing teenage childbearing than 
training teachers in the national HIV/AIDS curriculum. 
Source: Dufl o et al. 2006.
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ferences in outcomes among the diff erent groups, each group must contain 
a suffi  cient number of units of observation to ensure suffi  cient statistical 
power. In fact, detecting diff erences between diff erent intervention arms 
may require larger samples than when comparing a treatment to a pure 
control. If the two treatment arms are successful in causing changes in the 
desired outcomes, larger samples will be required to detect the potentially 
minor diff erences between the two groups.  
Finally, crossover designs can also be put in place in evaluation designs 
that combine various evaluation methods (boxes 9.1 and 9.2). The opera-
tional rules that guide the assignment of each treatment will determine 
which combination of methods has to be used. For instance, it may be that 
the ﬁ rst treatment is allocated based on an eligibility score, but the second 
one is allocated in a randomized fashion. In that case, the design can use a 
regression discontinuity design for the ﬁ rst intervention and a randomized 
assignment method for the second intervention. 
Box 9.2: Testing Program Alternatives for Monitoring 
Corruption in Indonesia
In Indonesia, Olken (2007) used an innovative crosscutting design to test 
different methods for controlling corruption, from a top-down enforcement 
approach to more grassroots community monitoring. He used a randomized 
assignment methodology in more than 600 villages that were building roads 
as part of a nationwide infrastructure improvement project. 
One of the multiple treatments included randomly selecting some vil-
lages to be informed that their construction project would be audited by a 
government agent. Then, to test community participation in monitoring, the 
researchers implemented two interventions. They passed out invitations to 
community accountability meetings, and they provided comment forms 
that could be submitted anonymously. To measure the levels of corruption, 
an independent team of engineers and surveyors took core samples of the 
new roads, estimated the cost of the materials used, and then compared 
their calculations to the reported budgets. 
Olken found that increasing government audits (from about a 4 percent 
chance of being audited to a 100 percent chance) reduced missing expendi-
tures by about 8 percentage points (from 24 percent). Increasing commu-
nity participation in monitoring had an impact on missing labor but not on 
missing expenditures. The comment forms were effective only when they 
were distributed to children at school to give to their families and not when 
handed out by the village leaders. 
Source: Olken 2007.
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Note
1. See Banerjee and Duﬂ o (2009) for a longer discussion.
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HOW TO IMPLEMENT 
AN IMPACT EVALUATION
In part 1 of this book, we discussed why an impact evaluation would be under-
taken and when it is worthwhile to do so. In principle, evaluations should be 
designed to address questions that need to be answered for policy-making pur-
poses, for example, for budget negotiations or for decisions about whether to 
expand a nutrition program, increase scholarship benefi ts, or roll out a hospital 
reform. The evaluation objectives and questions should fl ow directly from the 
policy questions. Once it is clear what policy needs to be evaluated and what 
policy questions the evaluation must address, you will need to develop a theory 
of change such as a results chain for your program, which will then allow you to 
choose appropriate indicators. In part 2 of this book, we described a series of 
methods that can be used to evaluate the impact of programs and discussed 
their advantages and disadvantages, with examples for each method.
This third part of the book focuses on the operational steps in managing or com-
missioning an impact evaluation. These steps constitute the building blocks of 
Part 3
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an impact evaluation that will answer the policy questions that have been formu-
lated and estimate the causal impact of the program. We have grouped the 
operational steps of an impact evaluation into four broad phases: operationaliz-
ing the evaluation design, choosing a sample, collecting data, and producing 
and disseminating fi ndings. The fi gure on the next page illustrates their 
sequence, and chapters 10 through 13 deal with each of the four phases. 
In chapter 10, we discuss the key components of operationalizing the design for 
the evaluation. That is, you will examine the program’s implementation plans and 
choose an appropriate evaluation design. Before you can move on to implement-
ing the evaluation, you must confi rm that your proposed evaluation design is 
ethical. Once that is clear, you will assemble a team for the evaluation, construct 
a budget, and identify funding.
In chapter 11, we discuss how to sample respondents for the surveys and how 
many survey respondents are required.
In chapter 12, we review the steps in collecting data. Bearing in mind the policy 
questions you wish to answer, as well as your evaluation design, you must 
determine what data can be extracted from existing sources and decide what 
kind of data need to be collected. You must oversee the development of an 
appropriate questionnaire for the data that are to be collected. Once that is 
done, help must be hired from a fi rm or government agency that specializes in 
data collection. That entity will recruit and train fi eld staff and pilot test the ques-
tionnaire. After making the necessary adjustments, the fi rm or agency will be 
able to go ahead with fi eldwork. Finally, the data that are collected must be 
digitized or processed and validated before they can be used. 
In chapter 13, we deal with the fi nal stages of the evaluation. We describe what 
products an evaluation will deliver and what the evaluation reports should con-
tain, and we provide some guidelines on how to disseminate fi ndings among 
policy makers and other stakeholders.
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Prepare for the
evaluation (part I)
Operationalize the
evaluation design
(ch. 10)   
Choose the sample
(ch. 11)  
Collect data
(ch. 12)  
Produce and
disseminate findings
(ch. 13)   
•
•
•
•
Decide what to evaluate 
Objectives, policy questions 
Develop hypotheses / theory of change / results chain 
Choose indicators 
•
•
•
• Time the evaluation 
•
Choose an evaluation design
Confirm that the evaluation design is ethical 
Assemble an evaluation team 
Budget for the evaluation 
•
•
Decide on the size of the sample 
Decide on the sampling strategy 
•
•
•
•
• Conduct fieldwork 
•
Decide what type of data need to be collected 
Hire help to collect data 
Develop the questionnaire 
Pilot test the questionnaire   
Process and validate the data 
•
•
•
•
Analyze the data 
Write the report 
Discuss findings with policy makers 
Disseminate findings 
Figure P3.1   Roadmap for Implementing an Impact Evaluation
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Operationalizing the Impact 
Evaluation Design
CHAPTER 10
In part 2, we described various alternative methodologies that produce 
valid comparison groups. Based on those comparison groups, the causal 
impact of a program can be estimated. We now turn to the practical aspects 
of choosing which method to use for your own program. We will show that 
the program’s operational rules provide clear guidance on how to generate 
comparison groups and, thus, on which method is most appropriate for your 
policy context.
Choosing an Impact Evaluation Method
The key to estimating a causal impact is ﬁ nding a valid comparison group. 
In part 2, we discussed a number of valid comparison groups, including 
those generated from randomized assignment, randomized promotion, 
regression discontinuity, diff erence-in-diff erences, and matching. In this 
chapter, we consider the question of which method to use in which situa-
tion. The overarching principle is that the rules of program operation pro-
vide a guide to which method is best suited to which program and that 
those rules can and should drive the evaluation method, not vice versa. 
The evaluation should not drastically change key elements of the inter-
vention for the sake of a cleaner evaluation design.
Key Concept:
The rules of program 
operation determine 
which impact 
evaluation method 
can be applied (not 
vice versa).
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Randomized assignment is often the method preferred by evaluators. 
When properly implemented, it generates comparability between the treat-
ment and comparison groups in observed and unobserved characteristics, 
with low risk for bias. Because randomized assignment is fairly intuitive, 
requires limited use of econometrics, and generates an average treatment 
eff ect for the population of interest, it also makes communicating results to 
policy makers straightforward. However, randomized designs are not 
always feasible, especially when they conﬂ ict with the operational rules of 
the program.
The operational rules most relevant for the evaluation design are those 
that identify who is eligible for the program and how they are selected for 
participation. Comparison groups come from those that are eligible but can-
not be incorporated at a given moment (for example, when excess demand 
exists) or those near the threshold for participation in the program based on 
targeting or eligibility rules. It is diffi  cult to ﬁ nd valid comparison groups 
unless the program rules that determine beneﬁ ciaries’ eligibility and selec-
tion are equitable, transparent, and accountable.
Targeting Rule Principles
We can almost always ﬁ nd valid comparison groups if the operational rules 
for selecting beneﬁ ciaries are equitable, transparent, and accountable:
• Equitable targeting criteria are rules that rank or prioritize eligibility 
based on a commonly agreed indicator of need, or under which everyone 
is off ered program beneﬁ ts, or at least has an equal chance of being 
off ered beneﬁ ts.
• Transparent targeting criteria are rules that are made public, so that civil 
society can implicitly agree to them and can monitor that they were actu-
ally followed. Transparent rules should be quantitative and easily 
observed by outside parties.
• Accountable rules are rules that are the responsibility of program offi  cials 
and whose implementation is the basis of those offi  cials’ job performance 
and reward.
Equitable rules, as we discuss later, translate in most cases into either ran-
domized assignment or regression discontinuity designs. Transparency and 
accountability ensure that targeting criteria are quantitatively veriﬁ able and 
are actually implemented as designed. When the operational rules violate 
these three principles of good governance, we face challenges both to creat-
ing a well-designed program and to conducting the evaluation.
Key Concept:
We can almost always 
fi nd valid comparison 
groups if the 
operational rules for 
selecting benefi ciaries 
are equitable, 
transparent, and 
accountable. 
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The operational rules of eligibility are transparent and accountable when 
the government uses quantiﬁ able criteria that can be externally veriﬁ ed and 
makes those criteria public. These principles of good governance improve 
the likelihood that the program actually beneﬁ ts the target population and 
are the key to a successful evaluation. If the rules are not quantiﬁ able and 
veriﬁ able, then the evaluation team will have diffi  culty making sure that 
assignment to treatment and comparison groups happens as designed or, at 
minimum, documenting how it actually happened. If the evaluators cannot 
actually verify assignment, then they cannot correctly analyze the data to 
calculate impacts. Understanding the program assignment rules is critical 
to identifying the proper impact evaluation method. 
Operational Targeting Rules
Rules of operation typically govern what the program beneﬁ ts are, how they 
are ﬁ nanced and distributed, and how the program selects beneﬁ ciaries. The 
rules governing program ﬁ nancing and the incorporation of beneﬁ ciaries are 
key to ﬁ nding valid comparison groups. The rules governing incorporation 
cover eligibility, allocation rules in the case of limited resources, and the 
phasing in of beneﬁ ciaries. More speciﬁ cally, the key rules that generate a 
road map to comparison groups answer three fundamental operational ques-
tions related to money, targeting, and timing:
1. Money: Does the program have suffi  cient resources to achieve scale and 
reach full coverage of all eligible beneﬁ ciaries? Governments and nongov-
ernmental organizations do not always have enough money to provide 
program services to everyone who is eligible and applies for beneﬁ ts. In 
that case, the government has to decide which of the eligible applicants 
receive program beneﬁ ts and which are excluded. Many times, programs 
are limited to speciﬁ c geographic regions, to rural areas, or to small com-
munities, even though there may be eligible beneﬁ ciaries in other regions 
or in larger communities.
2. Targeting Rules: Who is eligible for program beneﬁ ts? Is the program tar-
geted based on an eligibility cutoff , or is it available to everyone? Public 
school and primary health care are usually off ered universally. Many pro-
grams use operational targeting rules that rely on a continuous ranking with 
a cutoff  point. For example, pension programs set an age limit above which 
elderly individuals become eligible. Cash transfer programs often rank 
households based on their estimated poverty status, and households below 
a predetermined cutoff  are deemed eligible.
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3. Timing: How are potential beneﬁ ciaries enrolled in the program—all at once 
or in phases over time? Many times, administrative and resource con-
straints prevent a government from immediately providing beneﬁ ts to 
everyone in its target group. It must roll out the program over time, and 
thus, it must decide who gets the beneﬁ ts ﬁ rst and who is incorporated 
later. A common approach is to phase in a program geographically, over 
time, incorporating all eligible beneﬁ ciaries in one village or region before 
moving to the next.
Identifying and Prioritizing Benefi ciaries
A critical operational issue embedded in all three questions is how beneﬁ -
ciaries are selected. This, as we will see below, is the key to identifying valid 
comparison groups. Comparison groups are naturally found among the 
noneligible populations and more frequently among the populations who 
are eligible but are incorporated later. How beneﬁ ciaries are prioritized 
depends in part on the objectives of the program. Is it a pension program for 
the elderly, a poverty alleviation program targeted to the poor, or an immu-
nization program available to everyone?
To prioritize beneﬁ ciaries, the program must choose an indicator that is 
both quantiﬁ able and veriﬁ able. Once an indicator of need is agreed on, then 
how it is applied largely depends on the ability of the government to mea-
sure and rank need. If the government can accurately rank beneﬁ ciaries 
based on relative need, it may feel ethically obligated to roll out the program 
in order of need. However, ranking based on need requires not only a quan-
tiﬁ able measure, but also the ability and resources to measure that indicator 
on an individual basis.
In some cases, eligibility can be based on a continuous indicator that is 
cheap and easy to collect, such as age for pensions. For example, age 70 as a 
cutoff  for eligibility for a pension is simple to measure and easy to apply. 
However, many times the eligibility indicator does not rank relative need 
within the eligible population. For example, a person 69 years old does not 
necessarily need a pension less than a person 70 years old, or a person 
75 years old, does not necessarily need a pension more than a 72-year-old. 
In this case, the program can identify the eligible population but cannot 
easily rank relative need with the eligible population.
Other programs use eligibility criteria that could in principle be used both 
to determine eligibility and to rank relative need. For example, many 
programs are targeted to poor individuals, though accurate poverty indica-
tors that reliably rank households are often hard to measure and costly to 
collect. Collecting income or consumption data on all potential beneﬁ ciaries 
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to rank them by poverty level is a complex and costly process. Instead, many 
programs use some sort of proxy means tests to estimate poverty levels. 
These are indexes of simple measures such as assets and sociodemographic 
characteristics (Grosh et al. 2008). Proxy means tests can suff er from mea-
surement error, are costly to implement, and may not always permit ﬁ ne-
tuned ranking of socioeconomic status or need, especially in the lower part of 
the poverty distribution. Proxy means tests can help determine reasonably 
well whether a household is above or below some gross cutoff , but they may 
be less precise when identifying distance from the cutoff . Their use enables 
programs to identify the eligible poor but not necessarily to rank need within 
an eligible population.
Rather than confront the cost and complexity of ranking households, 
many programs choose to rank at a higher level of aggregation, such as at the 
community level. The underlying assumption is that households within 
communities are basically homogenous, that the vast majority of the popu-
lation is likely eligible, and that ranking households would not be worth the 
cost of identifying and excluding the few ineligibles. In this case, everyone 
within a community would be eligible for the program. Although this strat-
egy works for small, rural communities, it works less well as programs move 
into more urbanized areas that are more heterogeneous. Targeting at an 
aggregate level has obvious operational beneﬁ ts, but it often does not obvi-
ate the need to rank individual beneﬁ ciaries based on some objective and 
quantiﬁ able indicator of need.
In cases when the agency funding a program chooses not to rank need 
because the process is too costly and error prone, it must use other criteria 
to decide how to sequence program rollout. One criterion that is consistent 
with good governance is equity. An equitable rule would be to give everyone 
who is eligible an equal chance of going ﬁ rst and to randomly assign poten-
tial beneﬁ ciaries their place in the sequence. This is a fair and equitable allo-
cation rule, and it also produces a randomized evaluation design with both 
internal and external validity.
Translating Operational Rules into Comparison Groups
In table 10.1, we map the possible comparison groups to the type of program, 
based on operational rules and the three fundamental operational questions 
related to money, targeting, and timing that we formulated earlier. The 
columns are split by whether or not the program has suffi  cient resources to 
cover all potentially eligible beneﬁ ciaries eventually (money) and are further 
subdivided into programs that have targeted versus universal eligibility (tar-
geting rules). The rows are divided into phased versus immediate rollout of 
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Table 10.1   Relationship between a Program’s Operational Rules and Impact Evaluation Methods
T
IM
IN
G
MONEY 
Excess demand for program
(limited resources)
No excess demand for program
(fully resourced)
TARGETING 
RULES 
Continuous 
targeting or 
ranking & cutoff
(1)
No continuous 
targeting or 
ranking & cutoff
(2)
Continuous 
targeting or 
ranking & cutoff
(3)
No continuous 
targeting or 
ranking & cutoff
(4)
Phased 
implementation 
over time
(A) 
CELL A1 CELL A2 CELL A3 CELL A4
(3.1) 
Randomized 
assignment
(4) RDD 
(3.1) 
Randomized 
assignment
(3.2) 
Randomized 
promotion
(5) DD with 
(6) Matching
(3.1) 
Randomized 
assignment to 
phases 
(4) RDD
(3.1) 
Randomized 
assignment to 
phases 
(3.2) 
Randomized 
promotion to 
early take-up 
(5) DD with 
(6) Matching
Immediate 
implementation
(B)
CELL B1 CELL B2 CELL B3 CELL B4
(3.1) 
Randomized 
assignment 
(4) RDD
(3.1) 
Randomized 
assignment
(3.2) 
Randomized 
promotion 
(5) DD with 
(6) Matching
(4) RDD If less than full 
takeup: 
(3.2) 
Randomized 
promotion 
(5) DD with 
(6) Matching
Source: Authors.
Note: The number in parentheses refers to the chapter of the book where the method is discussed. RDD = regression 
discontinuity design; DD = difference-in-differences.
the program (timing). Each cell lists the potential sources of valid comparison 
groups. Each cell is labeled with an index whose ﬁ rst place indicates the row 
in the table (A, B) and whose second place indicates the column (1–4). For 
example, cell A1 refers to the cell in the ﬁ rst row and ﬁ rst column of the table. 
Cell A1 identiﬁ es the evaluation methods that are most adequate for programs 
that have limited resources, are targeted, and are phased in over time.
Most programs need to be phased in over time because of either ﬁ nanc-
ing constraints or logistical and administrative limitations. This group or 
category covers the ﬁ rst row of the chart—that is, cells A1, A2, A3, and A4. In 
this case, the equitable, transparent, and accountable operational rule is to 
give everyone an equal chance of getting the program ﬁ rst, second, third, 
and so on, implying randomized rollout of the program. 
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In the cases in which resources are limited—that is, in which there will 
never be enough resources to achieve full scale-up (in cells A1 and A2, and 
B1 and B2)—excess demand for those resources may emerge very quickly. 
Then a lottery to decide who gets into the program may be a viable alterna-
tive. In this case also, everyone gets an equal chance to beneﬁ t from the pro-
gram. A lottery is an equitable, transparent, and accountable operational 
rule to allocate program beneﬁ ts.
Another class of programs comprises those that are phased in over time 
and for which administrators can rank the potential beneﬁ ciaries by need—
cells A1 and A3. If the criteria used to prioritize the beneﬁ ciaries are quanti-
tative and available and have a cutoff  for eligibility, the program can use a 
regression discontinuity design.
The other broad category consists of programs that have the administra-
tive capability to be implemented immediately—that is, the cells in the bot-
tom row of the chart. When the program has limited resources and is not 
able to rank beneﬁ ciaries (cell B2), then one could use randomized assign-
ment based on excess demand. If the program has suffi  cient resources to 
achieve scale and no targeting criteria (cell B4), then the only solution is to 
use randomized promotion, under the assumption of less than full take-up 
of the program. If the program can rank beneﬁ ciaries and is targeted, one 
can again use regression discontinuity. 
Finding the Minimum Scale of Intervention
The rules of operation also determine the minimum scale of intervention. 
The scale of intervention is the scale at which the program is being imple-
mented. For example, if a health program is implemented at the district 
level, then all villages in the district would either receive the program (as a 
group) or not receive it. Some programs can be effi  ciently implemented at 
the individual, household, or institution level, whereas others need to be 
implemented at a community or administrative district level. Implementing 
an intervention at one of these higher levels (for example, by province or 
state) can be problematic for the evaluation for three main reasons: 
1. The size of the evaluation sample and the cost of the evaluation increase 
with the scale of the intervention.
2. As the scale of the intervention increases, it is harder to ﬁ nd a suffi  cient 
number of units to include in the evaluation.
3. The internal validity of the evaluation is more likely to be threatened 
with large-scale units of intervention.
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First, evaluations of interventions implemented at higher levels, such as the 
community or administrative district, require larger sample sizes and will 
be more costly, compared to evaluations of interventions at a lower level, 
such as at the individual or household level.1 The level of intervention is 
important because it deﬁ nes the unit of assignment to the treatment and 
comparison groups, and that has implications for the size of the evaluation 
sample and its cost. For interventions implemented at higher levels, you will 
need a larger sample to be able to detect the program’s true impact. The 
intuition behind this will be discussed in chapter 11, which reviews power 
calculations and how to establish the sample size required for an evaluation. 
A slightly distinct point is that the sample size needed for the random-
ized assignment to successfully balance the treatment and comparison 
groups becomes problematic at large levels of aggregation. Intuitively, if the 
level of aggregation is at the province level and the country only has six 
provinces, then randomization is unlikely to achieve balance between the 
treatment and comparison groups. In this case, say that the evaluation 
design allocates three states to the treatment group and three to the com-
parison group. It is very unlikely that the states in the treatment group 
would be similar to the comparison group, even if the number of households 
within each state is large. The key to balancing the treatment and compari-
son groups is the number of units assigned to the treatment and comparison 
groups, not the number of individuals or households in the sample.
The third problem with using large-scale units of intervention is that dif-
ferential changes over time are more likely to compromise the internal 
validity of the randomized selection even if the groups’ characteristics are 
balanced at baseline. Consider again the example of using states as the level 
of intervention for a health insurance program. The evaluation randomly 
assigns one group of states to the treatment group and another to the com-
parison group. Assume that you are lucky and the two groups are balanced 
at baseline—that is, households in the treatment and comparison groups 
have the same level of out-of-pocket medical expenditures, on average. After 
the baseline data are collected, some individual states may introduce other 
health policies, such as immunization programs or water and sanitation 
programs, that improve the health status of the population and thereby 
lower demand for medical care and out-of-pocket expenditures. If these 
policy changes are not balanced across the comparison and treatment 
groups, then the impact of health insurance on out-of-pocket expenditures 
is confounded with the change in other state health policies. Similarly, some 
states may experience faster economic growth than others. Health care 
expenditures most likely rise faster in states with faster income growth. 
Again, if those diff erential changes in local economic growth are not bal-
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anced across the comparison and treatment groups, then the impact of 
health insurance on out-of-pocket expenditures will be confounded with 
the change in the local economy. In general, it is harder to control for these 
types of temporal changes at larger scales of intervention. Performing ran-
domized assignment on small units of implementation mitigates those 
threats to internal consistency.
To avoid the problems associated with implementing an intervention at a 
high geographical or administrative unit level, program managers need to 
ﬁ nd the minimum scale at which the program can be implemented. Various 
factors determine the minimum feasible scale of intervention: 
• Economies of scale and administrative complexity in the delivery of the 
program
• Administrative ability to assign beneﬁ ts at the individual or household 
level
• Concerns about potential civil conﬂ icts
• Concerns about contamination of the comparison group.
The minimum scale of intervention is typically based on economies of scale 
and the administrative complexity of delivering the program. For example, 
a health insurance program may require a local offi  ce for beneﬁ ciaries to 
submit claims and to pay providers. The ﬁ xed costs of the offi  ce need to be 
spread over a large number of beneﬁ ciaries, so it might be ineffi  cient to roll 
out the program at the individual level and more effi  cient to do so at the 
community level. However, in situations with new and untested types of 
interventions, it may be worth absorbing short-run ineffi  ciencies and rolling 
out the program within administrative districts, so as to better ensure cred-
ibility of the evaluation and lower the costs of data collection. 
Some governments argue that locally administered programs, such as 
health insurance programs, do not have the administrative capabilities to 
roll out programs at the individual level. They worry that it would be a bur-
den to set up systems to deliver diff erent beneﬁ ts to diff erent beneﬁ ciaries 
within local administrative units and that the program would not be able to 
guarantee that the assignment of treatment and comparison groups would 
be implemented as designed. The latter problem is a serious threat to the 
ability of the government to implement the evaluation design and therefore 
to the success of the study. 
Sometimes governments prefer to implement programs at more aggre-
gate levels, such as the community, because they worry about potential civil 
conﬂ ict when members of the comparison group observe their neighbors in 
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the treatment group getting beneﬁ ts early. In reality, little evidence has been 
put forward to substantiate these claims. A large number of programs have 
been successfully implemented at the individual or household level within 
communities without generating civil conﬂ ict, when beneﬁ ts have been 
assigned in an equitable, transparent, and accountable way.
Finally, when a program is implemented at a very low level, such as at the 
household or individual level, contamination of the comparison group may 
compromise the internal validity of the evaluation. For example, say that 
you are evaluating the eff ect on households’ health of providing tap water. If 
you install the taps for a household, but not for its neighbor, the treatment 
household may well share the use of the tap with their comparison neigh-
bor; the neighboring household then would not be a true comparison, since 
it would beneﬁ t from a spillover eff ect.
In practice, program managers therefore need to ﬁ nd the minimum scale 
of intervention that (1) allows a large-enough sample for the evaluation, 
(2) mitigates the risks to internal validity, and (3) ﬁ ts the operational con-
text. Box 10.1 illustrates the choice and implications of the minimum scale of 
intervention in the context of cash transfer programs. 
Box 10.1: Cash Transfer Programs and the Minimum Scale 
of Intervention
The majority of conditional cash transfers use 
communities as the minimum scale of inter-
vention, for administrative and program design 
reasons, as well as out of concern about spill-
overs and potential confl ict in the community if 
treatment were to be assigned at a lower level. 
For example, the evaluation of Progresa/
Oportunidades, Mexico’s conditional cash 
transfer program, relied on the rollout of the 
program at the community level in rural areas 
to randomly assign communities to the treat-
ment and comparison groups. All eligible 
households in the treatment communities 
were offered the opportunity to enroll in the 
program in spring 1998, and all of the eligible 
households in the comparison communities 
were offered the same opportunity 18 months 
later, in winter 1999. However, the evaluators 
found substantial correlation in outcomes 
between households within communities. 
Therefore, to generate suffi cient statistical 
power for the evaluation, they needed more 
households in the sample than would have 
been needed if they had been able to assign 
individual households to the treatment and 
comparison groups. The impossibility of 
implementing the program at the household 
level therefore led to larger sample size 
requirements and increased the cost of the 
evaluation. Similar constraints apply to a large 
proportion of programs in the human devel-
opment sector. 
Sources: Behrman and Hoddinott 2001; Gertler 2004; Levy and Rodríguez 2005; Schultz 2004; Skoufi as and 
McClafferty 2001.
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Is the Evaluation Ethical? 
Ethics questions are often raised about conducting impact evaluations. One 
point of departure for this debate is to consider the ethics of investing sub-
stantial public resources in programs whose eff ectiveness is unknown. In 
this context, the lack of evaluation can itself be seen as unethical. The infor-
mation on program eff ectiveness that impact evaluations generate can lead 
to more eff ective and ethical investment of public resources. 
When the decision is made to design an impact evaluation, some impor-
tant ethical issues must be considered. They relate to the rules used to 
assign program beneﬁ ts, as to well as to the methods by which human sub-
jects are studied. 
The most basic principle in the assignment of program beneﬁ ts is that 
the delivery of beneﬁ ts should never be denied or delayed solely for the pur-
pose of an evaluation. In this book, we have argued that evaluations should 
not dictate how beneﬁ ts are assigned, but that instead evaluations should be 
ﬁ tted to program assignment rules. In this context, any ethical concerns do 
not stem from the impact evaluation itself but directly from the program 
assignment rules.
Randomized assignment of program beneﬁ ts often raises ethical con-
cerns about denying program beneﬁ ts to eligible beneﬁ ciaries. Yet most pro-
grams operate with limited ﬁ nancial and administrative resources, making it 
impossible to reach all eligible beneﬁ ciaries at once. From an ethical stand-
point, all subjects that are equally eligible to participate in any type of social 
program should have the same chance of receiving the program. Random-
ized assignment fulﬁ lls this ethical requirement. In situations where a pro-
gram will be phased in over time, rollout can be based on randomly selecting 
the order in which equally deserving beneﬁ ciaries will receive the program. 
In these cases, beneﬁ ciaries who enter the program later can be used as a 
comparison group for earlier beneﬁ ciaries, generating a solid evaluation 
design as well as a transparent and fair method for allocating scarce resources.
In many countries and international institutions, review boards or ethics 
committees have been set up to regulate research involving human subjects. 
These boards are charged with assessing, approving, and monitoring 
research studies, with the primary goals of protecting the rights and pro-
moting the welfare of all subjects. Although impact evaluations are primar-
ily operational undertakings, they also constitute research studies and as 
such should adhere to research guidelines for human subjects.
In the United States, the Offi  ce for Human Research Protections, within 
the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for coordi-
nating and supporting the work of institutional review boards that are 
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established in all research institutions and universities. The Offi  ce for Human 
Research Protections also publishes a compilation of over a thousand laws, 
regulations, and guidelines governing human subjects research in 96 coun-
tries and provides links to the ethical codes and regulatory standards cur-
rently used by the leading international and regional organizations.
For example, all research conducted in the United States or funded by 
U.S. federal agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, must comply with the ethical prin-
ciples and regulatory requirements set forth in federal law.2 The basic prin-
ciples of the U.S. law pertaining to the protection of human subjects are 
based on the historic Belmont Report and include ensuring that 
• selection of subjects is equitable, 
• risks to subjects are minimized, 
• risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated beneﬁ ts,
• informed consent is sought from each prospective subject or his or her 
legal representative, 
• adequate provisions are in place to protect the privacy of subjects and 
maintain conﬁ dentiality, and
• additional safeguards are included to protect more vulnerable subjects 
such as children, prisoners, and the economically disadvantaged.
Although the list stems from historical experience with medical trials, the 
basic principles of protecting the rights and promoting the welfare of all 
subjects are applicable to social research today. In the context of the evalu-
ation of social programs, the ﬁ rst three points relate to the ethics of beneﬁ t 
assignments. The last three points relate to the protocols based on which 
subjects are studied for the sake of the evaluation.3
When designing, managing, or commissioning an impact evaluation, you 
should make sure that all stages adhere to any existing laws or review pro-
cesses governing human subjects research, whether of the country where 
the evaluation is implemented or of the country where the funding agency 
is located.
How to Set Up an Evaluation Team?
An evaluation is a partnership between policy makers and evaluators, with 
each group dependent on the other for its success. Policy makers are respon-
sible for guiding the work and ensuring the relevance of the evaluation—
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formulating the evaluation questions, determining whether an impact 
evaluation is needed, supervising the evaluation, ensuring adequate 
resources for the work, and applying the results. Evaluators are responsible 
for the technical aspects—the evaluation methodology, sampling design, 
data collection, and analysis. 
An evaluation is a balance between the technical expertise and indepen-
dence brought to it by an external group of evaluators, and the policy rele-
vance, strategic guidance, and operational coordination brought by the 
policy makers. In this partnership, a key element is determining what degree 
of institutional separation to establish between the evaluation providers and 
the evaluation users. Much can be gained from the objectivity provided by 
having the evaluation carried out independently of the institution respon-
sible for the project that is being evaluated. However, evaluations can often 
have multiple goals, including building evaluation capacity within govern-
ment agencies and sensitizing program operators to the realities of their 
projects once carried out in the ﬁ eld. 
For an impact evaluation to be successful, evaluators and policy makers 
must work together. Whereas impact evaluations should be conducted by 
an external group to maintain objectivity and credibility, the process cannot 
be divorced from the operational rules, notably in assessing the rules of pro-
gram implementation to determine the appropriate evaluation design and 
in ensuring that program implementation and evaluation are well coordi-
nated, so that one does not compromise the other. Moreover, the results are 
less likely to be directly policy relevant or have policy impact without the 
engagement of policy makers from the beginning.
The Composition of an Evaluation Team
Policy makers can commission an evaluation using various contracting 
arrangements. First, the government unit commissioning the evaluation 
may decide to contract out the entire evaluation at once. It is then respon-
sible for establishing at least a ﬁ rst draft of the evaluation plan, including the 
key objectives, policy questions, expected methodology, data to be collected, 
and budget ceilings. That plan provides the basic terms of reference to 
launch a call for technical and ﬁ nancial proposals from external evaluators. 
The terms can also specify a minimum team composition that the external 
evaluators must comply with. The preparation of technical proposals gives 
the external evaluators the chance to suggest improvements to the evalua-
tion plan that the government has produced. Once the evaluation is con-
tracted out, the external agency that has been contracted actively manages 
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the evaluation and appoints an evaluation manager. In this model, the gov-
ernment team principally provides oversight.
Under a second type of contractual arrangement, the government unit 
commissioning the evaluation may decide to manage it directly. This 
involves developing an impact evaluation plan and sequentially contracting 
out its subcomponents. In this arrangement, the evaluation manager 
remains in the government unit commissioning the evaluation. 
Regardless of the contracting arrangement, a key responsibility of the 
evaluation manager is to build the evaluation team, keeping in mind the 
interests of the clients and the steps needed to carry out the evaluation. 
Although each evaluation is diff erent, the technical team of any impact eval-
uation eff ort that relies on collecting its own data, qualitative or quantita-
tive, will almost always need certain members. They include the following: 
• An evaluation manager. This person is responsible for establishing the 
key objectives, policy questions, indicators, and information needs of the 
evaluation (often in close collaboration with policy makers and using a 
theory of change such as a results chain); selecting the evaluation meth-
odology; identifying the evaluation team; and drafting terms of reference 
for the parts of the evaluation to be contracted or subcontracted. It is 
important to designate an evaluation manager who will be able to work 
eff ectively with the data producers, as well as with the analysts and pol-
icy makers using the data and the results of the evaluation. If the person 
is not based locally, it is recommended that a local manager be designated 
to coordinate the evaluation eff ort in conjunction with the international 
manager. 
• A sampling expert. This is someone who can guide work on power calcu-
lations and sampling. For quantitative impact evaluations, the sampling 
expert should be able to carry out power calculations to determine the 
appropriate sample sizes for the indicators established, select the sam-
ple, review the results of the actual sample versus the designed sample, 
and provide advice at the time of the analysis, for instance, on how to 
incorporate the sampling weights for the analysis, if needed. The sam-
pling expert should also be tasked with selecting sites and groups for the 
pilot test. Particularly if the sampling expert is an international consul-
tant, he or she will often need to be paired with a local information coor-
dinator responsible for collecting the data from which the sample will be 
drawn.
• A person or team responsible for designing the data collection instruments 
and accompanying manuals and codebooks. This person works with the 
evaluation manager to ensure that the data collection instruments will 
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indeed produce the data required for the analysis and is also involved in 
pilot testing the questionnaires.
• A ﬁ eldwork team. The team includes a ﬁ eldwork manager who can super-
vise the entire data collection eff ort, from planning the routes for the data 
collection to forming and scheduling the ﬁ eldwork teams, which are gen-
erally composed of supervisors and interviewers.
• Data managers and processors. They design the data entry programs, 
enter the data, check its validity, provide the needed data documentation, 
and produce the basic results that can be veriﬁ ed by the data analysts. 
• Data and policy analysts. The analysts work with the data produced and 
with the evaluation manager to conduct the required analysis and write 
the evaluation reports.
Partners for the Evaluation
One of the ﬁ rst determinations that policy makers, together with the evalu-
ation manager, must make is whether the evaluation—or parts of it—can be 
implemented locally and what kind of supervision and outside assistance 
will be needed. Evaluation capacity varies greatly from country to country. 
International contracts that allow ﬁ rms in one country to carry out evalua-
tions in another country are becoming more common. It is also becoming 
increasingly common for governments and multilateral institutions to 
implement evaluations locally, while providing a great deal of international 
supervision. It is up to the evaluation manager to critically assess local 
capacity and determine who will be responsible for what aspects of the eval-
uation eff ort. 
Another question is whether to work with a private ﬁ rm or a public 
agency. Private ﬁ rms or research institutions can be more dependable in 
providing timely results, but capacity building in the public sector is lost, 
and private ﬁ rms often are understandably less amenable to incorporating 
into the evaluation elements that will make the eff ort costlier. Research 
institutions and universities can also work as evaluators. The reputation and 
technical expertise of solid research institutions or universities can ensure 
that evaluation results are widely accepted by stakeholders. However, those 
institutions sometimes lack the operational experience or the ability to per-
form some aspects of the evaluation, such as data collection, so that those 
aspects may need to be subcontracted to another partner. Whatever combi-
nation of counterparts is ﬁ nally crafted, a sound review of potential collabo-
rators’ past evaluation activities is essential to making an informed choice. 
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Particularly when working with a public agency, a conscientious evalua-
tor should be aware of the capacity of the evaluation team in light of other 
activities that the unit is carrying out. This is particularly relevant when 
working with public sector agencies with multiple responsibilities and lim-
ited staff . Awareness of the unit’s workload is important for assessing not 
only how it will aff ect the quality of the evaluation being conducted but also 
the opportunity cost of the evaluation with respect to other eff orts for which 
the unit is responsible. In one example, an impact evaluation of an education 
reform was planned that required the eff orts of the staff  of the national 
assessment team responsible for the biannual national achievement tests. 
The team was selected as counterparts for the evaluation eff ort because 
they were the most professionally qualiﬁ ed to assume responsibility for the 
evaluation and because complementarities were sought between the evalu-
ation and the national assessment. However, when the reform—and corre-
spondingly the evaluation—was delayed, the delay derailed the entire survey 
eff ort; the achievement tests for the national assessment were not applied 
on schedule, and the country lost an opportunity to monitor educational 
progress. Such situations can be avoided through coordination with manag-
ers in the unit responsible for the evaluation to ensure that a balance is 
achieved in the timing of various activities, as well as the distribution of staff  
and resources across those activities. 
How to Time the Evaluation?
We discussed in part 1 the advantages of prospective evaluations, designed 
during program preparation. Advance planning allows for a broader choice 
in generating comparison groups, facilitates the collection of baseline data, 
and helps stakeholders reach consensus about program objectives and ques-
tions of interest. 
Though it is important to plan evaluations early in the project design 
phase, carrying them out should be timed to assess the program once it is 
mature. Pilot projects or nascent reforms are often prone to revision both of 
their content and in regard to how, when, where, and by whom they will be 
implemented. Program providers may need time to learn and consistently 
apply new operational rules. Because evaluations require clear rules of pro-
gram operation to generate appropriate counterfactuals, it is important to 
apply evaluations to programs after they are well established.
Baseline data should always be collected, but another key timing issue is 
how much time is needed before results can be measured. The right balance 
is very much context speciﬁ c: “If one evaluates too early, there is a risk of 
ﬁ nding only partial or no impact; too late, and there is a risk that the pro-
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gram might lose donor and public support or that a badly designed program 
might be expanded” (King and Behrman 2009, p. 56). The following factors 
need to be weighted to determine when to collect follow-up data:4 
• Program cycle, including program duration, time of implementation, and 
potential delays
• Expected time needed for the program to aff ect outcomes, as well as the 
nature of outcomes of interest
• Policy-making cycles
First, the impact evaluation needs to be ﬁ tted to the program implementa-
tion cycle. The evaluation cannot drive the program being evaluated. By 
their very nature, evaluations are subject to the program time frame; they 
must be aligned to the expected duration of the program. They also must be 
adapted to potential implementation lags when programs are slow to assign 
beneﬁ ts or are delayed by external factors.5 In general, although evaluation 
timing should be built into the project from the outset, evaluators should be 
prepared to be ﬂ exible and to make modiﬁ cations as the project is imple-
mented. In addition, provision should be made for tracking the interven-
tions, using a strong monitoring system so that the evaluation eff ort is 
informed by the actual pace of the intervention.
The timing of follow-up data collection must take into account how much 
time is needed after the program is implemented for results to become 
apparent. The program results chain helps with identifying outcome indica-
tors and the appropriate time to measure them. Some programs (such as 
income support programs) aim to provide short-term beneﬁ ts, whereas oth-
ers (such as basic education programs) aim for longer-term gains. Moreover, 
certain results by their nature take longer to appear (such as changes in life 
expectancy or fertility from a health reform) than others (such as earnings 
from a training program). 
For example, in the evaluation of the Bolivian Social Investment Fund, 
which relied on baseline data collected in 1993, follow-up data were not col-
lected until 1998 because of the time required to carry out the interventions 
(water and sanitation projects, health clinics, and schools) and for eff ects on 
the beneﬁ ciary population’s health and education to emerge (Newman et al. 
2002). A similar period of time has been required for the evaluation of a 
primary education project in Pakistan that used an experimental design 
with baseline and follow-up surveys to assess the impact of community 
schools on student outcomes, including academic achievement (King, 
Orazem, and Paterno 2008).
When to collect follow-up data will therefore depend on the program 
under study as well as on the outcome indicators of interest. Some 
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evaluations will collect follow-up data while the program is still being 
implemented, to measure short-term changes and to maintain contact with 
the evaluation sample to reduce sample attrition over time. For programs 
that do not have continuous operations, additional rounds of follow-up data 
collected well after the program has been completed can help to measure 
longer-term changes. Follow-up data can be collected more than once, so 
that short-term and medium-term results can be considered and contrasted. 
Follow-up data collected during program implementation may not cap-
ture full program impact if indicators are measured too early. Indeed, “pro-
grams do not necessarily attain full steady-state eff ectiveness after 
implementation commences. Learning by providers and beneﬁ ciaries may 
take time” (King and Behrman 2009, 65). Still, it is very useful to document 
short-term impacts. As already stated, some programs have only short-term 
objectives (such as income support). Evidence on how such a program per-
forms in the short term can also provide information about expected longer-
term outcomes. For instance, it is often valuable to measure shorter-term 
indicators that are good predictors of longer-term indicators (such as 
attended births as a shorter-term indicator of infant mortality). Follow-up 
data collected while the program is still being implemented are also useful 
to produce early impact evaluation results, which can invigorate dialogue 
between evaluators and policy makers.
Follow-up surveys that measure long-term outcomes after program 
implementation often produce the most convincing evidence regarding 
program eff ectiveness. For instance, the positive results from long-term 
impact evaluations of early childhood programs in the United States (Currie 
and Thomas 1995, 2000; Currie 2001) and Jamaica (Grantham-McGregor et 
al. 1994) have been inﬂ uential in making the case for investing in early child-
hood interventions. 
Long-term impacts sometimes constitute explicit program objectives, 
but they can also reﬂ ect unintended, indirect eff ects, such as those related to 
behavioral changes. The identiﬁ cation of longer-term impacts can never-
theless create diffi  culties. Impacts may simply vanish in the long term. A 
strong impact evaluation design also may not withstand the test of time. For 
example, units in the control group may begin to beneﬁ t from spillover 
eff ects from program beneﬁ ciaries. 
Although short-term and longer-term follow-up data are complemen-
tary, the timing of an evaluation must also take into account when certain 
information is needed to inform decision making and must synchronize 
evaluation and data collection activities to key decision-making points. The 
production of results should be timed to inform budgets, program expan-
sion, or other policy decisions.
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How to Budget for an Evaluation?
Budgeting constitutes one of the last steps to operationalize the evaluation 
design. In this section, we review some existing impact evaluation cost 
data, discuss how to budget for an evaluation, and suggest some options 
for funding.
Review of Cost Data
Tables 10.2 and 10.3 contain cost data on impact evaluations of a number of 
World Bank–supported projects. The sample in table 10.2 comes from a 
comprehensive review of programs supported by the Social Protection and 
Labor unit. The sample in table 10.3 was selected based on the availability of 
current budget statistics from the set of impact evaluations ﬁ nanced by the 
Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund (SIEF). Although the two samples are not 
necessarily representative of all evaluations undertaken by the World Bank, 
as cost data are not yet consistently documented, they provide useful bench-
marks on the costs associated with conducting rigorous impact evaluations.
Table 10.2   Cost of Impact Evaluations of a Selection of World Bank–Supported Projects 
Impact evaluation Country
Total cost of 
IE ($)
Total cost of 
program ($)
IE% of total 
program costs
Migrant Skills Development 
and Employment China 220,000 50,000,000 0.4
Social Safety Net Project Colombia 130,000 86,400,000 0.2
Social Sectors Investment 
Program
Dominican 
Republic 600,000 19,400,000 3.1
Social Protection Jamaica 800,000 40,000,000 2.0
Social Safety Net Technical 
Assistance Pakistan 2,000,000 60,000,000 3.3
Social Protection Project Panama 1,000,000 24,000,000 4.2
1st Community Living 
Standards Rwanda 1,000,000 11,000,000 9.1
Social Fund for 
Development 3 Yemen, Rep. 2,000,000 15,000,000 13.3
 Average 968,750 38,225,000 4.5
Source: Authors’ calculations from a sample of World Bank programs in the Social Protection Sector.
Note: IE = impact evaluation.
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Table 10.3   Disaggregated Costs of a Selection of World Bank–Supported Projects
Disaggregation of IE costs
SIEF impact evaluation Country Total cost Travel
World 
Bank staff
Consultants 
(national and 
int’l.)
Data collection 
(including fi led 
staff)
Other 
(dissemination 
& workshops)
Poverty Reduction Support 
Credits and Maternal Health Benin 1,690,000 270,000 200,000 320,000 840,000 60,000
Performance Pay Reform for 
School Teachers Brazil 513,000 78,000 55,000 105,000 240,000 35,000
Nadie es Perfecto Program to 
Improve Parenting Skills Chile 313,000 11,500 — 35,500 260,000 6,000
Paying for Performance in 
China’s Health Sector: 
Evaluation of Health XI China 308,900 60,000 35,000 61,000 152,900 —
National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Program India 390,000 41,500 50,000 13,500 270,000 15,000
School Health and Nutrition: 
the Role of Malaria Control in 
Improving Education Kenya 652,087  69,550 60,000 103,180 354,000 65,357
HIV Prevention Campaign for 
the Youth: Abstinence, Fidelity 
and Safe Sex Lesotho 630,300 74,300 9,600 98,400 440,000 8,000
CCT, Schooling, and HIV Risk Malawi 1,842,841 83,077 144,000 256,344 1,359,420 —
Contigo Vamos por Mas 
Oportunidades Program in the 
State of Guanajuato Mexico 132,199 2,660 50,409 — 80,640 1,150
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Randomized CCT Pilot in 
Rural Primary Education Morocco 674,367 39,907 66,000 142,460 426,000 —
Learning and Growing in the 
Shadow of HIV/AIDS: 
Randomized ECD Program Mozambique 838,650 86,400 31,000 62,500 638,750 20,000
Training of Community 
Distributors in the Prevention 
and Treatment of Malaria Nigeria 1,024,040 64,000 35,000 106,900 817,740 —
School Health and Nutrition: 
the Role of Malaria Control in 
Improving Education Senegal 644,047 61,800 60,000 102,890 354,000 65,357
CCTs to Prevent HIV and Other 
Sexually Transmitted Infections Tanzania 771,610 60,000 62,000 100,000 518,611 30,999
 Average 744,646 71,621 66,031 115,975 482,290 30,686
Source: Authors’ calculations from a sample of impact evaluations fi nanced by the Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund. 
Note: CCT = conditional cash transfer; ECD = early childhood development; — = not available.
164 Impact Evaluation in Practice
The direct costs of the evaluation activities range between $130,000 and 
$2 million, with an average cost of $968,750. Although those costs vary 
widely and may seem high in absolute terms, in relative terms they amounted 
to between 0.2 percent and 13.3 percent of total program costs,6 with an 
average of 4.5 percent. Based on this sample, impact evaluations constitute 
only a small percentage of overall program budgets. In addition, the cost of 
conducting an impact evaluation must be compared to the opportunity costs 
of not conducting a rigorous evaluation and thus potentially running an 
ineff ective program. Evaluations allow researchers and policy makers to 
identify which programs or program features work, which do not, and 
which strategies may be the most eff ective and effi  cient in achieving pro-
gram goals. In this sense, the resources needed to implement an impact 
evaluation constitute a relatively small but signiﬁ cant investment. 
Table 10.3 disaggregates the costs of the sample of SIEF-supported 
impact evaluations. The total costs of an evaluation include World Bank 
staff  time, national and international consultants, travel, data collection, and 
dissemination activities.7 In these, as in almost all evaluations for which 
existing data cannot be used, the highest cost is new data collection, account-
ing for over 60 percent of the cost, on average. 
It is important to keep in mind that these numbers reﬂ ect diff erent sizes 
and types of evaluations. The relative cost of evaluating a pilot program is 
generally higher than the relative cost of evaluating a nationwide or univer-
sal program. In addition, some evaluations require only one follow-up sur-
vey or may be able to use existing data sources, whereas others may need to 
carry out multiple rounds of data collection. The Living Standards Mea-
surement Study Manual (Grosh and Glewwe 2000) provides estimations of 
the cost of collecting data through household surveys, based on experience 
in countries all over the world. However, the manual also emphasizes that 
costs depend largely on the capabilities of the local team, the resources 
available, and the length of time in the ﬁ eld. To learn more about how to cost 
a survey in a particular context, it is recommended that evaluators ﬁ rst con-
tact the national statistical agency.
Budgeting for an Impact Evaluation
Clearly, many resources are required to implement a rigorous impact evalu-
ation. Budget items include staff  fees for at least one principal investigator/
researcher, a research assistant, a ﬁ eld coordinator, a sampling expert, sur-
vey enumerators, and project staff , who may provide support throughout 
the evaluation. These human resources may consist of researchers and tech-
nical experts from international organizations, international or local con-
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sultants, and client country program staff . The costs of travel and subsistence 
(hotels and per diems) must also be budgeted. Resources for dissemination, 
often in the form of workshops, reports, and academic papers, should also 
be considered in the evaluation planning. 
As we have said, the largest costs in an evaluation are usually those of 
data collection (including creating and pilot testing the survey) data collec-
tion materials and equipment, training for the enumerators, daily wages for 
the enumerators, vehicles and fuel, and data entry operations. Calculating 
the costs of all of these inputs requires making some assumptions about, for 
example, how long the questionnaire will take to complete and travel times 
between sites. A work sheet is provided in table 10.4 to help with estimating 
the costs of the data collection stage. 
The costs of an impact evaluation may be spread out over several ﬁ scal 
years. A sample budget in table 10.5 shows how the expenditures at each 
stage of an evaluation can be disaggregated by ﬁ scal year for accounting and 
reporting purposes. Again, budget demands will likely be higher during the 
years when the data are collected.
Funding for Evaluations
Financing for an evaluation can come from many sources, including a proj-
ect loan, direct program budgets, research grants, or donor funding. Often, 
evaluation teams look to a combination of sources to generate the needed 
funds. Although funding for evaluations used to come primarily from 
research budgets, a growing emphasis on evidence-based policy making has 
increased funding from other sources. In cases where an evaluation is likely 
to ﬁ ll a substantial knowledge gap that is of interest to the development 
community more broadly, and where a credible, robust evaluation can be 
applied, policy makers should be encouraged to look for outside funding, 
given the public-good nature of the evaluation results. Sources of funding 
include the government, development banks, multilateral organizations, 
United Nations agencies, foundations, philanthropists, and research and 
evaluation organizations such as the International Initiative for Impact 
Evaluation.
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Table 10.4 Work Sheet for Impact Evaluation Cost Estimation
Tasks and resources Number Rate/unit
No. of 
units Total
Staff     
     Program evaluation staff 
              (evaluation manager, etc.)     
     International and/or national consultants
             (researcher/principal investigator)     
     Research assistant     
     Statistical expert     
     Field coordinator     
     
Travel     
     International and local airfare     
     Local ground transport     
     Subsistence (hotel and per diem)     
     
Data collectiona     
     Instrument design     
     Piloting     
     Training     
           Travel and per diems     
     Survey material, equipment     
          Printing questionnaires     
     Field staff     
          Enumerators     
          Supervisors     
     Transport (vehicles and fuel)     
          Drivers     
     
Data entry and cleaning     
     
Data analysis and dissemination     
     Workshops     
     Papers, reports     
     
Other     
     Offi ce space     
     Communications     
     Software     
Source: Authors.
a. Data collection calculations must refl ect assumptions such as the number of rounds of data collection required, how long 
the data collection will take, the number of villages in the sample, the number of households per village, the length of the 
questionnaire, travel time, and so on.
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Table 10.5   Sample Impact Evaluation Budget
Design Stage Baseline Data Stage
Unit
Cost per 
unit (US$)
No. of 
units
Total cost 
(US$) Unit
Cost per 
unit (US$)
No. of 
units
Total cost 
(US$)
A. Staff salaries Weeks 7,500 2 15,000 Weeks 7,500 2 15,000
B. Consultant fees 10,250 27,940
 International consultant (1) Days 450 15 6,750 Days 450 0 0
 International consultant (2) Days 350 10 3,500 Days 350 10 3,500
 Research assistant/fi eld coordinator Days 188 0 0 Days 188 130 24,440
C. Travel & subsistence 14,100 15,450
 Staff: international airfare Trips 3,350 1 3,350 Trips 3,350 1 3,350
 Staff: hotel & per diem Days 150 5 750 Days 150 5 750
  International airfare: international 
consultants
Trips 3,500 2 7,000 Trips 3,500 2 7,000
  Hotel & per diem: international 
consultants
Days 150 20 3,000 Days 150 20 3,000
 International airfare: fi eld coordinator Trips 0 0 Trips 1,350 1 1,350
 Hotel & per diem: fi eld coordinator Days 0 0 Days 150 0 0
D. Data collection 126,000
 Data type 1: consent School 120 100 12,000
 Data type 2: education outcomes Child 14 3,000 42,000
 Data type 3: health outcomes Child 24 3,000 7,200
V. Other
 Workshop(s)
 Dissemination / reporting
  Other 1 (clusterwide coordination 
overhead)
Total costs per stage Design stage: 39,350 Baseline stage: 184,390
 (continued)
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Table 10.5   (continued)
Follow-up Data Stage I Follow-up Data Stage II
Unit
Cost per 
unit (US$)
No. of 
units
Total cost 
(US$) Unit 
Cost per 
unit (US$)
No. of 
units
Total cost 
(US$)
A. Staff salaries Weeks 7,500 2 15,000 Weeks 7,500 2 15,000
B. Consultant fees 32,550 32,440
 International consultant (1) Days 450 15 6,750 Days 450 10 4,500
 International consultant (2) Days 350 20 7,000 Days 350 10 3,500
 Research assistant/fi eld coordinator Days 188 100 18,800 Days 188 130 24,440
C. Travel & subsitence 20,000 20,000
 Staff: International airfare Trips 3,350 2 6,700 Trips 3,350 2 6,700
 Staff: hotel & per diem Days 150 10 1,500 Days 150 10 1,500
  International airfare: international 
consultants
Trips 3,500 2 7,000 Trips 3,500 2 7,000
  Hotel & per diem: international 
consultants
Days 150 20 3,000 Days 150 20 3,000
 International airfare: fi eld coordinator Trips 1,350 1 1,350 Trips 1,350 1 1,350
 Hotel & per diem: fi eld coordinator Days 150 3 450 Days 150 3 450
D. Data Collection 114,000 114,000
 Data type 1: consent
 Data type 2: education outcomes Child 14 3,000 42,000 Child 14 3,000 42,000
 Data type 3: health outcomes Child 24 3,000 72,000 Child 24 3,000 72,000
V. Other 65,357
 Workshop(s) 20,000 2 40,000
 Dissemination / reporting 5,000 3 15,000
  Other 1 (clusterwide coordination 
overhead)
5,179 2 10,357
Total costs per stage Follow-up stage I 181,550 Follow-up stage II 246,797
Total evaluation costs: 652,087
Source: Authors.
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Notes
 1. The discussion in this section applies most directly to a randomized assign-
ment design, but the same principles hold for evaluations based on other 
methodologies. 
 2. See Kimmel 1988; NIH 2006; USAID 2008; U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 2010; and U.S. National Archives 2009.
 3. Potential risk in collecting data for the evaluation of social programs include 
failing to obtain informed consent from subjects; testing children’s cognitive 
development in front of their parents, which may lead to assumptions about 
the children’s future capabilities; asking to speak with women alone or 
interviewing women about sensitive subjects in front of male family members; 
failing to understand the time or opportunity costs of interviewing subjects 
and providing compensation or a token of appreciation when appropriate.
 4. See King and Behrman (2009) for a detailed discussion of timing issues in 
relation to the evaluation of social programs.
 5. “There are several reasons why implementation is neither immediate nor 
perfect, why the duration of exposure to a treatment diff ers not only across 
program areas but also across ultimate beneﬁ ciaries, and why varying lengths of 
exposure might lead to a diff erent estimates of program impact” (King and 
Behrman 2009, 56).
 6. In this case, cost is calculated as a percentage of the portion of the project cost 
ﬁ nanced by the World Bank.
 7. This cost does not include the costs of local project staff , who were often heavily 
engaged in the design and supervision of the evaluation, as accurate data on 
these costs are not regularly recorded. 
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Choosing the Sample
CHAPTER 11
Once you have chosen a method to select the comparison group, the next 
step in planning an impact evaluation is to determine what data you need 
and the sample required to precisely estimate diff erences in outcomes 
between the treatment group and the comparison group. You must deter-
mine both the size of the sample and how to draw the units in the sample 
from a population of interest.
What Kinds of Data Do I Need?
Good quality data are required to assess the impact of the intervention on 
the outcomes of interest. The results chain discussed in chapter 2 provides 
a basis to deﬁ ne which indicators should be measured and when. The ﬁ rst 
and foremost need is data on outcome indicators directly aff ected by the 
program. However, the impact evaluation should not measure only out-
comes for which the program is directly accountable. Data on outcome indi-
cators that the program indirectly aff ects or indicators capturing unintended 
program impact will maximize the value of the information that the impact 
evaluation generates. As discussed in chapter 2, outcome indicators should 
preferably be selected so that they are “SMART”: speciﬁ c, measurable, 
attributable, realistic, and targeted.
Impact evaluations are typically conducted over several time periods, and 
you must determine when to measure the outcome indicators. Following the 
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results chain, you can establish a hierarchy of outcome indicators, ranging 
from short-term indicators, such as school attendance in the context of an 
education program, to longer-term ones, such as student achievement or 
labor market outcomes. To measure impact convincingly over time, data are 
needed starting at the baseline. The section in chapter 10 on the timing of 
evaluations sheds light on when to collect data. 
As we shall see, some indicators may not be amenable to impact evalua-
tion in relatively small samples. Detecting impacts for outcome indicators 
that are extremely variable, rare events, or that are likely to be only margin-
ally aff ected by an intervention may require prohibitively large samples. For 
instance, identifying the impact of an intervention on maternal mortality 
rates will be feasible only in a sample that contains many pregnant women. 
In such a case, it may be wise to focus the impact evaluation on indicators 
for which there is suffi  cient power to detect eff ect.  
Apart from outcome indicators, it is also useful to consider the following: 
• Administrative data on the delivery of the intervention. At a minimum, 
monitoring data are needed to know when a program starts and who 
receives beneﬁ ts, as well as to provide a measure of the “intensity” of the 
intervention in cases when it may not be delivered to all beneﬁ ciaries 
with the same content, quality, or duration. 
• Data on exogenous factors that may aff ect the outcome of interest. These 
make it possible to control for outside inﬂ uences. This aspect is particu-
larly important when using evaluation methods that rely on more 
assumptions than do randomized methods. Accounting for these factors 
also helps increase statistical power.
• Data on other characteristics. Including additional controls or analyzing 
the heterogeneity of the program’s eff ects along certain characteristics 
makes possible a ﬁ ner estimation of treatment eff ects. 
In short, indicators are required throughout the results chain, including 
ﬁ nal outcome indicators, intermediate outcomes indicators, measures of the 
delivery of the intervention, exogenous factors, and control characteristics.1
The design selected for the impact evaluation will also aff ect the data 
requirements. For example, if either the matching or the diff erence-in-
diff erences method is chosen, it will be necessary to collect data on a very 
broad array of characteristics for both treatment and comparison groups, 
making it possible to carry out a range of robustness tests, as described in 
part 2.
For each evaluation, it is useful to develop a matrix that lists the question 
of interest, the outcome indicators for each question, the other types of indi-
cators needed, and the source of data, as outlined in ﬁ gure 2.3 (chapter 2). 
Key Concept:
Indicators are needed 
across the results 
chain to measure fi nal 
outcomes, intermedi-
ate outcomes, 
intervention delivery, 
exogenous factors, and 
control characteristics.
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Can I Use Existing Data?
Some existing data are almost always needed at the outset of a program to 
estimate benchmark values of indicators or to conduct power calculations, 
as we will further discuss below. Beyond the planning stages, the availability 
of existing data can substantially diminish the cost of conducting an impact 
evaluation. 
Existing data alone are rarely suffi  cient, however. Impact evaluations 
require comprehensive data covering a suffi  ciently large sample that is rep-
resentative of both the treatment and comparison groups. Population census 
data covering the entire treatment and comparison groups are rarely avail-
able. Even when these censuses exist, they may contain only a limited set of 
variables or be ﬁ elded infrequently. Nationally representative household 
surveys may contain a comprehensive set of outcome variables, but they 
rarely contain enough observations from both the treatment and compari-
son groups to conduct an impact evaluation. Assume, for example, that you 
are interested in evaluating a large, national program that reaches 10 per-
cent of the households in a given country. If a nationally representative sur-
vey is carried out on 5,000 households every year, it may contain roughly 
500 households that receive the program in question. Is this sample large 
enough to conduct an impact evaluation? Power calculations can answer 
this question, but in most cases the answer is no. 
Still, the possibility of using existing administrative data to conduct 
impact evaluations should be seriously considered. Administrative data are 
data collected by program agencies, often at the point of service delivery, as 
part of their regular operations. In some cases, monitoring data contain out-
come indicators. For instance, schools may record students’ enrollment, 
attendance, or test scores, and health centers may record patients’ anthro-
pometrics and vaccination or health status. Some inﬂ uential retrospective 
evaluations have relied on administrative records (for instance Galiani, 
Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005 on water policy in Argentina).
To determine whether existing data can be used in a given impact evalu-
ation, the following questions must be considered:
• Size. Are existing data sets large enough to detect changes in the out-
come indicators with suffi  cient power?
• Sampling. Are existing data available for both the treatment group and 
comparison group? Are existing samples drawn from a sampling frame 
that coincides with the population of interest? Were units drawn from 
the sampling frame based on a probabilistic sampling procedure?
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• Scope. Do existing data contain all of the indicators needed to answer the 
policy questions of interest? 
• Frequency. Are the existing data collected frequently enough? Are they 
available for all units in the sample over time?
Only in relatively rare cases are existing data suitable for impact evalua-
tions. As a result, you will most likely have to budget for the collection of 
new data. Although data collection is often a major cost, it is also a high-
return investment upon which the quality of the evaluation depends.
In some cases, the data required for impact evaluation can be col-
lected by rolling out new information systems. This must be done in 
accordance with an evaluation design, so that outcome indicators are 
collected for a treatment and a comparison group at multiple times. New 
information systems may be required before new interventions, so that 
administrative centers in the comparison group use the new information 
system before receiving the intervention to be evaluated. Because the 
quality of administrative data can vary, auditing and external veriﬁ cation 
are required to guarantee the reliability of the evaluation. Collecting 
impact evaluation data through administrative sources instead of through 
surveys can dramatically reduce the cost of an evaluation but may not 
always be feasible. 
If administrative data are not suffi  cient for your evaluation, you will 
likely have to rely on survey data. In addition to exploring whether you 
can use existing surveys, you should also ﬁ nd out if any new national data 
collection eff orts (such as demographic and health surveys or a Living 
Standards Measurement Survey) are being planned. If a survey measur-
ing the required indicators is planned, it may be possible to oversample 
the population of interest. For instance, the evaluation of the Nicaraguan 
Social Fund complemented a national living standards measurement 
survey with an extra sample of beneﬁ ciaries (Pradhan and Rawlings 
2002). If a survey is planned that will cover the population of interest, 
you may also be able to introduce a question or series of questions as part 
of that survey. 
Most impact evaluations require the collection of survey data, including 
at least a baseline and a  follow-up survey. Survey data may be of various 
types depending on the program to be evaluated and the unit of analysis. 
Most evaluations rely on individual or household surveys as a primary data 
source. Here, we review some general principles of survey data collection. 
Even though they primarily relate to household surveys, the same princi-
ples also apply to most other types of survey data.2
The ﬁ rst step in deciding whether to use existing data or collect new 
survey data will be to determine the size of the sample that is needed. If 
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the existing data contain a suffi  cient number of observations, you may be 
able to use them. If not, additional data will need to be collected. Once 
it is determined that you need to collect survey data for the evaluation, 
you must
• determine who will collect the data,
• develop and pilot questionnaires,
• conduct ﬁ eldwork and quality control, and
• process and store the data,
The remainder of this chapter will discuss how to determine the neces-
sary sample size and how to sample.  The remaining steps in data collection 
are dealt with in chapter 12. The implementation of those various steps is 
usually commissioned, but understanding their scope and key components 
is essential to eff ectively managing a quality impact evaluation.
Power Calculations: How Big a Sample Do I Need? 
The ﬁ rst step in determining whether existing data can be used or in pre-
paring to collect new data for the evaluation will be to determine how 
large the sample must be. The associated calculations are called “power 
calculations.” We discuss the basic intuition behind power calculations by 
focusing on the simplest case—an evaluation conducted using a random-
ized assignment method and assuming that noncompliance is not an issue. 
(Compliance assumes that all of the units assigned to the treatment group 
are treated and all of the units assigned to the comparison group are not.)
Why Power Calculations? 
Power calculations indicate the minimum sample size needed to conduct an 
impact evaluation and to answer convincingly the policy question of inter-
est. In particular, power calculations can be used to do the following:
• Assess whether existing data sets are large enough for the purpose of 
conducting an impact evaluation.
• Avoid collecting too much information, which can be very costly. 
• Avoid collecting too few data. Say that you are estimating a program that 
has a positive impact on its recipients. If the sample is too small, you 
may not be able to detect positive impact and may thus conclude that the 
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program has no eff ect. That, of course, could lead to a policy decision to 
eliminate the program, and that would be detrimental to potential bene-
ﬁ ciaries and to society. 
Power calculations provide an indication of the smallest sample (and 
lowest budget) with which it is possible to measure the impact of a program, 
that is, the smallest sample that will allow meaningful diff erences in out-
comes between the treatment and comparison groups to be detected. Power 
calculations are thus crucial for determining which programs are successful 
and which are not. 
Is the Program’s Impact Different from Zero? 
Most impact evaluations test a simple hypothesis embodied in the question, 
Does the program have an impact? In other words, Is the program impact 
diff erent from zero? Answering this question requires two steps:
1. Estimate the average outcomes for the treatment and comparison groups.
2. Assess whether a diff erence exists between the average outcome for the 
treatment group and the average outcome for the comparison group.
Estimating Average Outcomes for the Treatment 
and Comparison Groups
Let us assume that you are interested in estimating the impact of a nutrition 
program on the weight of children at age 5. We assume that 100,000 chil-
dren participated in the program, that 100,000 children did not participate, 
and that the children who were chosen to participate were randomly drawn 
from among the country’s 200,000 children. As a ﬁ rst step, you will need to 
estimate the average weight of the children who participated and the aver-
age weight of those who did not. 
To determine the average weight of participating children,3 one could 
weigh every one of the 100,000 participating children, and then average the 
weights. Of course, doing that would be extremely costly. Luckily, it is not 
necessary to measure every child. The average can be estimated using the 
average weight of a sample drawn from the population of participating chil-
dren.4 The more children in the sample, the closer the sample average will 
be to the true average. When a sample is small, the average weight consti-
tutes a very imprecise estimate of the average in the population; for exam-
ple, a sample of two children will not give a precise estimate. In contrast, a 
sample of 10,000 children will produce a more precise estimate that is much 
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closer to the true average weight. In general, the more observations in the 
sample, the more reliable the statistics obtained from the sample will be.5 
Figure 11.1 illustrates this intuition. Suppose you are drawing a sample 
from a population of interest, in this case, the children that participated in 
the program. First, you draw a sample of just two observations. This does 
not guarantee that the sample will have the same characteristics as the pop-
ulation. It may be that you happen to draw two individuals with unusual 
characteristics. For example, even if in the population of interest only 
20 percent of children wear round hats, you might easily draw a sample of 
two children that wear round hats. Clearly, you were unlucky when drawing 
this sample. Drawing larger samples diminishes your chances of being 
unlucky. A large sample is more likely than a small sample to look just like 
the population of interest. Figure 11.1 illustrates what happens when you 
draw a large sample. A large sample is very likely to have roughly the same 
characteristics as the population: in this example, 20 percent wear round 
hats, 10 percent wear square hats, and 70 percent wear triangular hats. 
So now we know that with a larger sample we will have a more accurate 
image of the population of participating children. The same will be true for 
nonparticipating children: as the sample of nonparticipating children gets 
larger, we will know more precisely what that population looks like. But 
why should we care? If we are able to estimate the average outcome (weight) 
of participating and nonparticipating children more precisely, we will also 
be able to tell more precisely the diff erence in weight between the two 
A large
sample
A small
sample
Population of interest
Figure 11.1   A Large Sample Will Better Resemble the Population
Source: Authors.
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groups—and that is the impact of the program. To put it another way, if you 
only have a vague idea of the average weight of children in the participating 
(treatment) and nonparticipating (comparison) groups, then how can you 
have a precise idea of the diff erence in the weight of the two groups? That’s 
right; you can’t. In the following section, we will explore this idea in a 
slightly more formal way.
Comparing the Average Outcomes for the Treatment 
and Comparison Groups
Once you have estimated the average outcome (weight) for the treatment 
group (participating children selected by randomized assignment) and 
the comparison group (nonparticipating children selected by randomized 
assignment), you can proceed to determine whether the two outcomes are 
diff erent. This part is clear: you subtract the averages and check what the 
diff erence is. Formally, the impact evaluation tests the null (or default) 
hypothesis, 
H0 : impact = 0  (The hypothesis is that the program does not have an 
impact), 
against the alternative hypothesis: 
Ha : impact ≠ 0  (The alternative hypothesis is that the program has an 
impact).
Imagine that in the nutrition program example, you start with a sample 
of two treated children and two comparison children. With such a small 
sample, your estimate of the average weight of treated and comparison chil-
dren, and thus your estimate of the diff erence between the two groups, will 
not be very reliable. You can check this by drawing diff erent samples of two 
treated and two comparison children. What you will ﬁ nd is that the esti-
mated impact of the program bounces around a lot.
By contrast, let us say that you start with a sample of 1,000 treated chil-
dren and 1,000 comparison children. As we have said, your estimates of the 
average weight of both groups will be much more precise. Therefore, your 
estimate of the diff erence between the two groups will also be more precise. 
For example, say that you ﬁ nd that the average weight in the sample of 
treatment (participating) children is 25.2 kilograms (kg), and the average in 
the sample of comparison (nonparticipating) children is 25 kg. The diff er-
ence between the two groups is 0.2 kg. If these numbers came from samples 
of two observations each, you would not be very conﬁ dent that the impact of 
the program is truly positive because the entire 0.2 kg could be due to the 
lack of precision in your estimates. However, if these numbers come from 
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samples of 1,000 observations each, you would be conﬁ dent that you are 
quite close to the true program impact, which in this case would be positive. 
The key question then becomes, Exactly how large must the sample be to 
allow you to know that a positive estimated impact is due to true program 
impact, rather than to lack of precision in your estimates?
Two Potential Errors in Impact Evaluations
When testing whether a program has an impact, two types of error can be 
made. A type I error is made when an evaluation concludes that a program 
has had an impact, when in reality it had no impact. In the case of the hypo-
thetical nutrition intervention, this would happen if you, as the evaluator, 
were to conclude that the average weight of the children in the treated sam-
ple is higher than that of the children in the comparison sample, even though 
the average weight of the children in the two populations is in fact equal. In 
this case, the positive impact you saw came purely from the lack of precision 
of your estimates.
A type II error is the opposite kind of error. A type II error occurs when 
an evaluation concludes that the program has had no impact, when in fact it 
has had an impact. In the case of the nutrition intervention, this would hap-
pen if you were to conclude that the average weight of the children in the 
two samples is the same, even though the average weight of the children in 
the treatment population is in fact higher than that of the children in the 
comparison population. Again, the impact should have been positive, but 
because of lack of precision in your estimates, you concluded that the pro-
gram had zero impact.
When testing the hypothesis that a program has had an impact, statisti-
cians can limit the size of type I errors. Indeed, the likelihood of a type I 
error can be set by a parameter called the “conﬁ dence level.” The conﬁ dence 
level is often ﬁ xed at 5 percent, meaning that you can be 95 percent conﬁ -
dent in concluding that the program has had an impact. If you are very con-
cerned about committing a type I error, you can conservatively set a lower 
conﬁ dence level, for instance, 1 percent so that you are 99 percent conﬁ dent 
in concluding that the program has had an impact.
However, type II errors are also worrying for policy makers. Many fac-
tors aff ect the likelihood of committing a type II error, but the sample size is 
crucial. If the average weight of 50,000 treated children is the same as the 
average weight of 50,000 comparison children, then you probably can con-
ﬁ dently conclude that the program has had no impact. By contrast, if a sam-
ple of two treatment children weigh on average the same as a sample of two 
comparison children, it is harder to reach a reliable conclusion. Is the aver-
age weight similar because the intervention has had no impact or because 
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the data are not suffi  cient to test the hypothesis in such a small sample? 
Drawing large samples makes it less likely that you will only observe chil-
dren who weigh the same simply by luck (or bad luck). In large samples, the 
diff erence in mean between the treated sample and comparison sample pro-
vides a better estimate of the true diff erence in mean between all treated 
and all comparison units.
The power (or statistical power) of an impact evaluation is the probability 
that it will detect a diff erence between the treatment and comparison 
groups, when in fact one exists. An impact evaluation has a high power if 
there is a low risk of not detecting real program impacts, that is, of commit-
ting a type II error. The examples above show that the size of the sample is 
a crucial determinant of the power of an impact evaluation. The following 
sections will further illustrate this point. 
Why Power Calculations Are Crucial for Policy
The purpose of power calculations is to determine how large a sample is 
required to avoid concluding that a program has had no impact, when it has 
in fact had one (a type II error). The power of a test is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of a type II error.
An impact evaluation has high power if a type II error is unlikely to hap-
pen, meaning that you are unlikely to be disappointed by results showing 
that the program being evaluated has had no impact, when in reality it did 
have an impact.
From a policy perspective, underpowered impact evaluations with a 
high probability of type II errors are not only unhelpful but also very 
costly. A high probability of type II error jeopardizes the reliability of any 
negative impact evaluation results. Putting resources into these so-called 
underpowered impact evaluations is therefore a risky investment.
Underpowered impact evaluations can also have dramatic practical con-
sequences. For example, in the hypothetical nutrition intervention men-
tioned earlier, if you were to conclude that the program was not eff ective, 
even though it was, policy makers would be likely to close down a program 
that, in fact, beneﬁ ts children. It is therefore crucial to minimize the proba-
bility of type II errors by using large-enough samples in impact evaluations. 
That is why carrying out power calculations is so crucial and relevant. 
Power Calculations Step by Step
We now turn to the basic principles of power calculations, focusing on the 
simple case of a randomly assigned program. Carrying out power calcula-
tions requires examining the following six questions:
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1. Does the program create clusters?
2. What is the outcome indicator?
3. Do you aim to compare program impacts between subgroups?
4. What is the minimum level of impact that would justify the investment 
that has been made in the intervention? 
5. What is a reasonable level of power for the evaluation being conducted?
6. What are the baseline mean and variance of the outcome indicators?
Each of these steps must relate to the speciﬁ c policy context in which you 
have decided to conduct an impact evaluation. 
We have already mentioned that the minimum scale of intervention for 
a program inﬂ uences the size of the sample required for the evaluation. 
The ﬁ rst step in power calculations is to determine whether the program 
that you want to evaluate creates any clusters. An intervention whose level 
of intervention is diff erent from the level at which you would like to mea-
sure outcomes creates cluster. For example, it may be necessary to imple-
ment a program at the hospital, school, or village level (in other words, 
through clusters), but you measure its impact on patients, students, or vil-
lagers (see table 11.1).6 
The nature of any sample data built from programs that are clustered is 
a bit diff erent from that of samples obtained from programs that are not. As 
a result, power calculations will involve slightly diff erent steps, depending 
on whether the program in question randomly assigns beneﬁ ts among clus-
ters or simply assigns beneﬁ ts randomly among all units in a population. 
We will discuss each situation in turn. We start with the principles of power 
calculations when there are no clusters, that is, when the treatment is 
assigned at the level at which outcomes are observed, and then go on to dis-
cuss power calculations when clusters are present. 
Table 11.1   Examples of Clusters
Benefi t
Level at which benefi ts 
are assigned (cluster)
Unit at which outcome 
is measured
Conditional cash Village Households
Malaria treatment School Individuals
Training program Neighborhood Individuals
Source: Authors.
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Power Calculations without Clusters  
Let us assume that you have solved the ﬁ rst question by establishing that the 
program’s beneﬁ ts are not assigned by clusters. In other words, the program 
to be evaluated randomly assigns beneﬁ ts among all units in an eligible pop-
ulation. In this case, the evaluation sample can be constructed by taking a 
simple random sample of the entire population of interest.
The second and third steps relate to the objectives of the evaluation. In the 
second step, you must identify the most important outcome indicators that 
the program was designed to improve. These indicators derive from the fun-
damental evaluation research question and the conceptual framework, as 
discussed in part 1. The present discussion will also yield insights into the 
type of indicators that are most amenable to being used in impact evaluations.
Third, the main policy question of the evaluation may entail comparing 
program impacts between subgroups, such as age or income categories. If 
this is the case, then sample size requirements will be larger, and power 
calculations will need to be adjusted accordingly. For instance, it may be that 
a key policy question is whether an education program has a larger impact 
on female students than on male students. Intuitively, you will need a suffi  -
cient number of students of each sex in the treatment group and in the com-
parison group to detect an impact for each subgroup. Setting out to compare 
program impacts between two subgroups can double the required sample 
size. Considering heterogeneity between more groups (for example, by age) 
can also substantially increase the size of the sample required.
Fourth, you must determine the minimum impact that would justify the 
investment that has been made in the intervention. This is fundamentally a 
policy question rather than a technical one. Is a conditional cash transfer 
program a worthwhile investment if it reduces poverty by 5 percent, 10 per-
cent, or 15 percent? Is an active labor market program worth implementing 
if it increases earnings by 5 percent, 10 percent, or 15 percent? The answer is 
highly context speciﬁ c, but in all contexts it is necessary to determine the 
change in the outcome indicators that would justify the investment made in 
the program. Put another way, what is the level of impact below which an 
intervention should be considered unsuccessful? Answering this question will 
depend not only on the cost of the program and the type of beneﬁ ts that it 
provides, but also on the opportunity cost of not investing funds in an alter-
native intervention. 
Carrying out power calculations makes it possible to adjust the sample 
size to detect the minimum desired eff ect. For an evaluation to identify a 
small impact, estimates of any diff erence in mean outcomes between the 
treatment and comparison groups will need to be very precise, requiring a 
large sample. Alternatively, for interventions that are judged to be worth-
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while only if they lead to large changes in outcome indicators, the samples 
needed to conduct an impact evaluation will be smaller. Nevertheless, the 
minimum detectable eff ect should be set conservatively, since any impact 
smaller than the minimum desired eff ect is unlikely to be detected. 
Fifth, the evaluator needs to consult statistical experts to determine a 
reasonable power level for the planned impact evaluation. As stated earlier, 
the power of a test is equal to 1 minus the probability of any type II error. 
Therefore, the power ranges from 0 to 1, with a high value indicating less 
risk of failing to identify an existing impact. A power of 80 percent is a 
widely used benchmark for power calculations. It means that you will ﬁ nd 
an impact in 80 percent of the cases where one has occurred. A higher level 
of power of 0.9 (or 90 percent) often provides a useful benchmark but is 
more conservative, increasing the required sample sizes.7
Sixth, you must ask a statistical expert to estimate some basic parame-
ters, such as a baseline mean and variance, of the outcome indicators. These 
benchmark values should preferably be obtained from existing data col-
lected in a setting similar to the one where the program under study will be 
implemented.8 It is very important to note that the more variable the out-
comes of interest prove to be, the more diffi  cult it will be to estimate a reli-
able treatment eff ect. In the example of the hypothetical nutrition 
intervention, children’s weight is the outcome of interest. If all individuals 
weigh the same at the baseline, it will be feasible to estimate the impact of 
the nutrition intervention in a relatively small sample. By contrast, if base-
line weights among children are widely variable, then a much larger sample 
will be required to estimate the program’s impact. 
Once these six steps have been completed, the statistical expert can carry 
out a power calculation using standard statistical software.9 The resulting 
power calculation will indicate the required sample size, depending on the 
parameters established in steps 1 to 6. The computations themselves are 
straightforward, once policy-relevant questions have been answered (par-
ticularly in steps 3 and 4).10 
When seeking advice from statistical experts, the evaluator should ask for 
an analysis of the sensitivity of the power calculation to changes in the 
assumptions. That is, it is important to understand how much the required 
sample size will have to increase under more conservative assumptions (such 
as lower expected impact, higher variance in the outcome indicator, or a 
higher power level). It is also good practice to commission power calculations 
for various outcome indicators, as the required sample sizes can vary sub-
stantially if some outcome indicators are much more variable than others. 
Finally, power calculations provide the minimum required sample size. 
In practice, implementation issues often imply that the actual sample size is 
smaller than the planned sample size. Any such deviations need to be con-
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sidered carefully, but it is advisable to add a margin of 10 percent or 20 per-
cent to the sample size predicted by power calculations to account for such 
factors.11
How Big a Sample Do I Need to Evaluate an Expanded Health 
Insurance in Subsidy Program?
Let us say that the president and the minister of health were pleased with 
the quality and results of the evaluation of the Health Insurance Subsidy 
Program (HISP), our example in previous chapters. However, before scaling 
up the HISP, they decide to pilot an expanded version of the program (which 
they call HISP+). HISP pays for part of the cost of health insurance for poor 
rural households, covering costs of primary care and drugs, but it does not 
cover hospitalization. The president and the minister of health wonder 
whether an expanded HISP+ that also covers hospitalization would further 
lower out-of-pocket health expenditures. They ask you to design an impact 
evaluation to assess whether HISP+ further lowers health expenditures for 
poor rural households. 
In this case, choosing an impact evaluation design is not a challenge for 
you: HISP+ has limited resources and cannot be implemented universally 
immediately. As a result, you have concluded that randomized assignment 
would be the most viable and robust impact evaluation method. The presi-
dent and the minister of health understand how well the randomized 
assignment method works and are very supportive.
To ﬁ nalize the design of the impact evaluation, you have commissioned a 
statistician who will help you establish how big a sample is needed. Before 
he starts working, the statistician asks you for some key input. He uses a 
checklist of six questions. 
1. The statistician asks whether the HISP+ program will generate clusters. 
At this point, you are not totally sure. You believe that it might be possible 
to randomize the expanded beneﬁ t package at the household level among 
all poor rural households who already beneﬁ t from HISP. However, you 
are aware that the president and the minister of health may prefer to 
assign the expanded program at the village level, and that would create 
clusters. The statistician suggests conducting power calculations for a 
benchmark case without clusters and then considering how results 
change if clusters exist.
2. The statistician asks what the outcome indicator is. You explain that the 
government is interested in a well-deﬁ ned indicator: household out-of-
pocket health expenditures. The statistician looks for the most up-to-
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date source to obtain benchmark values for this indicator and suggests 
using the follow-up survey from the HISP evaluation. He notes that 
among households who received HISP, yearly per capita out-of-pocket 
health expenditures average $7.84. 
3. The statistician double-checks that you are not interested in measuring 
program impacts for subgroups, such as regions of the country or speciﬁ c 
subpopulations.
4. The statistician asks about the minimum level of impact that would jus-
tify the investment in the intervention. In other words, what additional 
decrease in out-of-pocket health expenditures below the benchmark 
average of $7.84 would make this intervention worthwhile? He stresses 
that this is not a technical consideration but truly a policy question; that 
is why a policy maker such as you has to set the minimum eff ect that the 
evaluation should be able to detect. You remember having heard the 
president mentioning that the HISP+ program would be considered 
eff ective if it reduced household out-of-pocket health expenditures by 
$2. Still, you know that for the purpose of the evaluation, it may be better 
to be conservative in determining the minimum detectable impact, since 
any smaller impact is unlikely to be captured. To understand how the 
required sample size varies based on the minimum detectable eff ect, you 
suggest that the statistician perform calculations for a minimum reduc-
tion of out-of-pocket health expenditures of $1, $2, and $3. 
5. The statistician asks what would be a reasonable level of power for the 
evaluation being conducted. He adds that power calculations are usually 
conducted for a power of 0.9 but off ers to perform robustness checks 
later for a less-conservative level of 0.8. 
6. Finally, the statistician asks what is the variance of the outcome indica-
tor in the population of interest. He goes back to the data set of treated 
HISP households, pointing out that the standard deviation of out-of-
pocket health expenditures is $8.
Equipped with all this information, the statistician undertakes the power 
calculations. As agreed, he starts with the more conservative case of a power 
of 0.9. He produces the results shown in table 11.2.  
The statistician concludes that to detect a $2 decrease in out-of-pocket 
health expenditures with a power of 0.9, the sample needs to contain at least 
672 units (336 treated units and 336 comparison units, with no clustering). 
He notes that if you were satisﬁ ed to detect a $3 decrease in out-of-pocket 
health expenditure, a smaller sample of at least 300 units (150 units in each 
group) would be suffi  cient. By contrast, a much larger sample of at least 
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2,688 units (1,344 in each group) would be needed to detect a $1 decrease in 
out-of-pocket health expenditures.
The statistician then produces another table for a power level of 0.8. 
Table 11.3 shows that the required sample sizes are smaller for a power of 
0.8 than for a power of 0.9. To detect a $2 reduction in household out-of-
pocket health expenditures, a total sample of at least 502 units would 
be suffi  cient. To detect a $3 reduction, at least 224 units are needed. How-
ever, to detect a $1 reduction, at least 2,008 units would be needed in 
the sample.
The statistician stresses that the following results are typical of power 
calculations:
• The higher (more conservative) the level of power, the larger the required 
sample size. 
• The smaller the impact to be detected, the larger the required sample size.
Minimum 
detectable effect Treatment group
Comparison 
group Total sample
$1 1,344 1,344 2,688
$2 336 336 672
$3 150 150 300
Source: Authors.
Note: The minimum detectable effect describes the minimum reduction of household out-of-pocket 
health expenditures to be detected by the impact evaluation.
Table 11.2   Sample Size Required for Various Minimum Detectable Effects 
(Decrease in Household Health Expenditures), Power = 0.9, No Clustering 
Table 11.3  Sample Size Required for Various Minimum Detectable Effects 
(Decrease in Household Health Expenditures), Power = 0.8, No Clustering
Minimum 
detectable effect Treatment group
Comparison 
group Total sample
$1 1,004 1,004 2,008
$2 251 251 502
$3 112 112 224
Source: Authors.
Note: The minimum detectable effect describes the minimum reduction of household out-of-pocket 
health expenditures to be detected by the impact evaluation.
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The statistician asks whether you would like to conduct power calcula-
tions for other outcomes of interest. You suggest also considering the sam-
ple size required to detect whether HISP+ aff ects the hospitalization rate. 
In the sample of treated HISP villages, 5 percent of households have a mem-
ber visiting the hospital in a given year. The statistician produces a new 
table, which shows that relatively large samples would be needed to detect 
even large changes in the hospitalization rate (table 11.4) of 1, 2, or 3 points 
from the baseline rate of 5 percent.
The table shows that sample size requirements are larger for this out-
come (the hospitalization rate) than for out-of-pocket health expenditures. 
The statistician concludes that if you are interested in detecting impacts on 
both outcomes, you should use the larger sample sizes implied by the power 
calculations performed on the hospitalization rates. If sample sizes from the 
power calculations performed for out-of-pocket health expenditures are 
used, the statistician suggests letting the president and the minister of 
health know that the evaluation will not have suffi  cient power to detect 
policy-relevant eff ects on hospitalization rates.
QUESTION 8
A. Which sample size would you recommend to estimate the impact of HISP+ on out-
of-pocket health expenditures? 
B. Would that sample size be suffi cient to detect changes in the hospitalization rate?
Power Calculations with Clusters
The discussion above introduced the principles of carrying out power cal-
culations for programs that do not create clusters. However, as discussed in 
part 2, some programs assign beneﬁ ts at the cluster level. We now brieﬂ y 
describe how the basic principles of power calculations need to be adapted 
for clustered samples.
Table 11.4  Sample Size Required to Detect Various Minimum Desired Effects 
(Increase in Hospitalization Rate), Power = 0.9, No Clustering
Minimum 
detectable effect 
(percentage 
point) Treatment group
Comparison 
group Total sample
1 9,717 9,717 19,434
2 2,430 2,430 4,860
3 1,080 1,080 2,160
Source: Authors.
Note: The minimum desired effect describes the minimum change in the hospital utilization rate 
(expressed as percentage point) to be detected by the impact evaluation.
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In the presence of clustering, an important guiding principle is that the 
number of clusters matters much more than the number of individuals 
within the clusters. A suffi  cient number of clusters is required to test con-
vincingly whether a program has had an impact by comparing outcomes in 
samples of treatment and comparison units. 
If you randomly assign treatment among a small number of clusters, the 
treatment and comparison clusters are unlikely to be identical. Randomized 
assignment between two districts, two schools, or two hospitals will not 
guarantee that the two clusters are similar. By contrast, randomly assigning 
an intervention among 100 districts, 100 schools, or 100 hospitals is more 
likely to ensure that the treatment and the comparison groups are similar. In 
short, a suffi  cient number of clusters is necessary to ensure that balance is 
achieved. Moreover, the number of clusters also matters for the precision of 
the estimated treatment eff ects. A suffi  cient number of clusters is required 
to test the hypothesis that a program has an impact with suffi  cient power. It 
is, therefore, very important to ensure that the number of clusters available 
for randomized assignment is large enough. 
Following the intuition discussed above, you can establish the number of 
clusters required for precise hypothesis testing by conducting power calcu-
lations. Carrying out power calculations for cluster samples requires an 
extra step beyond the basic procedure:
1. Does the program create clusters?
2. What is the outcome indicator?
3. Do you aim to compare program impacts between subgroups?
4. What is the minimum level of impact that would justify the investment 
that has been made in the program? 
5. What are the baseline mean and variance of the outcome indicator?
6. How variable is the outcome indicator in the population of interest?
7. How variable is the outcome indicator within clusters?
Compared to power calculations without cluster, only the last step is 
new: you now also have to ask your statistical expert what is the degree of 
correlation between outcomes within clusters. At the extreme, all out-
comes within a cluster are perfectly correlated. For instance, it may be 
that household income is not especially variable within villages but that 
signiﬁ cant inequalities in income occur between villages. In this case, if 
you consider adding an individual to your evaluation sample, adding an 
individual from a new village will provide much more additional power 
than adding an individual from a village that is already represented. 
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Indeed, in this case the second villager is likely to look very similar to the 
original villager already included. In general, higher intra-cluster correla-
tion in outcomes increases the number of clusters required to achieve a 
given power level.
In clustered samples, power calculations highlight the trade-off s between 
adding clusters and adding observations within clusters. The relative 
increase in power from adding a unit to a new cluster is almost always larger 
than that from adding a unit to an existing cluster. Although the gain in 
power from adding a new cluster can be dramatic, adding clusters may also 
have operational implications and increase the cost of data collection. The 
next section shows how to conduct power calculations with clusters in the 
case of HISP+ and discusses some of the trade-off s involved.
In many cases, at least 30 to 50 clusters in each treatment and compari-
son group are required to obtain suffi  cient power and guarantee balance of 
baseline characteristics when using randomized assignment methods. 
However, the number may vary depending on the various parameters dis-
cussed above, as well as the degree of intra-cluster correlation. Further-
more, the number will likely increase when using methods other than 
randomized assignment (assuming all else is set constant).
How Big a Sample Do I Need to Evaluate an Expanded Health 
Insurance Subsidy Program with Clusters?
After your ﬁ rst discussion with the statistician about power calculations for 
HISP+, you decided to talk brieﬂ y to the president and the minister of health 
about the implications of randomly assigning the expanded HISP+ beneﬁ ts 
among all individuals in the population receiving the basic HISP plan. That 
consultation revealed that such a procedure would not be politically feasi-
ble: it would be hard to explain why one person would receive the expanded 
beneﬁ ts, while her neighbor would not.
Instead of randomization at the individual level, you therefore suggest 
randomly selecting a number of HISP villages to pilot HISP+. All villagers in 
the selected village would then become eligible. This procedure will create 
clusters and thus require new power calculations. You now want to deter-
mine how large a sample is required to evaluate the impact of HISP+ when 
it is randomly assigned by cluster. 
You consult with your statistician again. He reassures you: only a little 
more work is needed. On his checklist, only one question is left unanswered. 
He needs to know how variable the outcome indicator is within clusters. 
Luckily, this is also a question he can answer using the HISP follow-up data, 
where he ﬁ nds that the within-village correlation of out-of-pocket health 
expenditures is equal to 0.04. 
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He also asks whether an upper limit has been placed on the number of 
villages in which it would be feasible to implement the new pilot. Since the 
program now has 100 HISP villages, you explain that you could have, at 
most, 50 treatment villages and 50 comparison villages for HISP+. With that 
information, the statistician produces the power calculations shown in 
table 11.5 for a power of 0.9.  
The statistician concludes that to detect a $2 decrease in out-of-pocket 
health expenditures, the sample must include at least 900 units, that is, 
9 units per cluster in 100 clusters. He notes that this number is higher than 
that in the sample under randomized assignment at the household level, 
which required only a total of 672 units. To detect a $3 decrease in out-of-
pocket health expenditures, the sample would need to include at least 
340 units, or 4 in each of 85 clusters.
However, when the statistician tries to establish the sample required to 
detect a $1 decrease in out-of-pocket health expenditures, he ﬁ nds that it 
would not be possible to detect such an eff ect with 100 clusters. At least 
109 clusters would be needed, and even then the number of observations 
within each cluster would be extremely high. As he notes, this ﬁ nding high-
lights that a large number of clusters is needed for an evaluation to have 
enough power to detect relatively small impacts, regardless of the number 
of observations within clusters.
The statistician then suggests considering how these numbers vary with 
a power of only 0.8 (table 11.6). The required sample sizes are again smaller 
for a power of 0.8 than for a power of 0.9, but they are still larger for the 
clustered sample than for the simple random sample.
The statistician then shows you how the total number of observations 
required in the sample varies with the total number of clusters. He decides 
Table 11.5  Sample Size Required for Various Minimum Detectable Effects 
(Decrease in Household Health Expenditures), Power = 0.9, Maximum of 
100 Clusters
Minimum 
detectable 
effect
Number of 
clusters
Units per 
cluster
Total sample 
with clusters
Total sample 
without 
clusters
$1 Not feasible Not feasible Not feasible 2,688
$2 100 9 900 672
$3 85 4 340 300
Source: Authors.
Note: The minimum desired effect describes the minimum reduction of household out-of-pocket 
health expenditures to be detected by the impact evaluation.
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to repeat the calculations for a minimum detectable eff ect of $2 and a 
power of 0.9. The size of the total sample required to estimate such an eff ect 
increases strongly when the number of clusters diminishes (table 11.7). 
With 100 clusters, a sample of 900 observations was needed. If only 
30 clusters were available, the total sample would need to contain 6,690 
observations. By contrast, if 157 clusters were available, only 785 observa-
tions would be needed.
QUESTION 9
A. Which total sample size would you recommend to estimate the impact of HISP+ 
on out-of-pocket health expenditures? 
B. In how many villages would you advise the president and minister of health to roll 
out HISP+?
Table 11.6  Sample Size Required for Various Minimum Detectable Effects 
(Decrease in Household Health Expenditures), Power = 0.8, Maximum of 
100 Clusters
Minimum 
detectable 
effect
Number of 
clusters
Units per 
cluster
Total sample 
with clusters
Total sample 
without 
Clusters
$1 100 102 10,200 2,008
$2 90 7 630 502
$3 82 3 246 224
Source: Authors.
Note: The minimum detectable effect describes the minimum reduction of household out-of-pocket 
health expenditures to be detected by the impact evaluation.
Table 11.7  Sample Size Required to Detect a $2 Minimum Impact for Various 
Numbers of Clusters, Power = 0.9
Minimum 
detectable 
effect
Number of 
clusters Units per cluster
Total sample 
with clusters
$2 30 223 6,690
$2 60 20 1,200
$2 86 11 946
$2 100 9 900
$2 120 7 840
$2 135 6 810
$2 157 5 785
Source: Authors.
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In Summary 
To summarize, the quality of an impact evaluation depends directly on the 
quality of the data on which it is based. In this regard, properly constructed 
samples of adequate size are absolutely crucial. We have reviewed the basic 
principles of carrying out power calculations. When performed while plan-
ning an evaluation, power calculations are an essential tool for containing 
data collection costs by avoiding the collection of more data than needed, 
while also minimizing the risk of reaching the costly and erroneous conclu-
sion that a program has had no impact because too little information was 
collected. Although power calculations require technical and statistical 
underpinnings, they also require a clear policy foundation. In general, 
increasing sample size produces decreasing returns, so that determining the 
adequate sample will often require balancing the need for precise impact 
estimates with budget considerations.
We have focused on the benchmark case of an impact evaluation imple-
mented using the randomized assignment method. This is the simplest 
scenario and therefore the most suitable to convey the intuition behind 
power calculations. Still, many practical aspects of our power calculations 
have not been discussed, and deviations from the basic cases discussed 
here need to be considered carefully. For instance, quasi-experimental 
impact evaluation methods almost always require larger samples than 
the randomized assignment benchmark. Sample size requirements also 
increase if a risk of bias is present in the estimated treatment eff ects or 
when imperfect compliance arises. Those topics are beyond the scope of 
this book, but Spybrook et al. (2008) and Rosenbaum (2009, chapter 14) 
discuss them in more detail. A number of tools are available for those 
interested in exploring sample design further. For example, the W.T. Grant 
Foundation developed the freely available Optimal Design Software for 
Multi-Level and Longitudinal Research, which is useful for statistical 
power analysis in the presence of clusters. In practice, many agencies 
commissioning an evaluation hire an expert to perform power calcula-
tions, and the expert should be able to provide advice when methods other 
than randomized assignment are used.
Deciding on the Sampling Strategy
Size is not the only relevant factor in ensuring that a sample is appropriate 
for an impact evaluation. The process by which a sample is drawn from the 
population of interest is also crucial. The principles of sampling can be 
guides to drawing representative samples. Sampling requires three steps:
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1. Determine the population of interest.
2. Identify a sampling frame.
3. Draw as many units from the sampling frame as required by power 
calculations.
First, the population of interest needs to be very clearly deﬁ ned.12 To do 
that requires accurately deﬁ ning the observational unit for which outcomes 
will be measured, with clear speciﬁ cation of the geographic coverage or any 
other relevant attributes that characterize the population. For example, if 
you are managing an early childhood development program, you may be 
interested in measuring cognitive outcomes for young children between 
ages 3 and 6 in the entire country, only for such children in rural areas, or 
only for children enrolled in preschool. 
Second, once the population of interest has been deﬁ ned, a sampling 
frame must be established. The sampling frame is the most comprehensive 
list that can be obtained of units in the population of interest. Ideally, the 
sampling frame should exactly coincide with the population of interest. For 
instance, a full and totally up-to-date census of the population of interest 
would constitute an ideal sampling frame. In practice, existing lists, such as 
population censuses, facility censuses, or enrollment listings are often used 
as sampling frames. 
An adequate sampling frame is required to ensure that the conclusions 
reached from analyzing a sample can be generalized to the entire popula-
tion. Indeed, a sampling frame that does not exactly coincide with the 
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Figure 11.2   A Valid Sampling Frame Covers the Entire Population of Interest
Source: Authors.
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population of interest creates a coverage bias, as illustrated in ﬁ gure 11.2. In 
the presence of coverage bias, results from the sample do not have full exter-
nal validity for the entire population of interest but only for the population 
included in the sampling frame. As a result, coverage biases blur the inter-
pretation of impact evaluation results, since it is unclear from which popu-
lation they were obtained. 
When considering drawing a new sample or assessing the quality of an 
existing sample, it is important to determine whether the best available 
sampling frame coincides with the population of interest. The degree to 
which statistics computed from the sample can be generalized to the popu-
lation of interest as a whole depends on the magnitude of the coverage bias, 
in other words, the lack of overlap between the sampling frame and the pop-
ulation of interest. 
Coverage bias can occur, for example, if you are interested in all house-
holds in a country but use a phone book as the sampling frame, so that any 
households without a phone will not be sampled. That can bias the evaluation 
results if the households without a phone also have other characteristics 
that diff er from those of the population of interest and if those characteris-
tics aff ect how households would beneﬁ t from the intervention. For instance, 
households without a phone may be in remote rural areas. If you are inter-
ested in evaluating the impact of a vocational training program, omitting the 
most isolated population will aff ect the results of the evaluation because 
those households are likely to have more diffi  culty accessing the labor market.
Coverage biases constitute a real risk, and the construction of sampling 
frames requires careful eff ort. For instance, census data may contain the list 
of all units in a population. However, if much time has elapsed between the 
census and the time the sample data are collected, the sampling frame may 
no longer be fully up-to-date, creating a coverage bias. Moreover, census 
data may not contain suffi  cient information on speciﬁ c attributes to build a 
sampling frame. If the population of interest consists of children attending 
preschool, and the census does not contain data on preschool enrollment, 
complementary enrollment data or facility listings would be needed.13 
Once you have identiﬁ ed the population of interest and a sampling frame, 
you must choose a method to draw the sample. Various alternative proce-
dures can be used. Probability sampling methods are the most rigorous, as 
they assign a well-deﬁ ned probability of each unit’s being drawn. The three 
main probability sampling methods are the following:14 
• Random sampling. Every unit in the population has exactly the same 
probability of being drawn.15
• Stratiﬁ ed random sampling. The population is divided into groups (for 
example, male and female) and random sampling is performed within 
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each group. As a result, every unit in each group (or stratum) has the 
same probability of being drawn. Provided that each group is large 
enough, stratiﬁ ed sampling makes it possible to draw inferences about 
outcomes not only at the level of the population but also within each 
group. Stratiﬁ cation is essential for evaluations that aim to compare pro-
gram impacts between subgroups.
• Cluster sampling. Units are grouped in clusters, and a random sample of 
clusters is drawn, after which either all units in those clusters constitute 
the sample or a number of units within the cluster are randomly drawn. 
This means that each cluster has a well-deﬁ ned probability of being 
selected, and units within a selected cluster also have a well-deﬁ ned 
probability of being drawn. 
In the context of an impact evaluation, the procedure for drawing a sam-
ple often derives from the eligibility rules of the program under evaluation. 
As described in the discussion on sample size, if the smallest viable unit of 
implementation is larger than the unit of observation, randomized assign-
ment of beneﬁ ts will create clusters. For this reason, cluster sampling often 
arises in impact evaluation studies.
Nonprobabilistic sampling can create serious sampling errors. Some-
times, purposive sampling or convenience sampling is used instead of the 
well-deﬁ ned probabilistic sampling procedures discussed above. In those 
cases sampling errors can occur even if the sampling frame captures the 
entire population and no coverage bias is present. To illustrate, suppose 
that a national survey is undertaken by asking a group of interviewers to 
collect household data from the dwelling closest to the school in each vil-
lage. When such a nonprobabilistic sampling procedure is used, it is likely 
that the sample will not be representative of the population of interest as 
a whole. In particular, a coverage bias will arise, as remote dwellings will 
not be surveyed.
In the end, it is necessary to pay careful attention to the sampling frame 
and the sampling procedure to determine whether results obtained from a 
given sample have external validity for the entire population of interest. 
Even if the sampling frame has perfect coverage and a probability sampling 
procedure is used, nonsampling errors can also limit the external validity of 
the sample. We discuss nonsampling errors in the next chapter.
Notes
 1. Cost data are also needed for cost-beneﬁ t analysis.
 2. For detailed reference on household surveys, see Grosh and Glewwe (2000) 
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and UN (2005). Dal Poz and Gupta (2009) discusses some issues speciﬁ c to 
collecting data in the health sector. 
 3. At this point, the discussion can apply to any population—the entire population 
of interest, the treatment population, or the comparison population.
 4. In this context, the term “population” does not refer to the population of the 
country but rather to the entire group of children that we are interested in, the 
“population of interest.”
 5. This intuition is formalized by a theorem called the “central limit theorem.” 
Formally, for an outcome y, the central limit theorem states that the sample 
mean y  on average constitutes a valid estimate of the population mean. In 
addition, for a sample of size n and for a population variance σ, the variance 
of the sample mean is inversely proportional to the size of the sample: 
var
n
y
2
)( = . 
  As the size of the sample n increases, the variance of sample estimates tends 
to 0. In other words, the mean is more precisely estimated in large samples 
than in small samples.
 6. The allocation of beneﬁ ts by cluster is often made necessary by social or 
political considerations that make randomization within clusters impossible. 
In the context of an impact evaluation, clustering often becomes necessary 
because of likely spillovers, or contagion of program beneﬁ ts between individu-
als within clusters. 
 7. Together with power, a conﬁ dence level ﬁ xing an acceptable probability of 
type I error also needs to be set, typically at 0.05 (or 0.01 for a conservative 
level).
 8. When computing power from a baseline, the correlation between outcomes 
over time should also be taken into account in power calculations.
 9. For instance, Spybrook et al. (2008) introduced Optimal Design, a user-friendly 
software to conduct power calculations.
 10. Having treatment and comparison groups of equal size is generally desirable. 
Indeed, for a given number of observations in a sample, power is maximized 
by assigning half the observations to the treatment group and half to the 
comparison group. However, treatment and comparison groups do not 
always have to be of equal size. Let your statistician know of any constraints 
against having two groups of equal size or any reasons to have two groups of 
unequal size.
 11. Chapter 12 will discuss the issues of nonresponse and attrition in more details.
 12. In the context of a program evaluation, the total population of interest 
may be assigned to the treatment group or the comparison group. This 
section discusses in general terms how to draw a sample from the total 
population of interest.
 13. If cluster sampling is used and the list of units within the clusters is outdated, 
you should consider the possibility of conducting a full enumeration of units 
within each cluster. For instance, if a community is sampled, the agency in 
charge of data collection could start by listing all of the households in the 
villages before conducting the survey itself.
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 14. See Cochran (1977); Lohr (1999); Kish (1995); Thompson (2002); or at a more 
basic level, Kalton (1983) for detailed discussions of sampling (including other 
methods such as systematic sampling or multistage sampling) beyond the basic 
concepts discussed here. Grosh and Muñoz (1996); Fink (2008); Iarossi (2006); 
and UN (2005) all provide practical guidance for sampling. 
 15. Strictly speaking, samples are drawn from sampling frames. In our discussion 
we assume that the sampling frame perfectly overlaps with the population.
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Collecting Data
CHAPTER 12
In chapter 11, we discussed the type of data needed for an evaluation and 
noted that most evaluations require the collection of new data. We then 
discussed how to determine the necessary sample size and how to draw a 
sample. In this chapter, we review the steps in collecting data. A clear 
understanding of these steps will help you ensure that the impact evalua-
tion is based on quality data that do not compromise the evaluation design. 
As a ﬁ rst step, you will need to hire help from a ﬁ rm or government agency 
that specializes in data collection. In parallel, you will commission the 
development of an appropriate questionnaire. The data collection entity 
will recruit and train ﬁ eld staff  and pilot test the questionnaire. After mak-
ing the necessary adjustments, the ﬁ rm or agency will be able to proceed 
with ﬁ eldwork. Finally, the data that are collected must be digitized or 
processed and validated before they can be delivered and used. 
Hiring Help to Collect Data
You will need to designate the agency in charge of collecting data early on. 
Some important trade-off s have to be considered when you are deciding 
who should collect impact evaluation data. Potential candidates for the 
job include
• the institution in charge of implementing the program,
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• another government institution with experience collecting data (such as 
the local statistical agency), or
• an independent ﬁ rm or think tank that specializes in data collection.
The data collection entity always needs to work in close coordination with 
the agency implementing the program. Because baseline data must be col-
lected before any program operations begin, close coordination is required 
to ensure that no program operations are implemented before data collec-
tion is done. When baseline data are needed for the program’s operation (for 
instance, data for a targeting index, in the context of an evaluation based on 
a regression discontinuity design), the entity in charge of data collection 
must be able to process it quickly and transfer it to the institution in charge 
of program operations. Close coordination is also required in timing the col-
lection of follow-up survey data. For instance, if you have chosen a random-
ized rollout, the follow-up survey must be implemented before the program 
is rolled out to the comparison group, to avoid contamination.
An extremely important factor in deciding who should collect data is that 
the same data collection procedures should be used for both the comparison 
and treatment groups. The implementing agency often has contact only 
with the treatment group and so is not in a good position to collect data for 
the comparison groups. But using diff erent data collection agencies for the 
treatment and comparison groups is risky, as it can create diff erences in the 
outcomes measured in the two groups simply because the data collection 
procedures diff ered. If the implementing agency cannot collect data eff ec-
tively for both the treatment and comparison groups, the possibility of 
engaging a partner to do so should be strongly considered.
In some contexts, it may also be advisable to commission data collection 
to an independent agency to ensure that it is perceived as objective. Con-
cerns that the program implementing agency does not collect objective data 
may not be warranted, but an independent data collection body that has no 
stake in the evaluation results can add credibility to the overall impact eval-
uation eff ort.
Because data collection involves a complex sequence of operations, it is 
recommended that a specialized and experienced entity be responsible for 
it. Few program-implementing agencies have suffi  cient experience to col-
lect the large-scale, high-quality data necessary for an impact evaluation. In 
most cases, you will have to consider commissioning a local institution such 
as the national statistical agency or a specialized ﬁ rm or think tank.
Commissioning a local institution such as the national statistical agency 
can give the institution exposure to impact evaluation studies and help it 
build capacity. However, local statistical agencies may not always have the 
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capacity to take on extra mandates in addition to their regular activities. 
They may also lack the necessary experience in ﬁ elding surveys for impact 
evaluations, for instance, experience in successfully tracking individuals 
over time. If such constraints appear, contracting an independent ﬁ rm or 
think tank specialized in data collection may be more practical. 
You do not necessarily have to use the same entity to collect information 
at baseline and in follow-up surveys. For instance, for an impact evaluation 
of a training program, for which the population of interest comprises the 
individuals who signed up for the course, the institution in charge of the 
course could collect the baseline data when individuals enroll. It is unlikely, 
however, that the same agency will also be the best choice to collect follow-
up information for both the treatment and comparison groups. In this con-
text, contracting rounds of data collection separately has its advantages, but 
eff orts should be made not to lose between rounds any information that will 
be useful in tracking households or individuals, as well as to ensure that 
baseline and follow-up data are measured consistently.
To determine the best institution for collecting impact evaluation data, 
all of these factors—experience in data collection, ability to coordinate with 
the program’s implementing agency, independence, opportunities for 
capacity building, adaptability to the impact evaluation context—must be 
weighed, together with the likely quality of the data collected in each case. 
One eff ective way to identify the organization best placed to collect quality 
data is to write terms of reference and ask organizations to submit technical 
and ﬁ nancial proposals.
Because the prompt delivery and the quality of the data are crucial for the 
reliability of the impact evaluation, the contract for the agency in charge of 
data collection must be structured carefully. The scope of the expected work 
and deliverables must be made extremely clear. In addition, it is often advis-
able to introduce incentives into contracts and link those incentives to clear 
indicators of data quality. For instance, as we will stress below, the nonre-
sponse rate is a key indicator of data quality. To create incentives for data 
collection agencies to minimize nonresponse, the contract can stipulate one 
unit cost for the ﬁ rst 90 percent of the sample, a higher unit cost for the 
units between 90 percent and 95 percent, and again a higher unit cost for 
units between 95 percent and 100 percent. Alternatively, a separate contract 
can be written for the survey ﬁ rm to track nonrespondents. 
Developing the Questionnaire
When commissioning data collection, you should have several clear objec-
tives in mind and give speciﬁ c guidance on the content of the data collection 
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instrument or questionnaire. Data collection instruments must elicit all the 
information required to answer the policy question set out by the impact 
evaluation. 
Developing Indicators
As we have discussed, indicators must be measured throughout the results 
chain, including ﬁ nal impact indicators, intermediate impact indicators, 
measures of the delivery of the intervention, exogenous factors, and control 
characteristics. 
It is important to be selective about which indicators to measure. Being 
selective helps to limit data collection costs, simpliﬁ es the task of the data 
collection agency, and improves the quality of the data collected by mini-
mizing demands on the respondents’ time. Collecting information that is 
either irrelevant or unlikely to be used has a very high cost. Having a data 
analysis plan written in advance will help you to identify priorities and nec-
essary information.
Data on outcome indicators and control characteristics must be collected 
consistently at the baseline and in the follow-up survey. Collecting baseline 
data is highly desirable. Even if you are using randomized assignment or a 
regression discontinuity design, where simple postintervention diff erences 
can in principle be used to estimate a program’s impact, baseline data are 
essential for testing whether the design of the impact evaluation is adequate 
(see the checklist in box 8.1 of chapter 8). Having baseline data also gives 
you an insurance policy when randomization does not work, in which case 
diff erence-in-diff erence methods can be used instead. Baseline data are also 
useful during the impact analysis stage, since baseline control variables can 
help increase statistical power and allow you to analyze impacts on diff erent 
subpopulations. Finally, baseline data can be used to enhance the design of 
the program. For instance, baseline data sometimes make it possible to ana-
lyze the eff ectiveness of the targeting or to provide additional information 
about beneﬁ ciaries to the program-implementing agency. 
Measuring Indicators
Once you have deﬁ ned the core data that need to be collected, the next step 
is to determine exactly how to measure those indicators. Measurement is an 
art in itself and is best commissioned to the agency hired to collect data, the 
survey experts, or the evaluators. Entire books have been written about how 
best to measure particular indicators in speciﬁ c contexts, for example, the 
exact phrasing of the questions asked in household surveys (see references 
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in Grosh and Glewwe [2000] and UN [2005])1 or the detailed procedures 
that should be followed to collect test score or health data. Though these 
discussions may appear cumbersome, they are extremely important. We 
here provide some general guiding principles to guide you in commission-
ing data collection.
Outcome indicators should be as consistent as possible with local and 
international best practice. It is always useful to consider how indicators of 
interest have been measured in best-practice surveys both locally and inter-
nationally. Using the same indicators (including the same survey modules or 
questions) ensures comparability between the preexisting data and the data 
collected for the impact evaluation. If you decide to choose an indicator that 
is not fully comparable or not well measured, that may limit the usefulness 
of the evaluation results.  
All of the indicators should be measured in exactly the same way for all 
units in both the treatment group and comparison group. Using diff erent 
data collection methods (for example, using a phone survey for one and an 
in-person survey for the other) creates the risk of generating bias. The 
same is true of collecting data at diff erent times for the two groups (for 
example, collecting data for the treatment group during the rainy season 
and for the comparison group during the dry season). That is why the pro-
cedures used to measure any outcome indicator should be formulated 
very precisely. The data collection process should be exactly the same for 
all units. Within the questionnaire, each module related to the program 
should be introduced without aff ecting the ﬂ ow or framing of responses in 
other parts of the questionnaire.
Formatting Questionnaires
Because diff erent ways of asking the same survey question can yield diff er-
ent answers, both the framing and the format of the questions should be the 
same for all units to prevent any respondent or enumerator bias. Glewwe 
(UN 2005) makes six speciﬁ c recommendations regarding the formatting of 
questionnaires for household surveys. These recommendations apply 
equally to most other data collection instruments:
1. Each question should be written out in full on the questionnaire, so that 
the interviewer can conduct the interview by reading each question word 
for word.
2. The questionnaire should include precise deﬁ nitions of all of the key 
concepts used in the survey, so that the interviewer can refer to the deﬁ -
nition during the interview if necessary. 
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3. Each question should be as short and simple as possible and should use 
common, everyday terms.
4. The questionnaires should be designed so that the answers to almost all 
questions are precoded.
5. The coding scheme for answers should be consistent across all questions.
6. The survey should include skip codes, which indicate which ques-
tions are not to be asked based on the answers given to the previous 
questions.
Once a questionnaire has been drafted by the person commissioned to work 
on the instrument, it should be presented to a team of experts for discussion. 
Everybody involved in the evaluation (policy makers, researchers, data ana-
lysts, and data collectors) should be consulted about whether the question-
naire collects all of the information desired in an appropriate fashion.  
Testing the Questionnaire
It is very important that the questionnaire be piloted and ﬁ eld-tested 
extensively before it is ﬁ nalized. Extensive piloting of the questionnaire 
will test its format, as well as any alternative formatting and phrasing 
options. Field-testing the full questionnaire in real-life conditions is criti-
cal for checking its length and for verifying that its format is suffi  ciently 
consistent and comprehensive to produce precise measures of all relevant 
information. Field-testing is an integral part of the questionnaire design 
work that is commissioned.
Conducting Fieldwork
Even when you commission data collection, a clear understanding of all the 
steps involved in that process is crucial to help you ensure that the required 
quality control mechanisms and the right incentives are in place. The entity 
in charge of collecting data will need to coordinate the work of a large num-
ber of diff erent actors, including enumerators, supervisors, ﬁ eld coordina-
tors, and logistical support staff , in addition to a data entry team composed 
of programmers, supervisors, and the data entry operators. A clear work 
plan should be put in place to coordinate the work of all these teams, and the 
work plan is a key deliverable. 
At the start, the work plan must include proper training for the data 
collection team before collection begins. A complete reference manual 
Collecting Data  205
should be prepared for training and used throughout ﬁ eldwork. Training 
is key to ensuring that data are collected consistently by all involved. The 
training process is also a good opportunity to identify the best-performing 
enumerators and to conduct a last pilot of instruments and procedures 
under normal conditions. Once the sample has been drawn, the instru-
ments have been designed and piloted, and the teams have been trained, 
the data collection can begin. It is good practice to ensure that the ﬁ eld-
work plan has each survey team collect data on the same number of treat-
ment and comparison units.
As discussed in chapter 11, proper sampling is essential to ensuring the 
quality of the sample. However, many nonsampling errors can occur while 
the data are being collected. In the context of an impact evaluation, a par-
ticular concern is that those errors may not be the same in the treatment and 
comparison groups.
Nonresponse arises when it becomes impossible to collect complete data 
for some sampled units. Because the actual samples are restricted to those 
units for which data can be collected, units that choose not to respond to a 
survey may make the sample less representative and can create bias in the 
evaluation results. Attrition is a common form of nonresponse that occurs 
when some units drop from the sample between data collection rounds, for 
example, because migrants are not fully tracked.
Nonresponse and attrition are particularly problematic in the context of 
impact evaluations because they may create diff erences between the treat-
ment group and the comparison group. For example, attrition may be diff er-
ent in the two groups: if the data are being collected after the program has 
begun to be implemented, the response rate among treatment units can be 
higher than the rate among comparison units. That may happen because the 
comparison units are unhappy not to have been selected or are more likely 
to migrate. Nonresponses can also occur within the questionnaire itself, 
typically because some indicators are missing or the data are incomplete for 
a particular unit. 
Measurement error is another type of problem that can generate bias if it 
is systematic. Measurement error is the diff erence between the value of a 
characteristic as provided by the respondent and the true (but unknown) 
value (Kasprzyk 2005). Such diff erence can be traced to the way the ques-
tionnaire is worded or to the data collection method that is chosen, or it can 
occur because of the interviewers who are ﬁ elding the survey or the respon-
dent who is giving the answers. 
The quality of the impact evaluation depends directly on the quality of 
the data that are collected. Quality standards need to be made clear to all 
stakeholders in the data collection process; the standards should be particu-
larly emphasized during the training of enumerators and in the reference 
Key Concept:
Nonresponse arises 
when data are missing 
or incomplete for some 
sampled units. 
Nonresponse can 
create bias in the 
evaluation results.
Key Concept:
Best-practice impact 
evaluations aim to 
keep nonresponse 
and attrition below 
5 percent.
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manuals. For instance, detailed procedures to minimize nonresponse or (if 
acceptable) to replace units in the sample are essential. The data collection 
agency must understand clearly the acceptable nonresponse and attrition 
rates. Best-practice impact evaluations aim to keep nonresponse and attri-
tion below 5 percent. That may not always be feasible in very mobile popula-
tions but nevertheless provides a useful benchmark. Survey respondents are 
sometimes compensated to minimize nonresponse. In any case, the contract 
for the data collection agency must contain clear incentives, for instance, 
higher compensation if the nonresponse rate is below 5 percent or another 
acceptable threshold.  
Well-deﬁ ned quality assurance procedures must be established for all 
stages of the data collection process, including the designing of the sampling 
procedure and questionnaire, the preparation stages, data collection, data 
entry, and data cleaning and storage. 
Quality checks during the ﬁ eldwork should be given a very high prior-
ity to minimize nonresponse errors for each unit. Clear procedures must 
exist for revisiting units that have provided no information or incomplete 
information. Multiple ﬁ lters should be introduced in the quality control 
process, for instance, by having enumerators, supervisors, and if neces-
sary, ﬁ eld coordinators revisit the nonresponse units to verify their status. 
The questionnaires from nonresponse interviews should still be clearly 
coded and recorded. Once the data have been completely digitized, the 
nonresponse rates can be summarized and all sampled units fully 
accounted for. 
Quality checks should also be made on any incomplete data for a particu-
lar surveyed unit. Again, the quality control process should include multiple 
ﬁ lters. The enumerator is responsible for checking the data immediately 
after they have been collected. The supervisor and the ﬁ eld coordinator 
should perform random checks at a later stage. 
Quality checks for measurement errors are more diffi  cult but are crucial 
for assessing whether information has been collected accurately. Consis-
tency checks can be built into the questionnaire. In addition, supervisors 
need to conduct spot checks and cross-checks to ensure that the enumera-
tors collect data in accordance with the established quality standards. Field 
coordinators should also contribute to those checks to minimize potential 
conﬂ icts of interests within the survey ﬁ rm. 
It is critical that all steps involved in checking quality are requested 
explicitly when commissioning data collection. You may also consider con-
tracting with an external agency to audit the quality of the data collection 
activities. Doing that can signiﬁ cantly limit the range of problems that can 
arise as a result of lack of supervision of the data collection team.
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Processing and Validating the Data
Household surveys are typically collected using paper and pencil, although 
more recently electronic data collection using laptop computers, hand-
helds, and other devices has become more commonplace. In either case, 
data must be digitized and processed. A data entry software program has to 
be developed and a system put in place to manage the ﬂ ow of data to be 
digitized. Norms and procedures must be established, and data entry opera-
tors must be carefully trained to guarantee that data entry is consistent. As 
much as possible, data entry should be integrated into data collection opera-
tions (including during the pilot-testing phase), so that any problems with 
the data collected can be promptly identiﬁ ed and veriﬁ ed in the ﬁ eld. 
When working with paper-and-pencil surveys, the quality benchmark 
for the data entry process should be that the raw physical data are exactly 
replicated in the digitized version, with no modiﬁ cations made to them 
while they are being entered. To minimize data entry errors, it is advisable 
to commission a double-blind data entry procedure that can be used to iden-
tify and correct for any remaining errors. 
In addition to these quality checks during the data entry process, soft-
ware can be developed to perform automatic checks for many nonsam-
pling errors (both item nonresponse and inconsistencies) that may occur 
in the ﬁ eld. If the data entry process is integrated into the ﬁ eldwork pro-
cedures, incomplete or inconsistent data can be referred back to the ﬁ eld 
workers for on-site veriﬁ cation (Muñoz 2005, chapter 15). This kind of 
integration is not without challenges for the organizational ﬂ ow of ﬁ eld-
work operation, but it can yield substantial quality gains, diminishing 
measurement error and increasing the power of the impact evaluation. 
The possibility of using such an integrated approach should be considered 
explicitly when data collection is being planned. New technologies can 
facilitate those quality checks.
As we have seen, data collection comprises a set of operations whose 
complexity should not be underestimated. Box 12.1 discusses how the data 
collection process for the evaluation of the Nicaraguan Atención a Crisis 
pilots yielded high-quality data with remarkably low attrition and item non-
response and few measurement and processing errors. Such high-quality 
data can be obtained only when data quality procedures and proper incen-
tives are put in place at the moment of commissioning data collection. 
At the end of the data collection process, the data set should be delivered 
with detailed documentation, including a complete codebook and data dic-
tionary, and stored in a secure location. If the data are being collected for an 
impact evaluation, then the data set should also include complementary 
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Box 12.1: Data Collection for the Evaluation of the Nicaraguan 
Atención a Crisis Pilots
In 2005, the Nicaraguan government launched 
the Atención a Crisis pilots. Its objective was 
to evaluate the impact of combining a con-
ditional cash transfer (CCT) program with 
productive transfers, such as grants for 
investment in nonagricultural activities or 
vocational training. The Atención a Crisis pilot 
was implemented by the ministry of the 
family, with support from the World Bank.
A randomized assignment in two stages 
was used for the evaluation. First, 106 target 
communities were randomly assigned to 
either the comparison group or the treat-
ment group. Second, within treatment com-
munities, eligible households were randomly 
assigned one of three benefi t packages: (1) a 
conditional cash transfer; (2) the CCT plus a 
scholarship that allowed one of the household 
members to choose among a number of voca-
tional training courses; and (3) the CCT plus a 
productive investment grant to encourage 
recipients to start a small nonagricultural activ-
ity, with the goal of asset creation and income 
diversifi cation (Macours and Vakis 2009).
A baseline survey was collected in 2005, a 
fi rst follow-up survey in 2006, and a second 
follow-up survey in 2008, 2 years after the 
intervention ended. Rigorous quality checks 
were put in place at all stages of the data col-
lection process. First, questionnaires were 
thoroughly fi eld-tested, and enumerators 
were trained both in class and in fi eld condi-
tions. Second, fi eld supervision was set up, 
so that all questionnaires were revised multi-
ple times by enumerators, supervisors, fi eld 
coordinators, and other reviewers. Third, a 
double-blind data entry system was used, 
together with a comprehensive quality check 
program that could identify incomplete or 
inconsistent questionnaires. Questionnaires 
with item nonresponse or inconsistencies 
were systematically sent back to the fi eld for 
verifi cation. These procedures and require-
ments were explicitly specifi ed in the terms 
of reference of the data collection fi rm.
In addition, detailed tracking procedures 
were put in place to minimize attrition. At the 
start, a full census of households residing in 
the treatment and control communities in 
2008 was undertaken in close collaboration 
with community leaders. In the presence of 
substantial geographical mobility, the survey 
fi rm was given incentives to track individual 
migrants throughout the country. As a result, 
only 2 percent of the original 4,359 house-
holds could not be interviewed in 2009. The 
survey fi rm was also commissioned to track 
all individuals from the households surveyed 
in 2005. Again only 2 percent of the individu-
als to whom program transfers were targeted 
could not be tracked (another 2 percent had 
died). Attrition was 3 percent for all children of 
households surveyed in 2005 and 5 percent 
for all individuals in households surveyed 
in 2005. 
Attrition and nonresponse rates provide 
a good indicator of survey quality. Reaching 
those remarkably low attrition rates required 
intense efforts by the data collection fi rm, as 
well as explicit incentives. The per unit cost of 
a tracked household or individual is also much 
higher, and that needs to be accounted for. In 
addition, thorough quality checks had a cost 
and increased data collection time. Still, in the 
context of the Atención a Crisis pilot, the sam-
ple remained representative at both the house-
hold and the individual levels 3 to 4 years after 
the baseline, measurement error was mini-
mized, and the reliability of the evaluation was 
ensured. As a result, the Atención a Crisis pilot 
is one of the safety net programs whose sus-
tainability can be most convincingly studied.
Source: Macours and Vakis 2009; authors.
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information on treatment status and program participation. A complete set 
of documentation will speed up the analysis of the impact evaluation data, 
which will produce results that can be used for policy making in a timely 
fashion. It will also facilitate information sharing.
Note
1. See also Fink and Kosecoff  (2008); Iarossi (2006); and Leeuw, Hox, and Dillman 
(2008), which provide a wealth of practical guidance for data collection.
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Producing and Disseminating 
Findings
CHAPTER 13
In this chapter, we discuss the content and use of the various reports that 
are produced during an impact evaluation. During the preparation phase, 
the evaluation manager will normally prepare an impact evaluation plan, 
which details the objectives, design, and sampling and data collection 
strategies for the evaluation (box 13.1 presents a suggested outline of the 
process). The various elements of the evaluation plan are discussed in 
chapters 1 through 12.
Once the evaluation is under way, the evaluators will produce a number 
of reports, including the baseline report, the impact evaluation report, and 
policy briefs. The evaluators should also produce fully documented data sets 
as ﬁ nal products. Once the impact evaluation report is available and the 
results are known, it is then time to think how to best disseminate the ﬁ nd-
ings among policy makers and other development stakeholders. The pro-
duction and dissemination of impact evaluation ﬁ ndings are the topic of this 
chapter.
What Products Will the Evaluation Deliver?
The main outputs of an evaluation are an impact evaluation report and a 
number of policy briefs that summarize the key ﬁ ndings. It can take several 
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Box 13.1: Outline of an Impact Evaluation Plan
1. Introduction
2. Description of the intervention
3. Objectives of the evaluation
3.1 Hypotheses, theory of change, results chain  
3.2 Policy questions
3.3 Key outcome indicators
4. Evaluation design 
5. Sampling and data
5.1 Sampling strategy
5.2 Power calculations 
6. Data collection plan
6.1 Baseline survey
6.2 Follow-up survey(s) 
7. Products to be delivered
7.1 Baseline report
7.2 Impact evaluation report
7.3 Policy brief
7.4 Fully documented data sets
8. Dissemination plan
9. Ethical issues
10. Time line
11. Budget and funding
12. Composition of evaluation team
years from the start of the evaluation to complete such a report, since evalu-
ation ﬁ ndings can be produced only once the follow-up data are available. 
Because of this lag, policy makers often request intermediary evaluation 
products, such as a baseline report, to make available preliminary informa-
tion to sustain policy dialogue and decisions.1
As discussed in chapter 10, the evaluation manager will work with data 
analysts to produce the baseline and ﬁ nal reports. Data analysts are experts 
in statistics or econometrics who will program the impact evaluation analy-
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sis in statistical software such as Stata, SPSS, or R. Data analysts are respon-
sible for ensuring the quality, scientiﬁ c rigor and credibility of the results. 
Here, we do not discuss how to analyze data,2 but rather outline the scope of 
the reports to which the data will contribute. 
Intermediate Product: Baseline Report
The main objectives of a baseline report are to assess whether the chosen 
impact evaluation design will be valid in practice and to describe the base-
line (preprogram) characteristics and outcomes of the eligible population. 
A baseline report also generates information about the program and its 
beneﬁ ciaries that can be useful to enhance both the implementation of the 
program and its evaluation. Box 13.2 outlines the suggested content of a 
baseline report.3
The baseline report is produced from the analysis of a clean baseline data 
set complemented by administrative data on each unit’s treatment status. 
The assignment of households, individuals, or facilities to the treatment or 
Box 13.2: Outline of a Baseline Report
1. Introduction
2. Description of the intervention (benefi ts, eligibility rules, and so on)
3. Objectives of the evaluation
3.1 Hypotheses, theory of changes, results chain
3.2 Policy questions
3.3 Key outcome indicators
4. Evaluation design
4.1 Original design
4.2 Actual program participants and nonparticipants 
5. Sampling and data
5.1 Sampling strategy
5.2 Power calculations 
5.3 Data collected 
6. Validation of evaluation design
7. Comprehensive descriptive statistics
8. Conclusion and recommendations for implementation
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the comparison group is generally performed after the baseline data have 
been collected. As a result, treatment status is often registered in a separate 
administrative data set. For instance, a public lottery may be organized to 
determine which communities, among all the eligible communities where a 
baseline survey has been collected, will beneﬁ t from a cash transfer pro-
gram. If that is to be done, data analysts must merge the administrative data 
with the baseline data. If the evaluation includes more than, say, 100 eligible 
units, it will not be practical to match the baseline data with the administra-
tive data by name. Each eligible unit will need to be assigned a unique num-
ber or identiﬁ er, which will identify it in all sources of data, including the 
baseline and administrative databases. 
The ﬁ rst sections of the baseline report build on the impact evaluation 
plan by presenting the motivation for the evaluation, the description of the 
intervention (including beneﬁ ts and beneﬁ t assignment rules), the objec-
tives of the evaluation (including the theory of change, core policy ques-
tions, hypotheses, and indicators), and the evaluation design. The section on 
the evaluation design should discuss whether the assignment of program 
beneﬁ ts was implemented in a manner consistent with the planned design. 
Because the assignment is normally done just after completion of the base-
line survey, it is good practice to include information on actual assignment 
in the baseline report. The section on sampling generally starts by outlining 
the sampling strategy and the power calculations produced for the evalua-
tion plan, before describing in detail how baseline data were collected and 
the type of information that is available. The report should discuss any chal-
lenges faced during baseline data collection, and it should present key indi-
cators of data quality, such as nonresponse rates. In that regard, the baseline 
report will highlight key issues that need to be addressed at follow-up. For 
instance, if the rate of nonresponse was high at baseline, the evaluators will 
need to develop new ﬁ eld or tracking procedures to ensure that that does 
not happen again during the follow-up survey. 
As we have said, the ﬁ rst main objective of the baseline report is to pro-
vide an early assessment of the validity of the evaluation design in practice. 
In chapter 8, we highlighted that most impact evaluation methods pro-
duce valid estimates of the counterfactual only under speciﬁ c assump-
tions. Box 8.1 (chapter 8) presents a checklist of tests that can be used to 
assess whether a method is appropriate in a given context. Some of those 
tests do not require follow-up data and can be applied as soon as baseline 
data are available. For example, if the randomized assignment or random-
ized off ering method is used, the baseline report should state whether the 
treatment and comparison groups have similar baseline characteristics. If 
the evaluation is based on the regression discontinuity method, the baseline 
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report should report tests of the continuity of the eligibility index around 
the threshold. Although these falsiﬁ cation checks do not guarantee that the 
comparison group will remain valid until the follow-up survey, it is crucial 
that the baseline report document them.
In addition to testing the validity of the evaluation design, the baseline 
report should include tables that describe the characteristics of the evalua-
tion sample. They can enhance program implementation by allowing the 
program managers to better understand the proﬁ le of beneﬁ ciaries and to 
tailor the program intervention to their needs. For example, by knowing the 
level of education or average work experience of participants in a training 
program, program managers may be able to ﬁ ne-tune the content of the 
training courses.
From the evaluation standpoint, the baseline survey often yields infor-
mation that was unavailable at the time the evaluation plan was being writ-
ten. Say that you are evaluating the impact of a village health program on 
child diarrhea. When writing the evaluation plan, you may not know what 
the incidence of diarrhea is in the village. So in the evaluation plan, you 
would have only an estimate, and you would base your power calculations 
on that estimate. However, once you have baseline data, you are able to ver-
ify the actual baseline incidence of diarrhea and, thus, whether your original 
sample size is adequate. If you ﬁ nd that baseline values of outcome indica-
tors are diff erent from the ones used to perform the original power calcula-
tions, the baseline report should include updated power calculations. 
To ensure the credibility of the ﬁ nal evaluation results, it is good practice 
to let external experts review the baseline report. Disseminating the base-
line report can also reinforce the policy dialogue among stakeholders 
throughout the evaluation cycle.
Final Products: Impact Evaluation Report, Policy Brief, and Data Sets
The ﬁ nal impact evaluation report is the main product of an evaluation and 
is produced after follow-up data have been collected.4 The main objectives 
of the evaluation report are to present evaluation results and answer all the 
policy questions that were set out initially. As a complement, the report also 
needs to show that the evaluation is based on valid estimates of the counter-
factual and that the estimated impacts are fully attributable to the program. 
The ﬁ nal impact evaluation report is a comprehensive one that summa-
rizes all the work connected with the evaluation and includes detailed 
descriptions of the data analysis and econometric speciﬁ cations, as well 
as discussion of results, tables, and appendixes. Box 13.3 outlines the con-
tent of a full impact evaluation report. Many good examples of ﬁ nal impact 
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evaluation reports are available, such as Maluccio and Flores (2005), Levy 
and Ohls (2007), or Skouﬁ as (2005) for conditional cash transfer programs; 
Card et al. (2007) for a youth training program; Cattaneo et al. (2009) for a 
housing program; and Basinga et al. (2010) for a results-based ﬁ nancing pro-
gram for the health sector. 
As for the baseline report, the evaluators will work with data analysts to 
produce the ﬁ nal impact evaluation report. The analyst will start by produc-
ing a master data set containing the baseline data set, the follow-up data set, 
administrative data on actual program implementation, and data on the 
original assignment to treatment and comparison groups. All of these 
sources should be merged, using a unique identiﬁ er for each unit. 
Because the ﬁ nal impact evaluation report is the main output of the eval-
uation, it should incorporate the key information presented in the evalua-
tion plan and the baseline report, before turning to analysis and discussion 
Box 13.3: Outline of an Evaluation Report
1. Introduction
2. Description of the intervention (benefi ts, eligibility rules, and so on) 
2.1. Design 
2.2 Implementation
3. Objectives of the evaluation
3.1 Hypotheses, theory of change, results chain
3.2 Policy questions
3.3 Key outcome indicators
4. Evaluation design
4.1 In theory
4.2 In practice
5. Sampling and data
5.1 Sampling strategy
5.2 Power calculations
5.3 Data collected
6. Validation of evaluation design
7. Results
8. Robustness checks
9. Conclusion and policy recommendations
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of the results. In particular, the introductory part of the ﬁ nal report should 
present the full rationale for the intervention and the evaluation and 
describe the intervention (beneﬁ ts and beneﬁ t assignment rules), the objec-
tives of the evaluation (including the theory of change, core policy ques-
tions, hypotheses, and indicators), the original evaluation design, and how it 
was implemented in practice. 
In general, the interpretation of results depends crucially on how well an 
intervention was implemented. The ﬁ nal evaluation report should therefore 
discuss the implementation of the intervention in detail. This can be done 
before presenting results, by describing data on program implementation 
obtained from follow-up surveys or complementary administrative sources. 
The sampling and data section is the place to describe the sampling strat-
egy and power calculations, before the extensive discussion of the baseline 
and follow-up data collected. Key indicators of data quality, such as nonre-
sponse and attrition, must be presented for each data round. If nonresponse 
and attrition rates are high, it becomes crucial for the data analysts to dis-
cuss how that may aff ect the interpretation of the results. For example, 
testing whether attrition and nonresponse are balanced between the com-
parison and treatment groups is a must. 
Once the data have been described, the report can turn to the presenta-
tion of results for all key policy questions and outcome indicators identi-
ﬁ ed as objectives of the evaluation. The structure of the results section 
will depend on the types of policy questions under study. For instance, 
does the evaluation test various program alternatives, or does it test only 
whether or not an intervention works? Did policy makers request an 
analysis of how results vary among subgroups? For evaluations that were 
well designed and implemented, rigorous evaluation results can often be 
presented in an intuitive way. 
As we have said, the impact evaluation report should provide strong 
evidence that the estimated impacts are indeed fully attributable to the 
program. Therefore, the report must carefully scrutinize the validity of 
the evaluation design. To demonstrate the validity of the impact evalua-
tion design, a ﬁ rst step is to present the results of falsiﬁ cation tests per-
formed with baseline data (box 8.1, chapter 8). The report should also 
contain the results of any tests that can be performed with follow-up data. 
For instance, if a diff erence-in-diff erences approach is chosen, the series of 
falsiﬁ cation tests described in box 8.1 can be performed only in the pres-
ence of follow-up data. 
The introductory section of the evaluation report should document 
any new challenges with the evaluation method that arose between the 
baseline and follow-up surveys. For example, noncompliance with assign-
ment to the treatment and comparison groups has important implications 
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for the analysis and interpretation of results and must be discussed up 
front in the report. The report must also contain information on how many 
units assigned to the treatment group indeed received the program and how 
many of those assigned to the comparison group did not receive the pro-
gram. If any deviation from the original assignment has occurred, the 
analysis has to be adjusted to account for noncompliance (refer to the 
techniques discussed in part 2). 
Parallel with tests of the validity of the evaluation design, the ﬁ nal report 
is the place to provide a comprehensive discussion of the nature, reliability, 
and robustness of the results. It should contain a series of robustness tests 
relevant to the evaluation methodology being used. For instance, when 
matching methods are applied, the report needs to present results from 
applying alternative techniques to ﬁ nd the best match for each treated 
observation. It is the responsibility of the data analysts to identify and pres-
ent the robustness checks most appropriate for a speciﬁ c evaluation. The 
ﬁ nal parts of the report should clearly answer each policy question that the 
evaluation set out to answer and provide detailed policy recommendations 
based on the results. 
Understanding how the intervention was implemented is particularly 
crucial when evaluation results show a limited or negative impact. Non-
results or negative results are no reason to punish program or evaluation 
managers. Rather, they provide an opportunity for program and evaluation 
managers to explain clearly what did not work as intended; that, in itself, 
can lead to large policy gains and should be rewarded. Continuous commu-
nication between the evaluation team and the policy makers responsible for 
the program is particularly critical when signs appear that an evaluation 
will produce non-results or negative results. Complementary process evalu-
ations or qualitative work can provide valuable explanation for why a pro-
gram did not achieve the intended results. Lack of results traceable to 
imperfect program implementation should be clearly distinguished from 
lack of results from a well-implemented program that had a weak design.5 
In general, evaluations that test program alternatives are most useful in 
illuminating which program design features work and which do not.
Overall, the ﬁ nal data analysis should provide convincing evidence that 
the estimated program impacts are indeed caused by the intervention. To 
guarantee that results are fully objective and thus ensure their legitimacy, 
all reports should be peer reviewed and subject to broad consultations 
before being ﬁ nalized. The content of the ﬁ nal impact evaluation report 
may subsequently be transformed into more technical academic papers 
for publication in peer-reviewed journals, lending additional credibility to 
the evaluation results.
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In addition to the comprehensive evaluation report, evaluators should 
produce one or more shorter policy briefs to help communicate the results 
to policy makers and other stakeholders. A policy brief concentrates on pre-
senting the core ﬁ ndings of the evaluation through graphs, charts, and other 
accessible formats and on discussing the policy recommendations. It also 
contains a short summary of the technical aspects of the evaluation. The 
policy brief can be made publicly available in paper and Web formats and 
circulated to politicians, civil society, and the media. Good examples of pol-
icy briefs can be found on the Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) or World Bank 
Human Development Web site (for example, Poverty Action Lab 2008; 
World Bank Human Development Network 2010). 
The last major product of an impact evaluation is a set of relevant data 
and their documentation. Tools such as the Microdata Management Toolkit 
of the International Household Survey Network (http://www.ihsn.org) can 
assist in this process. Policy makers and impact evaluators will typically 
agree on a time line in which the initial impact analysis is conducted and 
evaluation data are released into the public domain. Making data publicly 
available enhances transparency because impact results can be replicated 
and externally validated. Public access will also encourage external research-
ers to conduct additional analysis with the same data, which can provide 
valuable information and learning for the program. When making data pub-
licly available, it is important to guarantee anonymity to all research sub-
jects; any information that could identify survey respondents (such as names, 
addresses, or location information) must be removed from the publicly avail-
able data sets. This type of sensitive information should be kept secure and 
made available only for authorized future data collection activities.
How to Disseminate Findings?
Beyond delivering evaluation results, the ultimate goal of impact evalua-
tions is to make public policies more eff ective and improve development 
outcomes. To ensure that an impact evaluation informs policy decisions, it 
must communicate clearly with all of its stakeholders, including policy 
makers, civil society, and the media. Inﬂ uential evaluations often include a 
detailed dissemination plan that outlines how key stakeholders will be kept 
informed and engaged throughout the evaluation cycle. Such a dissemina-
tion plan can facilitate the use of results in policy making and ensure that 
impact evaluations truly achieve results.
At the initial stages of the evaluation design, evaluators have their ﬁ rst 
opportunity to build strong communication channels with policy makers. 
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As should be clear from our discussion of evaluation methods, an evaluation 
design depends directly on how the program itself is designed and imple-
mented, and so it is critical that external evaluators and the policy makers 
doing the commissioning collaborate during the program design stage. A 
well-functioning evaluation team will ensure that the evaluation is fully 
aligned to the needs of policy makers and that its progress and results are 
regularly communicated to them. 
The dissemination plan should outline how the evaluation team will 
increase the demand for the evaluation results and maximize their use in 
decision making. At minimum, the evaluators should foster awareness 
about the evaluation by eff ectively communicating the results to internal 
and external stakeholders throughout the evaluation cycle. At the inception 
of the evaluation, a pre-study and launch workshop with implementers and 
key stakeholders can help achieve consensus on its main objectives, policy 
questions, and design features. In addition to providing a platform for con-
sultations and ensuring that the evaluation is fully aligned to stakeholder 
needs, such an event is important to raise awareness about the evaluation 
and reinforce interest in learning its results. 
During the evaluation, periodic meetings of an interinstitutional com-
mittee or permanent discussion roundtable can help ensure that the work of 
the evaluation team remains fully policy relevant. Such discussion forums 
can provide feedback and guidance on the production of terms of reference, 
the content of the survey instrument, the dissemination of results, or the 
most appropriate channels to reach high-level decision makers. 
The organization of dissemination events for intermediary products, 
such as a baseline report, is important to maintain an active policy dialogue 
with evaluation users. Fostering early discussion around the baseline report 
is beneﬁ cial in both disseminating policy-relevant intermediary results and 
ensuring continued awareness about the nature of impact evaluation results 
to come. 
Before ﬁ nalizing the evaluation report, some evaluators choose to orga-
nize a ﬁ nal consultation event to give stakeholders the opportunity to com-
ment on the results. These consultations can contribute to improving the 
quality of evaluation results, as well as their acceptance. Once the ﬁ nal 
impact evaluation report and associated policy briefs are available, high-
visibility dissemination events are critical to ensure wide awareness of the 
results among stakeholders. An in-country consultation and dissemination 
workshop with a broad set of stakeholders provides a platform to discuss 
results, gather feedback, and outline policy changes that could be made as a 
result of the evaluation. That workshop can be followed by a high-level dis-
semination workshop involving top policy makers (see box 13.4). Outside 
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the country, the results can be disseminated at conferences, seminars, and 
other gatherings, if the evaluation results can be useful for policy making in 
other countries. Other innovative dissemination channels, such as Web 
interfaces, are also helpful to increase the visibility of ﬁ ndings.
Overall, the dissemination of impact evaluation outputs, according to a 
well-thought-out plan spanning the evaluation cycle, is important to ensure 
that results eff ectively feed the policy dialogue. Only when evaluation 
results are adequately shared with policy makers and fully used in the 
decision-making process can impact evaluations fulﬁ ll their ultimate 
objective of improving the eff ectiveness of social programs.
Notes
1. An evaluation may generate other intermediary products. For instance, 
qualitative ﬁ eldwork or process evaluations provide highly valuable comple-
mentary information before the ﬁ nal impact evaluation report is produced. 
We focus on the baseline report because it constitutes the main intermediary 
product of quantitative impact evaluations, the subject of this book.
2. Khandker et al. (2009) present an introduction to evaluation that includes a 
review of data analysis and the relevant Stata commands for each impact 
evaluation method.
3. The outline is indicative and can be tailored depending on the nature of each 
evaluation, for instance, by modifying the order or content of the various 
sections.
Box 13.4: Disseminating Evaluation Findings to Improve 
Policy
The evaluation of results-based fi nancing for health care in Rwanda provides a 
good example of a successful dissemination strategy. Under the leadership of 
the ministry of health, a team composed of local academics and World Bank 
experts was formed to lead the evaluation. Various stakeholders were involved 
throughout the evaluation, beginning with its launch, and that proved key to 
ensuring its success and strong political buy-in. Final results of the evaluation 
(Basinga et al. 2010) were unveiled during a daylong public dissemination event 
involving high-level decision makers and multiple stakeholders. Thanks to these 
communication channels, the fi ndings strongly infl uenced the design of health 
policy in Rwanda. The results were also disseminated at international health con-
ferences and through a Web site.
Source: Morgan 2010.
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4. In cases when multiple rounds of follow-up data are collected, an impact 
evaluation report can be produced for each round, and the results compared, to 
highlight whether program impacts are sustainable or vary with duration of 
exposure.
5. As discussed in chapter 1, this is a reason why effi  cacy trials to minimize 
implementation challenges are useful in determining whether a particular 
program design works under ideal circumstances. Once proof of concept has 
been documented, the pilot can be scaled up.
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Conclusion
CHAPTER 14
This book is a practical guide to designing and implementing impact evalu-
ations. We expect that its content will appeal to three main audiences: 
(1) policy makers who consume the information generated from impact 
evaluations, (2) project managers and development practitioners who com-
mission evaluations, and (3) technicians who design and implement impact 
evaluations. Essentially, impact evaluation is about generating evidence on 
which social policies work, and which do not. That can be done in a classic 
impact evaluation framework, comparing outcomes with and without the 
program. Impact evaluations can also be conducted to explore implementa-
tion alternatives within a program or to look across programs to assess com-
parative performance. 
We argue that impact evaluations are a worthwhile investment for many 
programs and that, coupled with monitoring and other forms of evaluation, 
they allow for a clear understanding of the eff ectiveness of particular social 
policies. We present a menu of impact evaluation methodologies, each with 
its own set of costs and beneﬁ ts with respect to implementation, political 
economy, ﬁ nancial requirements, and interpretation of results. We argue 
that the best method should be chosen to ﬁ t the operational context, and not 
the other way around. Finally, we provide practical tips, tools, and guidance 
to assist during the evaluation process and to facilitate getting the most out 
of an evaluation’s results. 
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Impact evaluations are complex undertakings with many moving parts. 
The following checklist highlights the core elements of a well-designed 
impact evaluation, which should include the following:
✓ A concrete policy question—grounded in a theory of change—that can be 
answered with an impact evaluation
✓ A valid identiﬁ cation strategy, consistent with the operational rules of 
the program, that shows the causal relation between the program and 
outcomes of interest
✓ A well-powered sample that allows policy-relevant impacts to be detected 
and a representative sample that allows results to be generalized to a 
larger population of interest
✓ A high-quality source of data that provides the appropriate variables 
required by the analysis, of both treatment and comparison groups, 
using both baseline and follow-up data
✓ A well-formed evaluation team that works closely with policy makers 
and program staff 
✓ An impact report and associated policy briefs, disseminated to key audi-
ences in a timely manner and feeding both program design and policy 
dialogues
We also highlight some key tips that can help mitigate common risks inher-
ent in the process of conducting an impact evaluation:
✓ Impact evaluations are best designed early in the project cycle, ideally as 
part of the program design. Early planning allows for a prospective eval-
uation design based on the best available methodology and will provide 
the time necessary to plan and implement baseline data collection prior 
to the start of the program in evaluation areas.  
✓ Impact results should be informed by process evaluation and rigorous 
monitoring data that give a clear picture of program implementation. 
When programs succeed, it is important to understand why. When pro-
grams fail, it is important to distinguish between a poorly implemented 
program and a ﬂ awed program design. 
✓ Collect baseline data and build a backup methodology into your impact 
evaluation design. If the original evaluation design is invalidated, for 
example if the original comparison group receives program beneﬁ ts, 
having a backup plan can help you avoid having to throw out the evalu-
ation altogether. 
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✓ Maintain common identiﬁ ers among diff erent data sources, so that they 
can be easily linked during the analysis. For example, a particular house-
hold should have the same identiﬁ er in the monitoring systems and in 
baseline and follow-up surveys. 
✓ Impact evaluations are as useful for learning about how programs work 
and for testing programmatic alternatives as they are for evaluating the 
overall impact of a single bundle of goods and services. By unbundling a 
program, even large, universal programs can learn a lot by testing innova-
tions through well-designed impact evaluations. Embedding an addi-
tional program innovation as a small pilot in the context of a larger 
evaluation can leverage the evaluation to produce valuable information 
for future decision making.
✓ Impact evaluations should be thought of as another component of a 
program’s operation and should be adequately staff ed and budgeted 
with the required technical and ﬁ nancial resources. Be realistic about 
the costs and complexity of carrying out an impact evaluation. The pro-
cess of designing an evaluation and collecting a baseline from scratch 
will typically take a year or more. Once the program starts, the inter-
vention needs a suffi  cient exposure period to aff ect outcomes. Depending 
on the program, that can take anywhere from a year to ﬁ ve years, or 
more. Collecting one or more follow-up surveys, conducting the analy-
sis, and dissemination will also involve substantial eff ort over a number 
of months. Altogether, a complete impact evaluation cycle from start to 
ﬁ nish typically takes at least three to four years of intensive work and 
engagement. Adequate ﬁ nancial and technical resources are necessary 
at each step of the way.
Ultimately, individual impact evaluations provide concrete answers to spe-
ciﬁ c policy questions. Although these answers provide information that is 
customized for the speciﬁ c entity commissioning and paying for the evalua-
tion, they also provide information that is of value to others around the 
world who can learn and make decisions based on the evidence. For exam-
ple, more recent conditional cash transfer programs in Africa, Asia, and 
Europe have drawn lessons from the original evaluations of Colombia’s 
Familias en Acción, Mexico’s Progresa, and other Latin American condi-
tional cash transfer programs established in years past. In that way, impact 
evaluations are partly a global public good. Evidence generated through one 
impact evaluation adds to global knowledge on that subject. This knowl-
edge base can then inform policy decisions in other countries and contexts 
as well. Indeed, the international community is moving toward scaling up 
support for rigorous evaluation.
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At the country level, more sophisticated and demanding governments 
are looking to demonstrate results and to be more accountable to their core 
constituencies. Increasingly, evaluations are being conducted by national 
and subnational line ministries and government bodies set up to lead a 
national evaluation agenda, such as the National Council for Evaluation of 
Social Development Policies (CONEVAL) in Mexico and the Department of 
Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in South Africa. Evidence from 
impact evaluations is increasingly informing budgetary allocations made by 
congresses at the national level. In systems where programs are judged 
based on hard evidence and ﬁ nal outcomes, programs with a strong evi-
dence base will be able to thrive, while programs lacking such proof will 
ﬁ nd it more diffi  cult to sustain funding.  
Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and regional develop-
ment banks, as well as national development agencies, donor governments, 
and philanthropic institutions, are also demanding more and better evi-
dence on the eff ective use of development resources. Such evidence is 
required for accountability to those lending or donating the money, as well 
as for decision making about where best to allocate scarce development 
resources. The number of impact evaluations undertaken by development 
institutions has risen sharply in recent years. To illustrate, ﬁ gure 14.1 depicts 
the number of impact evaluations completed or active at the World Bank 
between 2004 and 2010, by region. The positive trend is likely to continue.
A growing number of institutions dedicated primarily to the production 
of high-quality impact evaluations are emerging, including ones from the 
academic arena, including the Poverty Action Lab, Innovations for Poverty 
Action, and the Center of Evaluation for Global Action, and independent 
agencies that support impact evaluations, such as the International Initia-
tive for Impact Evaluation. A number of impact evaluation–related asso-
ciations now bring together groups of evaluation practitioners and 
researchers and policy makers interested in the topic, including the Net-
work of Networks on Impact Evaluation and regional associations such as 
the African Evaluation Association and the Latin American and Caribbean 
Economics Association Impact Evaluation Network. All of these eff orts 
reﬂ ect the increasing importance of impact evaluation in international 
development policy.1
Given this growth in impact evaluation, whether you run evaluations for 
a living, contract impact evaluations, or use the results of impact evaluations 
for decision making, being conversant in the language of impact evaluation 
is an increasingly indispensable skill for any development practitioner. Rig-
orous evidence of the type generated through impact evaluations can be one 
of the drivers of development policy dialogue, providing the basis to support 
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or oppose investments in development programs and policies. Evidence 
from impact evaluations allows project managers to make informed deci-
sions on how to achieve outcomes more cost-eff ectively. Armed with the 
evidence from an impact evaluation, the policy maker has the job of closing 
the loop by feeding those results into the decision-making process. This 
type of evidence can inform debates, opinions, and ultimately, the human 
and monetary resource allocation decisions of governments, multilateral 
institutions, and donors. 
Evidence-based policy making is fundamentally about reprogramming 
budgets to expand cost-eff ective programs, curtail ineff ective ones, and 
introduce improvements to program designs based on the best available evi-
dence. Impact evaluation is not a purely academic undertaking. Impact 
evaluations are driven by the need for answers to policy questions that aff ect 
people’s lives daily. Decisions on how best to spend scarce resources on anti-
poverty programs, health, education, safety nets, microcredit, agriculture, 
and myriad other development initiatives have the potential to improve the 
welfare of people across the globe. It is vital that those decisions be made 
using the most rigorous evidence possible. 
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Note
1. For additional reading, see Savedoff , Levine, and Birdsall (2006).
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Italic indicates terms that are deﬁ ned in the glossary.
Activity. Actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, 
technical assistance, and other types of resources are mobilized to produce speciﬁ c 
outputs.
Alternative hypothesis. In impact evaluation, the alternative hypothesis is usually 
the hypothesis that the null hypothesis is false; in other words, that the intervention 
has an impact on outcomes.
Attrition. Attrition occurs when some units drop from the sample between one data 
collection round and another, for example, because migrants are not tracked. Attri-
tion is a case of unit nonresponse. Attrition can create bias in impact evaluations if it 
is correlated with treatment status.
Baseline. Preintervention, ex-ante. The situation prior to an intervention, against 
which progress can be assessed or comparisons made. Baseline data are collected 
before a program or policy is implemented to assess the “before” state.
Before-and-after comparison. Also known as “pre-post comparison” or “reﬂ exive 
comparison,” a before-and-after comparison attempts to establish the impact of a 
program by tracking changes in outcomes for program beneﬁ ciaries over time, using 
measurements before and after the program or policy is implemented.
Bias. The bias of an estimator is the diff erence between an estimator’s expectation 
and the true value of the parameter being estimated. In impact evaluation, this is the 
diff erence between the impact that is calculated and the true impact of the program.
Census data. Data that cover all units in the population of interest (universe). Con-
trast with survey data.
Cluster. A cluster is a group of units that are similar in one way or another. For exam-
ple, in a sampling of school children, children who attend the same school would 
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belong to a cluster because they share the same school facilities and teachers and live 
in the same neighborhood.
Cluster sample. A sample obtained by drawing a random sample of clusters, after 
which either all units in the selected clusters constitute the sample, or a number of 
units within each selected cluster is randomly drawn. Each cluster has a well-deﬁ ned 
probability of being selected, and units within a selected cluster also have a well-
deﬁ ned probability of being drawn.
Comparison group. Also known as a “control group.” A valid comparison group 
will have the same characteristics as the group of beneﬁ ciaries of the program (treat-
ment group), except that the units in the comparison group do not beneﬁ t from the 
program. Comparison groups are used to estimate the counterfactual.
Cost-benefi t analysis. Ex-ante calculations of total expected costs and beneﬁ ts, 
used to appraise or assess project proposals. Cost-beneﬁ t can be calculated ex-post 
in impact evaluations if the beneﬁ ts can be quantiﬁ ed in monetary terms and the cost 
information is available.  
Cost-effectiveness. Determining cost-eff ectiveness entails comparing similar 
interventions based on cost and eff ectiveness. For example, impact evaluations of 
various education programs allow policy makers to make more informed decisions 
about which intervention may achieve the desired objectives, given their particular 
context and constraints.
Counterfactual. The counterfactual is an estimate of what the outcome (Y) would 
have been for a program participant in the absence of the program (P). By deﬁ nition, 
the counterfactual cannot be observed. Therefore, it must be estimated using com-
parison groups.
Difference-in-differences. Also known as “double diff erence” or “DD.” Diff erence-
in-diff erences estimates the counterfactual for the change in outcome for the treat-
ment group by taking the change in outcome for the comparison group. This method 
allows us to take into account any diff erences between the treatment and compari-
son groups that are constant over time. The two diff erences are thus before and after, 
and between the treatment and comparison groups.
Effect. Intended or unintended change due directly or indirectly to an intervention
Estimator. In statistics, an estimator is a statistic (a function of the observable sam-
ple data) that is used to estimate an unknown population parameter; an estimate is 
the result from the actual application of the function to a particular sample of data.
Evaluation. Evaluations are periodic, objective assessments of a planned, ongoing, 
or completed project, program, or policy. Evaluations are used to answer speciﬁ c 
questions, often related to design, implementation, and results.
External validity. To have external validity means that the causal impact discovered 
in the impact evaluation can be generalized to the universe of all eligible units. For an 
evaluation to be externally valid, it is necessary that the evaluation sample be a rep-
resentative sample of the universe of eligible units.
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Follow-up survey. Also known as “postintervention” or “ex-post” survey. A sur-
vey that is ﬁ elded after the program has started, once the beneﬁ ciaries have bene-
ﬁ ted from it for some time. An impact evaluation can include several follow-up 
surveys.
Hawthorne effect. The “Hawthorne eff ect” occurs when the mere fact that units 
are being observed makes them behave diff erently. 
Hypothesis. A hypothesis is a proposed explanation for an observable phenome-
non. See also, null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis. 
Impact evaluation. An impact evaluation is an evaluation that tries to make a causal 
link between a program or intervention and a set of outcomes. An impact evaluation 
tries to answer the question of whether a program is responsible for changes in the 
outcomes of interest. Contrast with process evaluation.
Indicator. An indicator is a variable that measures a phenomenon of interest to the 
evaluator. The phenomenon can be an input, an output, an outcome, a characteristic, 
or an attribute.
Inputs. The ﬁ nancial, human, and material resources used for the development 
intervention.
Instrumental variable. An instrumental variable is a variable that helps identify the 
causal impact of a program when participation in the program is partly determined 
by the potential beneﬁ ciaries. A variable must have two characteristics to qualify as 
a good instrumental variable: (1) it must be correlated with program participation, 
and (2) it may not be correlated with outcomes Y (apart from through program par-
ticipation) or with unobserved variables.
Intention-to-treat, or ITT, estimator. The ITT estimator is the straight diff erence 
in the outcome indicator Y for the group to whom we off ered treatment and the same 
indicator for the group to whom we did not off er treatment. Contrast with treat-
ment-on-the-treated.
Internal validity. To say that an impact evaluation has internal validity means that it 
uses a valid comparison group, that is, a comparison group that is a valid estimate of 
the counterfactual. 
Intra-cluster correlation. Intra-cluster correlation is correlation (or similarity) in 
outcomes or characteristics between units that belong to the same cluster. For exam-
ple, children that attend the same school would typically be similar or correlated in 
terms of their area of residence or socioeconomic background.
John Henry effect. The John Henry eff ect happens when comparison units work 
harder to compensate for not being off ered a treatment. When one compares 
treated units to those “harder-working” comparison units, the estimate of the 
impact of the program will be biased; that is, we will estimate a smaller impact of 
the program than the true impact that we would ﬁ nd if the comparison units did 
not make the additional eff ort.
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Matching. Matching is a nonexperimental evaluation method that uses large data 
sets and heavy statistical techniques to construct the best possible comparison group 
for a given treatment group.
Minimum desired effect. The minimum change in outcomes that would justify the 
investment that has been made in an intervention, counting not only the cost of the 
program and the beneﬁ ts that it provides, but also the opportunity cost of not invest-
ing funds in an alternative intervention. The minimum desired eff ect is an input for 
power calculations; that is, evaluation samples need to be large enough to detect at 
least the minimum desired eff ect with suffi  cient power. 
Monitoring. Monitoring is the continuous process of collecting and analyzing infor-
mation to assess how well a project, program, or policy, is performing. It relies pri-
marily on administrative data to track performance against expected results, make 
comparisons across programs, and analyze trends over time. Monitoring usually 
tracks inputs, activities, and outputs, though occasionally it includes outcomes as 
well. Monitoring is used to inform day-to-day management and decisions. 
Nonresponse. That data are missing or incomplete for some sampled units consti-
tutes nonresponse. Unit nonresponse arises when no information is available for 
some sample units, that is, when the actual sample is diff erent than the planned sam-
ple. Attrition is one form of unit nonresponse. Item nonresponse occurs when data 
are incomplete for some sampled units at a point in time. Nonresponse may cause 
bias in evaluation results if it is associated with treatment status. 
Null hypothesis. A null hypothesis is a hypothesis that might be falsiﬁ ed on the 
basis of observed data. The null hypothesis typically proposes a general or default 
position. In impact evaluation, the default position is usually that there is no diff er-
ence between the treatment and control groups, or in other words, that the interven-
tion has no impact on outcomes. 
Outcome. Can be intermediate or ﬁ nal. An outcome is a result of interest that 
comes about through a combination of supply and demand factors. For example, if 
an intervention leads to a greater supply of vaccination services, then actual vac-
cination numbers would be an outcome, as they depend not only on the supply of 
vaccines but also on the behavior of the intended beneﬁ ciaries: do they show up at 
the service point to be vaccinated? Final or long-term outcomes are more distant 
outcomes. The distance can be interpreted in a time dimension (it takes a long time 
to get to the outcome) or a causal dimension (many causal links are needed to 
reach the outcome).
Output. The products, capital goods, and services that are produced (supplied) 
directly by an intervention. Outputs may also include changes that result from the 
intervention that are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.
Population of interest. The group of units that are eligible to receive an interven-
tion or treatment. The population of interest is sometimes called the universe.
Power. The power is the probability of detecting an impact if one has occurred. 
The power of a test is equal to 1 minus the probability of a type II error, ranging 
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from 0 to 1. Popular levels of power are 0.8 and 0.9. High levels of power are more 
conservative and decrease the likelihood of a type II error. An impact evaluation 
has high power if there is a low risk of not detecting real program impacts, that is, 
of committing a type II error.
Power calculations. Power calculations indicate the sample size required for an 
evaluation to detect a given minimum desired eff ect. Power calculations depend on 
parameters such as power (or the likelihood of type II error), signiﬁ cance level, 
variance, and intra-cluster correlation of the outcome of interest.
Process evaluation. A process evaluation is an evaluation that tries to establish the 
level of quality or success of the processes of a program; for example, adequacy of the 
administrative processes, acceptability of the program beneﬁ ts, clarity of the infor-
mation campaign, internal dynamics of implementing organizations, their policy 
instruments, their service delivery mechanisms, their management practices, and 
the linkages among these. Contrast with impact evaluation.
Random sample. The best way to avoid a biased or unrepresentative sample is to 
select a random sample. A random sample is a probability sample in which each 
individual in the population being sampled has an equal chance (probability) of 
being selected. 
Randomized assignment or randomized control designs. Randomized 
assignment is considered the most robust method for estimating counterfactuals 
and is often referred to as the “gold standard” of impact evaluation. With this 
method, beneﬁ ciaries are randomly selected to receive an intervention, and each 
has an equal chance of receiving the program. With large-enough sample sizes, the 
process of random assignment ensures equivalence, in both observed and unob-
served characteristics, between the treatment and control groups, thereby address-
ing any selection bias.
Randomized offering. Randomized off ering is a method for identifying the impact 
of an intervention. With this method, beneﬁ ciaries are randomly off ered an inter-
vention, and each has an equal chance of receiving the program. Although the pro-
gram administrator can randomly select the units to whom to off er the treatment 
from the universe of eligible units, the administrator cannot obtain perfect compli-
ance: she or he cannot force any unit to participate or accept the treatment and can-
not refuse to let a unit participate if the unit insists on doing so. In the randomized 
off ering method, the randomized off ering of the program is used as an instrumental 
variable for actual program participation.
Randomized promotion. Randomized promotion is a method similar to random-
ized off ering. Instead of random selection of the units to whom the treatment is 
off ered, units are randomly selected for promotion of the treatment. In this way, the 
program is left open to every unit.
Randomized selection methods. “Randomized selection method” is a group 
name for several methods that use random assignment to identify the counterfactual. 
Among them are randomized assignment of the treatment, randomized off ering of the 
treatment, and randomized promotion.
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Regression. In statistics, regression analysis includes any techniques for modeling 
and analyzing several variables, when the focus is on the relationship between a 
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. In impact evaluation, 
regression analysis helps us understand how the typical value of the outcome indica-
tor Y (dependent variable) changes when the assignment to treatment or comparison 
group P (independent variable) is varied, while the characteristics of the beneﬁ cia-
ries (other independent variables) are held ﬁ xed.
Regression discontinuity design (RDD). Regression discontinuity design is a 
nonexperimental evaluation method. It is adequate for programs that use a continu-
ous index to rank potential beneﬁ ciaries and that have a threshold along the index 
that determines whether potential beneﬁ ciaries receive the program or not. The 
cutoff  threshold for program eligibility provides a dividing point between the treat-
ment and comparison groups.
Results chain. The results chain sets out the program logic that explains how the 
development objective is to be achieved. It shows the links from inputs to activities, 
to outputs, to results.
Sample. In statistics, a sample is a subset of a population. Typically, the population 
is very large, making a census or a complete enumeration of all the values in the 
population impractical or impossible. Instead, researchers can select a representa-
tive subset of the population (using a sampling frame) and collect statistics on the 
sample; these may be used to make inferences or to extrapolate to the population. 
This process is referred to as sampling.
Sampling. Process by which units are drawn from the sampling frame built from the 
population of interest (universe). Various alternative sampling procedures can be 
used. Probability sampling methods are the most rigorous because they assign a 
well-deﬁ ned probability for each unit to be drawn. Random sampling, stratiﬁ ed ran-
dom sampling, and cluster sampling are all probability sampling methods. Nonprob-
abilistic sampling (such as purposive or convenience sampling) can create sampling 
errors.
Sampling frame. The most comprehensive list of units in the population of interest 
(universe) that can be obtained. Diff erences between the sampling frame and the 
population of interest create a coverage (sampling) bias. In the presence of coverage 
bias, results from the sample do not have external validity for the entire population of 
interest.
Selection bias. Selection bias occurs when the reasons for which an individual par-
ticipates in a program are correlated with outcomes. This bias commonly occurs 
when the comparison group is ineligible or self-selects out of treatment.
Signifi cance level. The signiﬁ cance level is usually denoted by the Greek symbol, 
α (alpha). Popular levels of signiﬁ cance are 5 percent (0.05), 1 percent (0.01), and 0.1 
percent (0.001). If a test of signiﬁ cance gives a p value lower than the α level, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Such results are informally referred to as “statistically signiﬁ -
cant.” The lower the signiﬁ cance level, the stronger the evidence required. Choosing 
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the level of signiﬁ cance is an arbitrary task, but for many applications, a level of 
5 percent is chosen for no better reason than that it is conventional.
Spillover effect. Also known as contamination of the comparison group. A spillover 
eff ect occurs when the comparison group is aff ected by the treatment administered 
to the treatment group, even though the treatment is not administered directly to the 
comparison group. If the spillover eff ect on the comparison group is negative (that is, 
if they suff er because of the program), then the straight diff erence between outcomes 
in the treatment and comparison groups will yield an overestimation of the program 
impact. By contrast, if the spillover eff ect on the comparison group is positive (that 
is, they beneﬁ t), then it will yield an underestimation of the program impact.
Statistical power. The power of a statistical test is the probability that the test will 
reject the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true (that is, that it will 
not make a type II error). As power increases, the chances of a type II error decrease. 
The probability of a type II error is referred to as the false negative rate (β). There-
fore power is equal to 1 − β.
Stratifi ed sample. Obtained by dividing the population of interest (sampling frame) 
into groups (for example, male and female), and then drawing a random sample 
within each group. A stratiﬁ ed sample is a probabilistic sample: every unit in each 
group (or stratum) has the same probability of being drawn.
Survey data. Data that cover a sample of the population of interest. Contrast with 
census data.
Treatment group. Also known as the treated group or the intervention group. The 
treatment group is the group of units that beneﬁ ts from an intervention, versus the 
comparison group that does not.
Treatment-on-the-treated (effect of). Also known as the TOT estimator. The 
eff ect of treatment on the treated is the impact of the treatment on those units that 
have actually beneﬁ ted from the treatment. Contrast with intention-to-treat.
Type I error. Error committed when rejecting a null hypothesis even though the null 
hypothesis actually holds. In the context of an impact evaluation, a type I error is 
made when an evaluation concludes that a program has had an impact (that is, the 
null hypothesis of no impact is rejected), even though in reality the program had no 
impact (that is, the null hypothesis holds). The signiﬁ cance level determines the 
probability of committing a type I error. 
Type II error. Error committed when accepting (not rejecting) the null hypothesis 
even though the null hypothesis does not hold. In the context of an impact evalua-
tion, a type II error is made when concluding that a program has no impact (that is, 
the null hypothesis of no impact is not rejected) even though the program did have 
an impact (that is, the null hypothesis does not hold). The probability of committing 
a type II error is 1 minus the power level.
Variable. In statistical terminology, a variable is a symbol that stands for a value that 
may vary.
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" The aim of this book is to provide an accessible, comprehensive, and clear guide to impact evaluation. 
The material, ranging from motivating impact evaluation, to the advantages of diff erent methodolo-
gies, to power calculations and costs, is explained very clearly and the coverage is impressive. This 
book will become a much consulted and used guide and will aff ect policy making for years to come."
Orazio Attanasio, Professor of Economics, University College London; Director, Centre for 
the Evaluation of Development Policies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, United Kingdom 
" This is a valuable resource for those seeking to conduct impact evaluations in the developing world, 
covering both the conceptual and practical issues involved, and illustrated with examples from 
recent practice."
Michael Kremer, Gates Professor of Developing Societies, Department of Economics, 
Harvard University, United States
" The main ingredients for good public evaluations are (a) appropriate methodologies; (b) the ability 
to solve practical problems such as collecting data, working within low budgets, and writing the 
ﬁ nal report; and (c) accountable governments. This book not only describes solid technical method-
ologies for measuring the impact of public programs, but also provides several examples and takes 
us into the real world of implementing evaluations, from convincing policy makers to disseminating 
results. If more practitioners and policy makers read this handbook, we will have better policies and 
results in many countries. If governments improve accountability, the impact of this handbook 
would be even larger.”   
Gonzalo Hernández Licona, Executive Secretary, National Council for the Evaluation of Social 
Development Policy (CONEVAL), Mexico 
" I recommend this book as a clear and accessible guide to the challenging practical and technical issues 
faced in designing impact evaluations. It draws on material which has been tested in workshops 
across the world and should prove useful to practitioners, policy makers, and evaluators alike." 
Nick York, Head of the Evaluation Department, Department for International Development, 
United Kingdom
“ Knowledge is one of the most valuable assets for understanding the complex nature of the 
development process. Impact evaluation can contribute to ﬁ lling the gap between intuition and 
evidence to better inform policy making. This book, one of the tangible outputs of the Spanish 
Impact Evaluation Fund, equips human development practitioners with cutting-edge tools to 
produce evidence on which policies work and why. Because it enhances our ability to achieve 
results, we expect it to make a great diff erence in development practice.” 
Soraya Rodríguez Ramos, Secretary of State for International Cooperation, Spain
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